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The thesis charts the business history of the Royal Mint Refinery (RMR), a bullion 
refinery operated by the London merchant bank, N M Rothschild & Sons, between 
1852 and 1968. Through analysis of business records key events that changed the 
trading direction of the operation are identified: increased international competition, 
innovations and technological breakthroughs, diversification and expansion into light 
engineering, evolving administrative systems and management styles, changes in 
employer and worker relations, and the sale of the enterprise- set against a backdrop 
of international financial crises, two world wars, decolonisation and Britain’s 
changed relationship to Empire gold. 
 
Gold is a commodity like no other; in the twentieth century gold held a unique 
position at the heart of international relations and financial flows in monetary 
systems around the world.  Rothschild assumed an administrative monopoly of the 
London gold market; as agents to the Bank of England, Chair of the London Gold 
Fixing and the Bank’s varied business portfolio, which included a myriad of 
international investments. Ownership of RMR complemented and reinforced this 
position. Rothschild, through its connection to the refinery, gained access to and 
control over Empire gold, which in 1914 accounted for 70 per cent. of world output; 
the majority of which was shipped to London and treated at the Rothschild refinery. 
The ‘RMR’ brand was internationally recognised and accepted by Central Banks and 
private investors as good delivery. The profitability of the operation reflected the 
strong global demand for gold by jewellers, industrial sectors and investors; gold 
was considered a safe haven especially in times of economic crises or war. Post-1945 
London’s decline as a financial centre affected the future of RMR and the operation 
diverted into light engineering. The thesis links past with present; it charts the rise 
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This thesis charts the business history of the Royal Mint Refinery (RMR), a bullion 
refinery operated by the London merchant bank, N M Rothschild & Sons, between 
1852 and 1968. For centuries both the refining of gold and the minting of coins in 
England had been the responsibility of the Master of the Royal Mint, an office 
created in the sixteenth century. The Royal Mint itself had been located in the Tower 
of London from the late thirteenth to the early nineteenth century, until the demands 
of new steam press machinery necessitated a move into new premises at Tower Hill. 
Concerns and criticisms were frequently raised over the expense and the lack of 
accountability of the old contract style system of operation. These objections led to 
the establishment of a Royal Commission in 1848. Of the many recommendations 
made by the Commissioners, it is that relating to the treatment of unrefined gold 
entering the country which interests us here. The Commissioners proposed that this 
business should be put out to tender. 
 
     The prospect of taking on the refining business appealed to the Rothschild family 
in London. The responsibility for the negotiations fell to Anthony de Rothschild 
(1810-1876), one of the sons and business heirs of N M Rothschild who secured the 
lease from the Government in January 1852. The firm took full advantage of the gold 
rushes of California, from 1848, Australia, from 1851, and South Africa, from 1884. 
Gold refining facilities were improved and expanded in response to the arrival of 
African gold, and the silver refinery received constant supplies of demonetised coin 
from across Europe. 
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     Gold is a commodity like no other; in the twentieth century it held a unique 
position at the heart of international relations and financial flows in monetary 
systems around the world. It was the favoured commodity of the merchant bank N M 
Rothschild & Sons and complemented its business activities. Niall Ferguson, in The 
House of Rothschild, suggested that Rothschild was never ‘jacks–of-all-trades’.1 He 
described the preference of Rothschild as specialist in a number of select markets, 
the aim being to establish a ‘dominant role’ in each.2 Gold was one of Rothschild 
target areas. Over the course of two centuries Rothschild, once it established itself as 
agents to the Bank of England, assumed an administrative monopoly over the 
London gold market; it chaired the London Gold Fixing between1919 and 2004. 
This was in addition to the varied business portfolio it built, which enhanced its 
myriad of global investments. Rothschild benefited from its connection to the Royal 
Mint Refinery as it provided the merchant bank access to and control over much of 
the gold production within the British Empire, which in 1914 amounted to a massive 
70 per cent of the total world gold production.3 The ‘RMR’ brand was 
internationally recognised and accepted by central banks and private investors as 
‘good delivery’. The profitability of the operation reflected the strong global demand 
for gold by jewellers, industrial sectors and investors; in times of economic crises or 
war gold was considered a safe haven. Silver business at the Refinery was sporadic, 
and the high point came in 1934. Prior to the First World War gold was part of the 
everyday economy. However, by 1919 most gold had been taken out of daily 
circulation.  
 
                                                
1Niall Ferguson, The House of Rothschild, Money’s Prophets, 1797-1848, Vol. 1 (New York: Penguin 
Group, 1998), p. 276 
2 Ibid.  
3 C. R. Whittlesey, ‘The Gold Dilemma’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 51 (1937), 581-603 ( p. 
598). 
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     In the uncertain environment between the wars the London refining industry 
faced considerable problems including continued disruptions in the supply of metals. 
The greatest threat came after the establishment of the Rand Refinery in South 
Africa in 1922, the gold producers refined their own gold and business in London 
almost disappeared. Following the international financial crises from 1929, and the 
1931 abandonment by many countries of the gold standard, gold returned to London 
attracted by the safe haven it provided. The London refining industry profited from 
the so-called ‘gold rush’ of 1932, when the price of gold was allowed to find its own 
level, which encouraged the sale and purchase of pre-treated gold, jewellery and 
coin. The scrap metal was treated by the London refiners and returned to bullion bars 
to be sold in the market. 
 
     At the outbreak of the Second World War the bullion trade was severely limited 
by the Bank of England’s supervision. Although jewellery sales were almost 
forbidden but industrial demand was strong for gold and silver based products. The 
primary function of the Royal Mint Refinery was to refine the precious metals silver 
and gold and to process these and also certain base metals into the materials needed 
in commerce and industry. War was the catalyst for change; the plant was turned 
over to the manufacture of munitions and with financial assistance from the Ministry 
of Aircraft Production a ‘shadow’ factory was established at Tring. Additionally, the 
scope of activities grew. Many significant improvements in equipment and in 
technique were introduced. Both operations produced many and varied products. 
One of the company’s major production resources was its modern equipment for the 
rolling of sheet and strip and coated wire drawing. From the refining of the pure 
metal to its casting, rolling, annealing, final inspection the strictest care was taken to 
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ensure perfection. Much of the quality and reliability of the finished products stems 
from the degree of skill and experience put into the primary stages of work: 
smelting, refining and the earlier mechanical processes of casting and extrusion, 
rolling and drawing. Most of these processes were carried out on traditional 
principles, but many of the precious metals and the less common metals required 
treatment by individual methods. 
 
     With the end of war came a period of alignment for the firm and reorganisation. 
Management consultants were engaged and the firm set a course for recovery. The 
Tring operation continued and found a niche for the production of lipstick cases and 
ticket machines. The Royal Mint Refinery struggled to return to its pre-war primary 
operation, hindered by continued government restrictions that applied to gold and the 
continued closure of the London gold market. In 1954 as the gold market re-opened 
work returned to the Refinery. However, a new threat emerged and easy access to 
gold ore slowly disappeared. Hit by the decolonisation of countries across Africa the 
outlook for the future of the Royal Mint Refinery was bleak as new overseas native 
refineries were established. 
 
     In addition the Rothschild venture faced growing competition from engineering 
firms based in the United States and continental suppliers of metal strip and plating 
wire. Rothschild, rather than compete, opted to sell this part of the operation to its 
competitors. By the mid 1960s there was a return of the main business at the Royal 
Mint Refinery to the treatment of gold and silver. Tring continued to produce 
specialist items. The opening of the state refinery in Ghana in 1966 was the final 
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push Rothschild needed to divest themselves of the business and they approached an 
American firm, Engelhard, who were keen to establish a gold refining operation in 
Europe. A sale was agreed and the refinery closed in 1968. By 1974 the operation at 
Tring had also been sold.  
 
The main research question I have addressed relates to the performance of the Royal 
Mint Refinery and the long and short term challenges that led to its sale. At various 
points in time the Refinery was on the brink of closure. Throughout the late 
nineteenth century to the 1960s the London refining industry were exposed to and 
had to contend with consistent and considerable change and challenges. 
Predominantly the threat came from external forces rather than a failure by 
Rothschild to manage resources correctly. The thesis also examines how Rothschild 
employed monopolies and embraced advances in technology to protect the 
profitability of the venture. 
 
     The thesis also examines the advantages, both real and perceived, afforded to N 
M Rothschild & Sons in operating the Royal Mint Refinery. How and in what ways 
did the merchant bank profit from its association with this venture, which was one of 
the less well known activities with which Rothschild was associated. The study 
reveals how Rothschild distanced itself from the industrial operation, but, once 
needed it actively promoted its relationship to the refining of gold. It will be argued 
that at various points the Royal Mint Refinery enhanced the prestige and confidence 
in Rothschild through its control and access to gold. Consequently it will be shown 
that Rothschild’s connection to gold projected the firm’s position as confidant to the 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
13 
 
Bank of England. Rothschild gained a global reputation for treating and handling 
gold, which in turn facilitated its pivotally important role as chair of the Gold Fixing. 
 
The main problem in writing any company history is to place the story of the 
particular business concern in its proper context. The main battle faced by the study 
was locating information to discover what actually happened to the business. Whilst 
Niall Ferguson had produced the official history of N M Rothschild & Sons in 1998, 
little attention was given to the refining operation. No official published history of 
the Royal Mint Refinery has been either commissioned or published. The only trace 
of the venture was in short reminiscences published by former employees in the 
merchant bank’s annual pensioner’s newsletters. After basic background reading and 
bibliography I received some direction from the Director of The Rothschild Archive 
(RAL), Ms Aspey, and the archive team at New Court in the City of London. 
 
     As a springboard for researching the thesis I was directed to a series of un-
catalogued and previously un-examined business records generated at the Royal 
Mint Refinery since its inception in 1852 located at The Rothschild Archive. Many 
of the packages, wrapped in brown paper and tied with string for protection, had not 
been opened since they were first placed into storage. The collection of books, 
letters, accounts, minutes and other records accumulated in the normal course of 
business, and documents dealing with property of business and such matters as their 
relations with other firms and with their own staff. After several months spent 
examining the contents a picture of the framework and transformation of the 
business gradually began to emerge. 




     In addition to source material of records created by the business itself, I also drew 
on a wide and highly diverse group of materials external to the business in order to 
provide broader context of the general economic climate at various points in time 
and the varying fortunes of the industry as a whole. For this reason a copy of the 
unpublished history of Johnson Matthey & Company located at the Goldsmiths’ Hall 
Library was consulted. I also approached Johnson Matthey to gain access to other 
archival material in their possession. Whilst I was not allowed access to any 
materials I was provided with a copy of the unpublished history of the firm, as held 
by Goldsmiths’ Hall. Information held in the archives of the Bank of England 
(BEA), government agency records located at The National Archives (TNA) of the 
UK and reports in the press was consulted, which gave guidance of the performance 
of the company in relation to its immediate rivals. In addition these records provided 
knowledge of the varying fortunes of export markets of those countries from which 
raw material was drawn from and the changing domestic circumstances of foreign 
competitors. 
 
     Staff at N M Rothschild & Sons, past and present, was also approached. Directed 
by Ms Aspey, and the pensioners’ welfare officer, a number of employees were 
identified who generously provided some personal insight into the bullion business 
at Rothschild and the refining venture in London and factory at Tring during the 
final stages of the operations. Many shared memories of time spent working for the 
Rothschild family and tasks they performed. I was also able to speak to one of the 
Partners, Leopold de Rothschild, and have drawn upon some of his recollections. A 
small oral history project was also conducted. One drawback in the timing of the 
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research project was that most employees directly connected to the Refinery had 
died. However, I was able to cast the net further and contact a number of 
descendants in order to fill in some gaps that appeared in my research. 
 
     Before the paperwork explosion of recent years the average small or medium 
sized business created only a tiny volume of records and the chances of their survival 
are consequently even less.4 At various points in time destruction notices were issued 
at Rothschild to free up space for incoming records. In 1963 a destruction notice was 
issued for a selected group of papers relating to the Refinery between 1935 and 
1960, marked as ‘offering little or no further use to the bank’.5 Many businesses, 
especially banks, regard the records arising out of the service provided to their 
customers as confidential. I have been fortunate that I have been allowed full access 
to all records relating to the business. The normal closure for researchers is 1945. 
Due to the collaborative nature of the project I was able to negotiate an extension to 
the period to 1974. In return the thesis was offered to the business for reading and 
comment prior to submission as it remains an active business.  
 
     As surviving records at The Rothschild Archive were incomplete I turned to 
original business transactions and material from quality sources. Despite the 
important role performed by its members the London refining industry received little 
attention from scholars; Seyd, White, and Kettle are amongst the few that provide an 
                                                
4 John Orbell, A guide to tracing the history of a business (Hants: Gower Publishing Company 
Limited, 1987), p. 10. 
5 The Rothschild Archive London (hereafter RAL), 148/37/1, ‘Royal Mint Refinery, Archives’, 6 Sep 
1963. 
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account of tasks performed by the industry.6 Secondary sources tend to have been 
produced by a narrow but well informed group of authors, generally made up of 
contemporaries, associates and former employees of the industry which offered a 
varied insight into refining operations.7 Reference to the practice of refining is also 
located in literature pertaining to gold, althoughit  generally contains no more than a 
cursory note.8 These have been supplemented by published and unpublished 
company histories whenever available. The lack of coverage of the industry in 
London extends to the ‘traditional’ literature on the activities of the Bank of England 
(the Bank); authors failed to acknowledge that during the early 1920s the Bank built 
and operated the St Luke’s Refinery in London.9 One reason for the oversight of the 
Bank’s involvement with the ill-fated St Luke’s Refinery may be due to the swift 
passing of the external threat, which prompted the formation of the venture. 
However, perhaps the most compelling reason for the lack of coverage thus far is the 
veil of secrecy and mystery that surrounded the London gold refining industry as 
                                                
6See for example: Ernest Seyd, Bullion & Foreign Exchanges (London: Effingham Wilson, 1868); 
Benjamin White, Gold, Its Place in the Economy of Mankind (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 
1936); Brian Kettle, Gold (London: Graham Trotman, 1982).  
7 See, for example: Donald Clark, Gold Refining (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd. 
1909);Timothy Green, The World of Today (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 1973); —. The New World of 
Gold (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982); —. ‘Central Bank Gold Reserves, A Historical 
Perspective since 1845’ World Gold Council, Study No. 23 (London: 1999); —. The Ages of Gold 
(London: GFMS Ltd., 2007);—. The History of the London Good Delivery Gold List 1750-2010 
(London: London Bullion Market Association, 2010); —. ‘Precious Heritage, The three hundred years 
of Mocatta & Goldsmid’ (Unpublished, 1978); Donald Mc Donald and Leslie B. Hunt, A History of 
Platinum and its Allied Metals (London: Private publication,1982); Donald McDonald, The History of 
Johnson Matthey and Company: Volume One, The Years of Building 1860-1914 (London: Private 
publication, 1968);  —.The History of Johnson Matthey and Company: Volume Two, The Years of 
Change 1914-1939 (London: Private publication, 1974); Donald McDonald and Philip G. Smyrk, The 
History of Johnson Matthey and Company: Volume Three, The Years of World War Two 1939-1945 
(London: Private publication, 1984); T. Rose Kirke and W.A.C. Newman, The Metallurgy of Gold 
(London: Charles Griffin & Co. Ltd., 1937); Philip G. Smyrk, The History of Johnson Matthey and 
Company: Volume Four, The Years of Post-War Expansion at Home and Abroad 1946-1966 
(London: Private publication, 1991); Ronald F.Wilson, Two Hundred Precious Metal Years, A 
History of the Sheffield Smelting Company Limited 1760-1960 (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1960). 
8 For example:William M. Clarke, The golden thread: world financial centres and the gold 
connection (London: Sweet and Maxwell Ltd., 2001); Paul Einzig, International Gold Movements 
(London: Macmillan, 1929); Rae Weston, A World Survey (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1983). 
9 For example: John Clapham, The Bank of England: A History, Volume 11, 1797-1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1944); John Giuseppi, The Bank of England, A History from its 
Foundation in 1694 (London: Evans Brothers Limited, 1966); Richard S. Sayers, The Bank of 
England, 1891-1944, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
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much of the daily operations was performed behind closed doors, for reasons of 
security and the protection of secrets in the treatment process, which the Refiner 
‘jealously and carefully’ kept to himself. 10 
  
     Periodic literature by Timothy Green provided a rich source of information about 
the history of gold, markets and players. Green’s history of Mocatta & Goldsmid 
was a particularly crucial source for constructing the early history of the London 
gold market. Green was approachable and generously directed me to other source 
that proved useful. In particular printed material the annual bullion reports of Samuel 
Montagu, Sharps Pixley and Mocatta & Goldsmid located at the LSE Library. In 
addition I have utilised Chairman’s Statements and newspaper reports. Throughout 
the thesis appropriate literature has been utilised for each chapter making specific 
reference to events. In each case considerable background knowledge was called for 
to examine how external processes facilitated the transformation of the market. 
Chosen literature provided context and background information and helped support 
the decision making process by Rothschild at a particular point in time. Through 
these I constructed a broad history of the Royal Mint Refinery. 
 
The story illustrated the relationship Rothschild had to gold. Few business histories 
offer a better understanding of the gold market than that of N M Rothschild & Sons. 
The merchant banks involvement in the gold industry stretches back over 200 years. 
Gold was the main commodity the bank traded in and it specialised in mining 
investment, transporting, insurance, refining, price fixing and the sale of the precious 
                                                
10 Seyd, Bullion & Foreign Exchanges, p. 198. 
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metal. The thesis links past with present; it charts the rise and fall of the refining 
operation and the pursuit of profitability.  
 
     The thesis explores in historical terms how decisions were taken at particular 
moments in time. The business was complex and is operations were challenging for 
me to understand. Nevertheless a number of themes emerged from research into the 
Refinery: The dilemma Rothschild faced was the need to balance heavy investment 
against the return it received from the operation. The research also offered an insight 
into Rothschild business methods and relations with the workforce. In addition the 
strategies employed by Rothschild to limit competition are presented. It illuminates 
conditions in which the business operated and offered a view of the business from a 
well informed position. Through analysis of business records key events that 
changed the trading direction of the operation are identified: increased international 
competition, difficulties attracting gold to London, innovations and technological 
breakthroughs, diversification and expansion into light engineering, evolving 
administrative systems and management styles, changes in employer and worker 
relations, and the sale of the enterprise- set against a backdrop of international 
financial crises, two world wars, Britain’s changed relationship to Empire gold and 
the effects of decolonisation. 
 
      The historical tale in many ways presents an overview of the political economic 
history of the London gold market. The Royal Mint Refinery offers a window onto 
wider international affairs and thus provides an indirect history of world gold market 
and of the wider political tensions. In spite of the wealth of interest in gold 
transactions it is remarkable how little is known about the supply-side. The pages 
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that follow address this. Information about bullion brokers and refineries operating 
in London provide crucial insights into the business activities of the firms and their 
social structure.  
 
The history of the Royal Mint Refinery falls into three distinct periods. The first 
from 1852 to 1918 relates to the establishment and unrivalled position the venture 
held. The second between1919 to 1948 represents an era of turmoil and readjustment 
as the business was subjected to increased international competition, recurring 
international economic crises, and the disturbance and turmoil of two world wars. 
The third and final period from 1949 to 1968 marked the modernisation and 
diversification of the venture before the enterprise was sold at the end of 1967. Due 
to limitations on word count I would like to clarify that an overview of the first 
period have been provided in chapter one and two. The main study centres on the 
second period and form chapters three to seven, and an overview of the third period 
is provided in chapter eight. Conclusions will be discussed in the final chapter. Each 
chapter discusses the events that affected the business at a specific point in time, 
with the exception of chapter 2, which provides an overview of the technological 
advances at the Refinery from its establishment to the outbreak of war in 1939, a 
chronological approach was chosen.  
 
     Chapter 2 introduces and discusses the operational side of the Royal Mint 
Refinery. The circumstances of the government lease granted in 1852 to Anthony de 
Rothschild. It charts the steady rise in business at the Refinery and examines the 
modernisation of the venture. Apparatus and techniques employed improvements to 
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make the venture more profitable and able to cope with increased production of 
precious metals requiring treatment. Eyewitness accounts and photographic evidence 
have been utilised to describe the working environment and layout of the Refinery. 
 
     Chapter 3 discusses the legacy of World War 1, which marked a turning point in 
the history of the Royal Mint Refinery. In 1919 the Royal Mint Refinery was 
exposed to greater competition as it was announced that the Transvaal Chamber of 
Mines was to establish a native refinery, the Rand Refinery, in South Africa. The 
new ventured posed a direct challenge to the survival of the London refining 
industry. The chapter considers reactions to the news in London and the methods of 
market manipulation introduced by the Bank of England in an attempt to ensure that 
gold continued to be sent to the London market.  
 
     Chapter 4 focuses on the immediate impact of Britain’s return to the gold 
standard in 1925. Legislation fixed gold at the pre-war price of $4.26 per ounce. The 
fixed price placed additional stains on relations between London and South African 
gold producers. Gold sales were price-sensitive and shipment of gold by-passed 
London attracted to New York in pursuit of higher profits on offer. The fixed price 
did nothing to inspire investment in the South African industry and stifled gold 
production. Operating costs and profit margins suffered. The void left by the 
dwindling gold shipments to London was filled by increased levels of silver that 
required treatment. Unfortunately it was not long before the treatment of silver went 
the same way as gold. Treatment of both precious metals at the Royal Mint Refinery 
dropped to an all time low as the price of silver plummeted. An improvement in gold 
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treatment began at the Royal Mint Refinery following the Wall Street Crash in 1929. 
London became a safe haven for gold. Further improvement was made in 1931 as 
many countries abandoned the gold standard the constraints imposed by the fixed 
price disappeared.  
 
     Chapter 5 considers the impact from the rise in price of gold following the 
abandonment of the gold standard in 1931. The increased price of gold ushered in a 
period of exceptional activity in London. The London refining industry benefitted as 
shipments of gold returned to London. In 1932 the refineries had a steady trade in the 
melting of pre-owned gold, scrap gold and coins cast into bullion bars and offered 
for sale in the market. Staff at the Royal Mint Refinery worked around the clock to 
deal with the ‘gold rush’. The chapter charts the additional strain placed upon the 
business. The volume of work meant mistakes were made and allegations of fraud 
were brought by one customer. Business slowed down in 1934 with the introduction 
of the United States fixed price of gold at $35 ounce. However, gold soon returned to 
London as the new price stimulated gold production and new discoveries in East and 
West Africa, which benefited the Royal Mint Refinery 
  
     Chapter 6 examines a busy phase in the history of the Royal Mint Refinery. In 
1937 the introduction of Rolling Plant extended the range of products manufactured 
by the venture. Faced with the prospect of war, treatment of gold and silver at the 
Refinery reduced and gave way to the production of munitions. As the demand for 
munitions increased so the scale and pace of work intensified. It was up to 
Rothschild to ensure its workforce remained on task and motivated. The precarious 
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location of the Refinery, on the edge of the City close to the docks, meant once 
enemy air attacks on London began work was frequently interrupted. The decision 
was made, with financial assistance from the Ministry of Aircraft Production, to 
establish a shadow factory at Tring. In 1941 the bulk of the operation and workforce 
transferred to the new site at Tring and for the remainder of the war operated in the 
relative safety of the Buckinghamshire countryside. In London, a small workforce 
remained at the Refinery that dealt with small amounts of gold for industrial use, and 
later in 1943 produced small gold bars for export under special licence on behalf of 
the Bank of England. The period under review ends in 1944 as Rothschild faced the 
problems of readjustment in the post-war era. 
 
     Chapter 7 explores the transition of the Royal Mint Refinery from trading in war 
to peace. Hit by the scaling back of Government munitions contracts and bound by 
the continued war-time restrictions imposed on industry, the management at 
Rothschild had the task of seeking out markets that required new products which 
could be manufactured at the Refinery in London and factory in Tring. The period of 
transition proved a turbulent time for both operations; strict financial controls were 
put in place and the services of a commercial sales agent engaged. Either of the sites 
could have failed. However, by 1948 both had been transformed into viable 
commercial concerns with a secure outlook. 
 
     Chapter 8 summarises the third and final period in the history of the Royal Mint 
Refinery. It examines how and why the venture was dismantled. It begins with a 
review of the trading position of the operation during the first half of the 1950s; a 
period in which profits steadily increased, the Gold Fix returned to Rothschild and 
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the London gold market reopened. However, by 1955 the outlook for changed and 
decline set in. The 1960s were a period in which increased competition from US and 
European markets, the effects of decolonisation and independence of African states 
impacted on the business operation. The options open to Rothschild are examined. 
Finally, the sale of the Refinery and the eventual sale of the factory at Tring are 
discussed. 
 
     Chapter 9 provides a summary of the thesis and conclusions are presented. 
Britain’s changed relationship to gold is also discussed and the transformation of the 
London gold market and the new role for gold. I discuss why Rothschild finally sold 
the business in 1967 and how it maintained its relationship to gold through the firm’s 
chairing of the daily Gold Fixing. Whilst the physical handling of gold ended 
Rothschild projected its position to gold through the Gold Fixing.  
 
From the outset I would like to explain the terminology used to talk about each entity 
in order to limit any confusion. When discussing the business operations of ‘N M 
Rothschild & Sons’ and the ‘Royal Mint Refinery’ the following terms are used 
throughout the study ‘Rothschild’ ‘the firm’ ‘Rothschild refinery’ ‘the merchant 
bank’ ‘operation’ and ‘venture’. ‘Partners’ makes reference to family members 
actively working at the bank (Appendix 1). A list of Managers at the Royal Mint 
Refinery has been provided (Appendix 2). When I speak of the London gold market 
I refer to all basis of gold trading in London and means the Gold Fixing and over the 
counter transactions. It also refers to the organisation of five companies formed to 
oversee the operation of the gold market in London. Reference to trading in the City 
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of London is often abbreviated to ‘the City’. The Bank of England is often referred 
to as ‘the Bank’. Johnson Matthey & Company is generally referred to as Johnson 
Matthey. Throughout the thesis pre-decimal currency (sterling), pounds, shillings 
and pence(£ s d) is used. A guide of weights and measurements applied to gold is 
provided (Appendix 3). Estimated world gold production, 1887-1968, are provided 
(Appendix 4). Throughout the thesis, unless stated otherwise, an ounce refers to 
‘fine’ gold. 
 




The early years at Royal Mint Street, 1852-1938. 
 
This chapter introduces the operational side of the Royal Mint Refinery. During the 
115 years that Rothschild operated the Refinery its main business premises were 
located at 19 Royal Mint Street and adjacent land. At various stages additional sites 
were also utilised; Wood Street (1897), the Old Silk Mill at Tring (1941), and the 
James Royce Works at Chertsey, Surrey (1943). Explanations for the additional sites 
will be dealt with chronologically throughout the thesis. The chapter provides an 
overview of the early period for the business, how it was established and the 
modernisation, improvements and technological advances that took place. The 
character of the venture is explored through written testament and images and 
provides an insight into the daily activities of the operation. The review ends in 
1938, just as the Royal Mint Refinery entered a new phase of modernisation in 
preparation for the production of munitions and the establishment of a shadow 
factory at Tring (discussed further in chapter 6).  
 
For centuries both the refining of gold and the minting of coins in England had been 
the responsibilities of the Master of the Royal Mint, an office created in the sixteenth 
century. The Mint itself had been located in the Tower of London from the late 
thirteenth to the early nineteenth century, until the demands of new steam press 
machinery necessitated a move into new premises a short distance away at Tower 
Hill. In 1806 work commenced on the new purpose built structure, designed by 
James Johnson and finished by his successor Robert Smirke. The new site was 
located in Royal Mint Street, formally part of Rosemary Lane. Construction costs 
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were in excess of £300,000 and the main building was ‘handsome and dignified.’11 
Buildings to the rear of the main building housed new machinery and equipment. 
Accommodation for senior members of staff had been part of the original design 
remit. The original architect plans show that the refinery had been located to the left 
of the main building. The refinery chimney, erected to carry away the noxious gases 
produced by the refining process, towered over the three storey buildings that 
surrounded it. 
Figure 1. ‘Royal Mint, London’12 
 
 
     The occupation of the premises in Royal Mint Street by Rothschild formed part of 
the original lease agreement signed by Anthony de Rothschild on the 3 February 
1852. The property stood between the City of London and the East End. Transport 
links, the docks to the south and railways to the north, meant the Refinery was well 
placed to receive consignments of gold sent to London for treatment. The lease had 
previously been offered to refiners Johnson Matthey & Company, established in 
                                                
11 G. P. Dyer, The Royal Mint, An Illustrated History (Cardiff: Royal Mint, 1986), p. 27.  
12 ‘Royal Mint, London’, n.d., reproduced courtesy of the Royal Mint Museum. 
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1817 and located in Hatton Garden, but the firm declined the offer. Rothschild was 
charged a rent of £200 per annum which included all machinery at the premises. 
Under the terms of the contract the newly established Royal Mint Refinery was 
required to receive 100 lbs of precious metal consigned by the Master of the Mint 
and to return the correct quantity of refined metal within fourteen days.13 The 
contract also called for the erection of a boundary wall between the Royal Mint and 
the new Rothschild venture. Once constructed the wall sealed the Royal Mint 
operation and created a self-contained area for the Rothschild refinery with a 
separate courtyard and entrance. The decision to add the word ‘refinery’ to the 
previous title of the Royal Mint was a fortuitous one, affording an element of 
anonymity for Rothschild, whilst they also gained what would today be described as 
a world recognisable ‘brand’. 
 
     Donald Clark has observed that many English refiners adopted the French 
methods of refining.14 Certainly an interesting aspect of the new Rothschild venture 
was its Anglo-French nature. First of all Lionel de Rothschild, Anthony’s elder 
brother, took the advice of his uncle in Paris, Baron James, who already had 
experience of gold refining through a joint venture in Paris with a business partner 
called Michel Benoit Poisat.15 Lionel decided to work with Poisat in developing the 
London refinery. It is clear that the family felt that there were advantages as well as 
disadvantages to this sort of partnership. For Nat, the younger brother of Lionel and 
Anthony, who was by that time working in the Paris Office, observed that ‘you will 
                                                
13 RAL, 148/29, Draft for The Times, ‘Royal Mint Refinery Centenary’ (1952). 
14 Clark, Gold, p. 2.  
15 Ferguson, The House of Rothschild. The World’s Banker 1849-1999, Volume 2 (New York: 
Penguin Group, 1998), p. 70. 
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regret it if another firm go with it.’16 However, Nat also added a word of caution, as 
can be seen in this note to his brother Lionel: 
[Poisat] is a cunning old fox and much more interested than formerly … he 
has got plenty of money and likes adding to it. Nevertheless, he is a clever 
man and understands his business amazingly well. In a word, I think you had 
better come to terms with him, let him have half and keep the other for 
yourselves, but don’t make your contract more than three years. At the 
expiration of that period the affair will be so well organised that you will not 
want our friend Poisat and will be able to manage it yourselves.17 
 
It seems that Lionel followed Nat’s advice to the letter and a contract was signed by 
Poisat, who served as the first manager of the Royal Mint Refinery from 1852 until 
1854. The Anglo-French aspect to the venture went even further. Aside from an 
extensive knowledge of refining processes Poisat brought with him an experienced 
workforce from the Normandy area of France and introduced a sulphuric acid 
recovery plant, managed by the French workforce.18 Anthony was fortunate that 
through the family’s French connection he was able to access the closely guarded 
secret of the refining process, which were then passed down through generations of 
men who worked at the refinery. In 1856, having established the Rothschild London 
refinery, Poisat was engaged by the City merchant banker, Henry Lewis Raphael, to 
establish a refinery for the Raphael Bank at Limehouse, a few miles away from the 
Royal Mint Refinery.19 
 
     The establishment of the Royal Mint Refinery coincided with the acceleration in 
world gold production levels that were seen throughout the nineteenth century. 
Between 1800 and 1850 levels of new gold production were recorded at around 38 
                                                
16 RAL, T8/330, Business and family letters 1852, ‘Nat to Lionel’, 31 Mar 1852. 
17 RAL, 000/1242, Spencer Richards, ‘The Early History of the Royal Mint Refinery’ in N M 
Rothschild & Sons, Pensioners Newsletter, No.5, Mar 1989. 
18 RAL, 000/1242, Spencer Richards, ‘The French Connection’ in N M Rothschild & Sons, Pensioners 
Newsletter, No.12, Mar 1996. 
19 Ibid. 
Chapter 2: The early years 
29 
 
million fine ounces.20 However, from 1851 production levels soared to over 
334million fine ounces following the new gold discoveries in California from 1848, 
Australia from 1851 and South Africa from 1884.21 By 1856 the combined refining 
capabilities of the leading London refining houses, Rothschild, Johnson Matthey and 
Raphael, produced 120 gold bars a day.22 Timothy Green has suggested that the gold 
rushes created the modern market through the expansion in refining and the 
acceptance of gold bars treated at the Rothschild and Raphael refinery’s by the Bank 
of England; the bars were assayed by the independent firm operated by Frederick 
Claudet, the Bank of England’s approved assayer in London. A general flurry of 
activity of brokers arriving in the London market can be observed around the same 
period and are names that remain visible today; alongside Rothschild and Johnson 
Matthey are Mocatta & Goldsmid, Sharps, Pixley, and Samuel Montagu.23 By the 
turn of the twentieth century refineries had been established in California and 
Australia catering for locally-mined gold, by 1905 the Royal Mint Refinery was 
reported to be refining annually 3.3 million gross weight ounces of gold, rising 
steadily to 6.8 million by 1913, the majority of which originated in South Africa.24  
 
     A sign of the profitability of the Royal Mint Refinery was the move taken by N M 
Rothschild & Sons in purchasing the freehold of 19 Royal Mint Street in 1853 for a 
sum of £900.25 The purchase was the first of many in the Tower Hill area; over the 
next twenty years a number of surrounding properties were added to the Rothschild 
portfolio. In 1855 £5,000 was paid for buildings at 23-26 Rosemary Lane and 1-5 
                                                
20 The Times, ‘Gold’, a reprint of the Special Number, 20 Jun 1933, p. 21. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Green, The History of the London Good Delivery Gold List, p. 25. 
23 Ibid. 
24 RAL, 148/24/3, ‘RMR Silver and Gold Treated from 1 Jan 1905 – 31 Dec 1948’. 
25 RAL, 000/717, Correspondence file, ‘Royal Mint Street Leases’. 
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Torr Court. In 1856 eight houses in St Petro Court along with 27 Rosemary Lane and 
6-8 Torr Court had been purchased for a combined total of £2,284.26 The Rothschild 
portfolio was expanded further in 1858 when £7125 was paid for 20-22 Royal Mint 
Street, from a syndicate headed by a Miss Shepherd.27 Finally 140 Royal Mint Street 
was added in 1871, purchased from Edward Keymez for £700.28 Part of the site was 
cleared and flats erected, which were available for rent by those working at the 
refinery.29  
 
     Peter Scott and Peter Walsh have suggested that Rothschild took advantage of its 
location. The dominant position of the Refinery and the surrounding area, its close 
proximity to main ports for international trade and inland transport systems, they 
suggested provided ‘strong market access advantages’.30 The Refinery was also close 
the Bank of England and New Court, the head office of N M Rothschild & Sons, 
which held certain advantages as gold was transported easily between the three sites. 
Meanwhile the legacy of the East End for cheap labour and at first cheap property 
prices enabled Rothschild to capitalise on their earlier investments as prices rose and 
development opportunities became more infrequent. Subsequent expansions to the 
Refinery in the 1930s would reap the benefits of the earlier land purchases, unlike 




29 In 1884 Alfred Charles de Rothschild acquired from the Metropolitan Boart of Works a freehold 
plot in Cartwright Street, just off Royal Mint Street, that would be retained for eighty years for the 
express purpose of building and maintaining suitable artisan dwellings adequate to accommodate at 
least 100 workers and their families. From 1885 Rothschild purchased land in Flower and Dean 
Street, once reputed to have been the worst slums in the East End, cleared the site and erected a 
number of flats in the Rothschild Buildings. The flats were home to both Jewish and non-Jewish 
residents. Source: Jerry White Rothschild Buildings, Life in an East End Tenement Block 1887-1920 
(London: Pimlico, 2003). 
30 Peter Scott and Peter Walsh, 'Patterns and determinants of manufacturing plant location in interwar 
London' Economic History Review, 57 (Feb 2004), 109-141 (p. 111). 
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their main competitor, Johnson Matthey & Company, who in the 1930s had to 
relocate the growing operation outside the City. 
 
     General maintenance issues for the building at the Royal Mint Street were 
attended to by maintenance staff retained by the firm. Although in 1900 a problem 
occurred with the main boundary wall, erected fifty years earlier, which separated 
the Royal Mint from the Rothschild refinery. The wall required attention following 
the appearance of a large crack. Permission was sought by the Royal Mint to send a 
surveyor and the Clerk of Works to visit the refinery and carry out an inspection to 
establish a likely cause for the problem.31 The cause of the crack could not be 
determined and the party wall was rebuilt. 
 
Despite the important task undertaken by the refiner, removing impurities from raw 
gold and transforming it into a tradable commodity, there is a general lack of 
coverage on the subject in literature. Benjamin White noted that when discussing the 
production of gold and silver currency ‘we really know very little of the things with 
which we are most familiar’.32 He was drawn to the mystery that surrounded the 
early refining process and in the belief that the refiner possessed supernatural 
powers. The claim was made by those who saw ‘the flames smoke and pungent 
fumes which occupied the operations, together with the weird appearance of the 
appliances’ used, which increased the awe with which the common people regarded 
                                                
31 RAL, V11/36/1, ‘Clerk of Works, Royal Mint’Letter to N M Rothschild & Sons’, 27 Feb 1900. 
32 Benjamin White, Silver, Its History and Romance (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917), 
introduction. 
Chapter 2: The early years 
32 
 
the science.’33 In1868 Ernest Seyd, banker and economist, provided an early account 
of the refiner at work:  
The melter, standing before the furnace, places the mould on the ledge of it… 
he then examines the fire, poking it with an iron rod, or slightly tapping the 
moveable bars… with a pair of long tongs, he lifts up the top of the crucible, 
to see whether the contents are running. If he thinks it advisable, he throws in 
a little flux to clear the surface… the heat is very intense at this stage of the 
melting, sufficiently so indeed to scorch the faces of lookers-on who may be 
standing four or five feet off. The melter is accustomed to it… he wears on 
one hand a glove…although dampened; [the glove] is frequently on fire.34 
 
The refiners skill was in his accumulated knowledge of the treatment process, the 
finely balance chemical compounds and the right moment to remove the gold from 
the heat. Although glimpses into the refining process are available, the process is 
generally hidden from view. Mines produce different grade ore; coins contain 
different alloys and impurities and no two treatments are the same. The skill of the 
refiner was to ensure that all impurities were removed using the cheapest available 
method. 
 
     Donald Clark has suggested that the purification of alluvial gold ‘is a simple 
matter’.35 He set out many of the methods used by refineries in Gold Refining and 
suggested that the value of a refinery is in the technical expertise of its staff.36 This 
was a sentiment shared by Donald McDonald, an employee of Johnson Matthey & 
Company, who observed that ‘the price of gold is based on the weight and nature of 
the work of the refiner to remove impurities and produce a fineness of 999.9’.37 Far 
from a simple process, in fact, the refining of precious metals is a specialist art. The 
end result is the production of a gold bar and the pedigree of the bar should be 
undistinguishable. Once all impurities are removed the origin of the gold becomes 
                                                
33 Ibid, p. 88.  
34 Seyd, Bullion and Foreign Exchanges, p. 124.  
35 Clark, Gold Refining, p. 2. 
36 Ibid. 
37 McDonald and Hunt, A History of Platinum, p. 57. 
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untraceable. The only feature that sets each bar apart are the refiners stamp, and a 
unique serial number.38 
 
     In 1897 Rothschild purchased the failing refinery Browne and Wingrove, located 
at 30 Wood Street. In the past the Refinery held a pre-eminent position in London.39 
In 1868 Browne and Wingrove, along with the Rothschild refinery, were listed as 
being the chief melting establishments in London.40 However, the management of 
Browne and Wingrove failed to move with the times and implement the 
technological advances that occurred towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
Much of the firm’s equipment and apparatus was outdated, and the firm relied upon 
the refining processes that stemmed back to the eighteenth century. The premises at 
Wood Street, together with all equipment and stock formed part of the deal. 
Rothschild renamed the venture Wood Street Smelting and retained many of the 
original staff, although a new manager was engaged to deal with the daily operation 
of the venture. The refinery was turned over to smelt light coin bars and remelt 
imported bars. Timothy Green reflected that this was ‘a quiet ending’ for the 
refinery.41 The site was closed in 1903. It has been rumoured that when the smelting 
works were dismantled gold and silver recovered from the site was valued at a few 
thousand pounds. In 1896 Rothschild conceived plans to redevelop the site with the 
assistance of P Lawrence & Sons. It was proposed that the existing building be 
demolished and replaced. The cost of the transformation was quoted at £2064, which 
                                                
38 Green, The History of the London Good Delivery Gold List, p. 40. 
39 Browne and Wingrove was formed in 1838. The firm of 1838 had evolved from a series of mergers 
dating back to 1754. The earlier partnership of Plumbe and Browne in 1768 had become the official 
melters to the Bank of England.  
40 Seyd, Bullion and Foreign Exchanges, p. 8. 
41 Green, The History of the London Good Delivery Gold List, p. 28. 
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included negotiating for the adjoining properties.42 Whilst the site was redeveloped it 
is not recorded if Rothschild was involved. 
 
     Control of the Royal Mint Refinery passed directly into the name of N M 
Rothschild &Sons following the death of Anthony in 1896. Activities at the Refinery 
were affected by the Boer War, 1899-1902, which severely curtailed South African 
gold mining and gold sent to London for treatment. However, once the constraints of 
war had been removed gold production soured and levels increased from 1.6 million 
ounces to in excess of 9 million ounces.43 The Royal Mint Refinery was at full 
stretch. Charles Rothschild, Partner at N M Rothschild & Sons between 1897 and 
1923, sought to promote new methods of refining. Charles, a keen scientist, engaged 
an expert from the Paris refinery, Comptoir Lyon-Alemand, to provide a report on 
the separation of gold and platinum by electronic methods. The method of treatment 
had been advanced at the Sydney Mint since 1867.44 This method of refining was 
subsequently adopted and the old sulphur method of refining was replaced by the 
new chlorine method. Lodge Cottrell plant was installed at the refinery in 1912. The 
process substantially reduced the loss of gold and silver from the refinery chimney 
during treatment. Research undertaken by Scott and Walsh into the localised 
development of industries highlights how the modernisation of the Rothschild 
refinery was reflective of the refining sector.45 As the Royal Mint Refinery became 
more exposed to competition, from other London refining houses as well as 
international establishments, Partners had to seek out more advanced and cost 
                                                
42 RAL, X1/111/181, ‘Rebuilding Receipts, 29 Wood Street EC, (1896-7)’. 
43 Green, The History of the London Good Delivery Gold List, p. 29. 
44 RAL, 000/1242, Spencer Richards, ‘The Royal Mint Refinery in the Twentieth Century’ in N M 
Rothschild & Sons, Pensioners Newsletter, No.6, Mar 1990.  
45 Scott and Walsh, ‘Patterns and determinants’, pp. 114-5. 
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effective techniques. Therefore rather than innovators of change Rothschild merely 
reacted to external pressures. 
Figure 2. 'RMR Insurance Plan, 1927'46 
 
 
Accounts of the physical appearance, daily function, and operational processes 
carried out at the refinery are scarce. Insurance documents offer some insight into the 
layout of the refinery in the early twentieth century (see Figure.2). Benjamin White, 
following a tour of the Royal Mint Refinery while researching Silver, Its History and 
Romance, provides a written account of management and daily operation of the 
refinery. His visit coincided with the upgrade of the equipment. Writing in 1912 he 
suggested that the position of Rothschild as bankers rendered them capable of 
handling such an enterprise as a refinery. White observed that the Bank had the 
resources and skills it takes to deal with commodities of great value and are able to 
fund large transactions. He also suggested that the banks foreign business 
                                                
46 RAL, 148/15, ‘RMR Insurance Plan 1927’, produced by Alliance Assurance. 
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connections attracted consignments of bullion for treatment to the firms London 
refinery. An observation also made by Ernest Seyd in 1868 who noted that ‘when 
large refineries are carried on in connection with banking the bullion operations, they 
have an influence on the supply and demand of the precious metals in the market, 
and thereby yield indirect profits.’47  
 
White also considered that ‘the upkeep of such an establishment as a refinery, quite 
apart from its commercial character, is a source of legitimate pride to its owners.’ 48 
Although limited White’s observations and description of the treatment of silver and 
of employees of the refinery does provide a limited account of the working character 
of the Royal Mint Refinery: 
The exterior of the Refinery is lofty and massive, and the visitor, as he passes 
through a wicket-gate in the huge doors, receives a first impression of 
security and space. He crosses the ample yard and becomes conscious of a 
somewhat sickly pungent smell, regarding which he is informed, casually, 
‘Oh! That is only SO(2).’ The first room, about forty feet square, is used for 
weighing; six large balances within glass cases range the walls, a counter 
occupies the centre, and stacks of silver bars, fine and otherwise, are on the 
floor.  
The actual refining takes place in a fine central hall, with annexes where 
minor details are dealt with. Five sets of apparatus stand side by side, each 
composed of a series of three tanks, two covered and on a high platform and 
one uncovered on a lower level. The liquid, with precious metals held in 
solutions, flows down to the lower tank, which measures about 12 feet by 6 
feet and is about 3 feet deep. From the open tanks steam rises in clouds, for 
the contents are heated to 1000 degrees Celsius and the tanks are continually 
stirred with long poles to assist the action of the acid. The sulphate of copper 
in the solution gives a beautiful blue tint to the contents.49 
 
The account described in detail the atmosphere of the refinery and the unknown 
smells the visitor would encounter. George Buess, refinery manager 1912-1937, 
accompanied White on his tour of the Royal Mint Refinery. White recorded the 
                                                
47 Seyd, Bullion and Foreign Exchanges, p. 199. 
48 White, Silver, p. 97. 
49 Ibid, pp. 97-8. 
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‘courtesy of the manager, his anxiety to explain the process and his perfect mastery 
of the details showed that his interest charge was by no means regarded in the light 
of a mere duty.’50 White also observed that ‘around the central apparatus lies 
precious material in various stages of purity. The exposed heap of fine gold, in 
appearance like wet clay sand, demonstrates the need for perfect confidence between 
employer and employed.’51 However, according to Seyd it was not just confidence 
between an employer and his staff but a matter of effective deterrent: 
The uninitiated might be led to think that the workmen in a Refinery, where 
such large masses of Bullion are under their hands, could pilfer without 
detection. The exact quantities of gold and silver present are, however, 
known with almost mathematical accuracy, and the precious metals pass 
from hand to hand, or in the charge of foreman, in such a way that robbery 
becomes almost impossible, or is, at least, at once detected.52 
 
Reports of theft by employees at a number of the London refineries can be found in 
court reports published in the press. Isolated cases did occur at the Royal Mint 
Refinery and if caught the matter was referred to the police and court for 
prosecution.  
 
     On the outbreak of war in 1914 business activities at the Royal Mint Refinery 
were once again severely curtailed; a result of the limited gold mining activities in 
South Africa and issues that arose over safe transportation of gold to London for 
treatment. Throughout the conflict the refinery marked time by treating small parcels 
of gold and silver, which arrived in London. Much of the machinery at the refinery 
stood idle until the end of war. It was not until 1919 that shipments of gold returned 
to London and a sharp recovery was experienced by the Refinery. According to 
White during the early 1920s the Rothschild refinery in Royal Mint Street handled 
                                                
50 Ibid, p. 99. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Seyd, Bullion and Foreign Exchanges, p. 198. 
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more gold than any similar institution in the world.53 Following the death of Charles 
in 1923 business and family interest for the Royal Mint Refinery continued under the 
management of the remaining two Partners brothers Lionel and Anthony. Between 
1919 and the outbreak of war in 1939 the Royal Mint Refinery underwent a series of 
changes incorporating the modernisation of equipment, methods of production and 
range of products manufactured. 
 
     In 1927 the Refinery underwent a planned modernisation that began with the 
installation of new electrical plant, housed in a motor generator room, which 
powered 24 electrolytic tanks employed to recover copper.54 At the beginning of the 
1930s oil tanks, with a capacity to hold 10-15 tons, were installed.55 In 1932 the 
installation of a new precipitator was discussed. The old equipment had formed part 
of the 1912 upgrade of machinery at the refinery and whilst frequent modifications 
had been made to the machinery it was thought that the equipment, compared to the 
competition, had become outdated. The study findings noted that:  
the chief disadvantages of the present treater [were], the inability for quick 
and efficient cleaning of the various components and its lower capacity for 
gases than the newer type… much [had] been expected from the existing 
plant and results proved the justification of our expectations, as far as its 
precipitating abilities are concerned. We were informed, at the time of 
installation, that the plant was the first and best of its kind to be employed for 
the recovery of precious metal fume.56 
 
A quotation for an oil fuelled precipitator was provided by the Lodge Cottrell 
Company. The new type of machine was thought to be far superior to the old one 
and capable of treating a higher volume of fume with a greater velocity being 
recovered by the new machine. The cost of the new machinery would partly be 
                                                
53 White, Silver, p. 97. 
54 RAL, 148/15, ‘Study: replacement of refinery equipment’, 4 Jul 1932. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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funded from ‘sweeps’, or metals recovered from the old plant, and the improved 
capabilities would ‘speedily compensate the initial outlay.’57 Impurities that 
remained in the bottom of the cell and plant were periodically removed and placed 
with other residues for ‘sweeps’, where the smallest valuable particles present were 
recovered.58 It was suggested that if the apparatus could be erected outside it would 
free up space within the factory. It was deemed a ‘valuable extension’ to the refinery.  
 
     Benjamin White, through his research into and experience of the metallurgy trade, 
described the considerable trade that was done in trade waste, or ‘sweeps’. He noted 
the great lengths that firms went to gather up the fragments of precious metals lost in 
the refining and articles being manufactured. White explained how in previous 
centuries in the engraving trade, the engravers wife carefully swept the benches and 
workshops and any particles were collected, for it used to be customary for an annual 
sale of sweep, and any profit made was kept by the engraver’s wife for pin money.59 
Victor Rothschild, during a short period of working at the Royal Mint Refinery in 
the 1930s, had enjoyed the ‘annual saturnalia of burning the wooden staircases and 
sabots to extract the gold dust.’60 The ritual guarded against the loss of valuable 
quantities of gold and silver. Spencer Richards, employed at the Rothschild refinery 
during the 1950s and 1960s, made reference to the annual pursuit when the roof 
would be swept, and the settling tank rain water drained into emptied ‘the mud cake 
could yield gold at the rate of 15 troy ounces per ton! Not that there was ever a ton to 
be seen.’61 The annual ritual also included the burning of ‘used crucibles, refining 
                                                
57 Ibid. 
58 RAL, 148/29, Draft for The Times, ‘Royal Mint Refinery Centenary’ (1952), p. 4. 
59 White, Gold, p. 16. 
60 Kenneth Rose, Elusive Rothschild, The life of Victor, Third Baron (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson, 2003), p. 38. 
61RAL, 000/1242, ‘The Royal Mint Refinery in the Twentieth Century’, p. 7. 
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bricks and wooden floors , dust from the walls and even workmen’s clothing and in 
the air of the refinery [was] sampled and assayed and the metal separated.’62 Figures 
shown in Table 1. highlight the importance to the refinery of the valuable refiner’s 
bonus ounces recovered during the interwar period. 
Table 1. ‘RMR Inter-war Refiners gold Bonus, 1919-1939’ 
Royal Mint Refinery 
Inter-war Refiners Gold Bonus Ozs 
1919-1939 
Year Bonus Ozs Year Bonus Ozs 
1919 4300.146 1930 No Sweeps 
1920 5262.168 1931 No Sweeps 
1921 4525.499 1932 6233.342 
1922 3498.320 1933 3074.655 
1923 1332.545 1934 3078.285 
1924 2916.069 1935 4659.560 
1925 1279.871 1936 6434.428 
1926 1503.179 1937 1752.733 
1927 654.780 1938 No Sweeps 
1928 1316.010 1939 4875.671 
1929 774.803   
 
Source:RAL, 148/24/3,’ RMR Silver and Gold Treated 1 January 1905- 31 December 1948’. 
 
During certain years, no sweeps were collected but, as would be expected, the 
greatest quantity of bonus ounces coincided with the busiest periods of activity at the 
refinery. 
 
     In 1933 the Royal Mint Refinery appeared in a special editorial supplement that 
accompanied The Times.63 Entitled the Gold Number the special edition featured a 
                                                
62 RAL, 148/29, Draft for The Times, ‘Royal Mint Refinery Centenary’, (1952). 
63 The release of the special edition coincided with the World Economic Conference (WEC). 1000 
Delegates from 60 countries around the world attended the London conference. The months leading 
up to the conference were surrounded by press speculation about the effectiveness of the event. 
Topical issues included the re-establishment of the gold standard in Britain and although reparations 
payments had been settled prior to the conference Anglo-American relations remained strained. Prior 
to the conference in April 1933 President Roosevelt had placed an embargo on the export of gold, 
unless by licence. The move was an attempt to restore some degree of economic stability for the 
United States. Conference discussions centred upon measures to fight global depression, revive 
international trade and stabilise currency exchange rates. The conference was not a resounding 
success and eventually collapsed. Gold generated confidence and the psychological impact of large 
sums of gold held in London reflected this. For a fuller account of the WEC and outcomes. See, 
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series of articles that promoted Britain’s relationship to gold and the various stages 
of the trade around the world. Articles described the mining process through to the 
sale of the refined gold bars. It promoted imperial relations between Britain and the 
main gold producing countries; in particular Canada, South Africa, Australia, New 
Zealand and India. Featured articles included a history of early gold production 
juxtaposed to the modern methods and equipment used in operation in the twentieth 
century. The breadth of coverage related to gold in legends, literature, art, crafts, 
monetary use, salvaged gold, mining refining and sale. Advertisements appeared at 
regular intervals for mining equipment and company mining shares. Photographs 
accompanied many of the articles. The section on London included the refining of 
gold. The series of photographs taken at the Royal Mint Refinery showed the process 
of refining and techniques engaged. However, only three images were eventually 
selected and printed in the Gold Number. These selected images provided an insight 
for readers into a mysterious world and represented the main stages in the treatment 
of gold. The accompanying article offered readers a rare behind the scenes view of 
the treatment of gold at the Royal Mint Refinery.  
 
     Thirty of the photographs produced for The Times article, replicated and framed, 
today hang at the bank in New Court. Staff and clients frequently pass them on their 
way to the Rothschild meeting rooms. No use has been made of captions to inform 
the audience of the scenes and how the images fit into the history of Rothschild. Few 
people are aware of the bank’s connection to the Royal Mint Refinery. The name 
                                                                                                                                     
Gianni Toniolo, Central Bank Cooperations at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930-1973 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Zara Steiner, The Lights that failed: European 
International History 1919-1933 (USA, Oxford University Press, 2007); Peter Clarke, Keynes, The 
Twentieth Century’s Most Influential Economist (London: Bloomsbury, 2009). For an American 
perspective see David Farrer, The Warburgs, The Story of a Family (New York: Stein and Day, 
1977). James Warburg was the US financial advisor at the WEC appointed by President Roosevelt.  
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Rothschild did not appear in the company title, publicity was not ordinarily courted 
by the firm. The utmost discretion surrounded the venture, generally only those in 
the bullion and refining trade, were aware of the full extent of Rothschild’s activities. 
Although not ‘mirrors of reality’ the images prove a major source of information as 
they not only captured and represented people and events at the Refinery but they 
also reflected the mood of the nation. The photographs are rich with information 
relating to the layout of the refinery, cultural elements and dress codes; they offered 
an insight into the glamorous attraction of gold and reflected the hard toil endured by 
employees of the Refinery who physically handled the vast quantities of bullion 
entering the country during the 1930s. 
 
     Rothschild commissioned a two page front cover to accompany the special gold 
edition. These were probably forwarded to international clients of the bank. The 
cover was a replica of the usual front pages of the newspaper with The Times in the 
masthead and underneath it an illustrated drawing of New Court, produced by 
Sydney R Jones.64 At the bottom of the front page the firm announced its 
relationship as proprietors of the Royal Mint Refinery, refiners of Gold, Silver and 
other Precious Metals.65 The remaining pages contained the end of year results of 
various mining organisations. In the main body of the special supplement a whole 
page was dedicated to the London refineries. The important relationship to platinum 
of Johnson Matthey & Company was reported and the advances made by the firm 
since 1919, following a period of modernisation by the firm, which incorporated a 
chemical laboratory that investigated new methods of metallurgy. No photographs of 
the Johnson Matthey operation appeared in the special editorial. Editorial space 
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would have been at a premium and the three selected images represented the main 
stages of the refining process. Image one (Figure 3.) depicted the first stage of the 
process where gold was received at the Royal Mint Refinery, misshaped and rough 
cast. The second image (Figure 4.) depicted the physical change from rough to 
polished gold, the refiner’s added value to the process removing impurities and 
transforming the physical shape of the gold into recognisable 400 Troy ounce bars. 
The final image (Figure 5.) represented the transformed gold, the final part of the 
refining process.  
 
     The subject of the first photograph featured was a consignment of gold from 
India. The image was set in the bullion room, described as the heart of the refinery, 
where staff opened the  
Figure 3. ‘RMR, consignment of Indian Gold for treatment, 1933’66 
 
 
wooden crates the gold had been packed in for the journey to London. Details of how 
the ore, whilst in India, had been crushed and undergone a concentration process 
where the gold had been separated from any base metals present. The concentrates 
were then melted and turned into rough cast bars and shipped to the London 
                                                
66 RAL, 000/376/1, Royal Mint Refinery Album , 1933, ‘RMR, consignment of Indian Gold for 
treatment’. 
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refinery.67 It was these rough cast bars that appeared in the published photograph. 
Once checked and weighed they were sent to the melting room. An accompanying 
explanation informed the reader that ‘some £50,000,000 of Indian gold was refined 
in Britain during the last six months following the abandonment of the gold 
standard.’68 Weekly bullion reports, produced by Samuel Montagu & Company, 
frequently charted large quantities of gold shipped from India throughout 1933.69 An 
increased sum insured for gold at the refinery was recorded, from £300,000 to 
£700,000 in November 1931, this reflected the increased quantities being received 
from Bombay.70 By 1933 the Rothschild refinery had a refining capacity of around 
£1,000,000 worth of gold in twenty four hours. 71 The bullion room, described as the 
scale room on the premises plan prepared in 1927 by the refinery’s insurers Alliance, 
placed the room next to the main office.  
 
    Norman Raven, a member of the bullion department during the 1930s, observed 
that generally gold arrived at the refinery on a Monday aboard the South African 
mail boats and was marketed by N M Rothschild & Sons on Tuesday.72  However, 
gold refined for The Times article arrived on the Thursday afternoon and was ready 
to leave the following day. The consignment produced 219 bars of 400 troy ounce 
bars. Gold was moved the short distance from the scale room across the yard in to 
                                                
67 RAL, 148/37/1, ‘Memorandum to Edmund de Rothschild describing existing refining techniques’, 
11 Mar 1964. 
68 The Times, 20 Jun 1933, p. xxi. 
69 Throughout 1933 the weekly reports offered by brokers Samuel Montague & Co. described large 
shipments of gold arriving from India. 
70 RAL, 148/12, ‘Letter received from Alliance Assurance Company Ltd to N M Rothschild & Sons 
Bullion Department’, 12 Nov 1931. 
71The Times, 20 Jun 1933, p. xxi. 
72 RAL, 148/24/7, ‘Evidence provided to Bischoff & Co., acting on behalf of the Iraq Petroleum 
Company by Norman Raven regarding Mechanism of the Gold Market’ (1951), p. 6.  
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the foundry, marked L and K on the insurance plan (Figure 2.), relayed on sturdy 
trolleys with iron wheels. 
 




Figure 5. ‘RMR Gold Bars ready for sale, 1933’74 
 
    Figures in Table 2. charts the monthly amount of gold and the adjusted average 
value received at the refinery throughout 1933. In excess of 8.5 million ounces of 
                                                
73 RAL, 000/376/1, Royal Mint Refinery Album , 1933, ‘Casting – Gold being Cast into bar under a 
gas flame at the Royal Mint Refinery’; This is the last stage in the refining process, the gas flame 
giving the surface a high polish. 
74 RAL, 000/376/1, Royal Mint Refinery Album , 1933, ‘Ready for the Market’; Gold Bars which 
have been weighed and checked ready for sale in the gold market. Each of the bars shown is worth 
about £2,500 (1933). 
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fine gold at a market value of just below £54.5 million was processed by the refinery 
during 1933. 
Table 2. ‘RMR 1933 Treatment of Gold’ 
Royal Mint Refinery - Receipts of Gold (in Fine Ounces) 
January - December 1933 
1933 Fine Ounces   £ 
January 393,730.347 @ 122/5.75 £2,411,188 
February 291,372.711 @ 120/8.5 1,758,556 
March 676,090.133 @ 120/3.5 4,066,400 
April 582,968.569 @ 120/7.75 3,516,636 
May 1,054,668.520 @ 123/4.5 6,505,987 
June 833,367.783 @ 122/3.5 5,095,697 
July 780,328.011 @ 123/11.75 4,837,221 
August 529,021.761 @ 125/8.75 3,325,673 
September 950,347.009 @ 131/4.25 6,239,475 
October 980,347.009 @ 131/6.5 6,447,824 
November 1,074,662.187 @ 128/8.75 6,917,018 
December 529,542.225 @ 126/2.5 3,341,632 
Total 8,676,446.265   £54,463,307 
 
Source: RAL, 000/604A/39, ‘Receipts of Gold 1933’. 
 
     The second image (Figure 4.) provided an action shot of the physical change of 
the refining process. The description that accompanied the photograph noted: 
Casting – Gold being cast into bars under a gas flame at the Royal Mint 
Refinery. This [was] the stage where gold was turned into the cask and had 
been chemically changed during the refining process, the gas flame gave the 
surface a highly polished appearance.75 
 
Two of the refinery workers can be seen engaged in turning the gold out into casks, 
whilst their colleagues looked on. All workers wore wooden clogs and protective 
sabots, whilst arms and hands in the direct line of the flame received additional 
protection. The wooden refinery floor can be seen in the photograph. In the 
background, the working environment is clearly visible; as would be expected dirt 
surrounded the furnaces and was captured by the photographer. The image provided 
an insight into the physical characteristics of staff at the refinery; the muscular arms 
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of the workers are clearly on display. The photographer caught a touch of the 
everyday working life of the Refinery; the shot incorporated a workman’s mug in the 
right hand side and the factory kettle. White in 1912 commented on the relaxed 
relationship to gold by workers at the refinery. He observed that ‘gold, indeed, to the 
staff of the refinery [was] too familiar to excite the wonder which the occasional 
visitor [was] bound to feel but a sense of deep responsibility for its handling in every 
department of the firm is the keynote of the whole operation.’76 Today the surviving 
photographs stir an excitement to most observers for the working environment and 
quantities of gold handled by the refinery.  
 
     In one unpublished shot the recent new electrostatic precipitator was visible. 
There were two methods of gold refining, chlorine and electrolytic, performed at the 
Royal Mint Refinery. Once gold had been weighed and moved to the foundry the 
second stage in the refining process took place. Following the preliminary melting of 
three or four bars together to establish an assay, the standard of fineness then 
determined the method used.77 The chlorine method usually produced bars between 
995 to 998 parts a thousand. This was achieved by melting the metal in oil-fired 
furnaces and blowing chlorine gas through it.78 During this process the chorine unit 
removed any base metal impurities, as well as any silver present, and formed 
chlorides. These were removed by skimming the surface, which left the pure gold 
behind. During the process vapours from the furnaces were directed through Lodge-
Cottrell precipitators, where electrodes were energised to 100,000 vaults.79 This 
                                                
76 RAL, 148/29, Draft for The Times, ‘Royal Mint Refinery Centenary’, p. 3. 
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created a powerful electrostatic field that trapped the chloride particles to the 
electrodes and enabled the valuable dust to be collected periodically from the plant. 
 
     Electrolysis formed the second element of the refining process. This component 
produced the richest gold fineness at 999.8 or 999.9 parts a thousand, used mainly in 
the jewellery trades. The process followed the same initial stage as the chlorine 
method. Cathodes, electrodes on which gold is deposited, are made of thin gold foil 
of the highest purity formed into corrugations to give it adequate stiffness. When 
exposed to the solution of gold chloride, and once the correct current was passed 
through, the gold was deposited on the cathodes. The texture of the deposit was 
similar to coarse brown crystals. These were then washed, dried, melted and cast into 
bars.80 The bars were then sent to the assaying firm of Frederick Claudet, which was 
commissioned by the Royal Mint Refinery to establish the purity of the gold refined 
by the firm. The assay process involved a chip (equivalent to a 62nd part of an ounce 
of gold) being taken from every bar. The chip was wrapped and marked with the 
corresponding bar number and sent to Claudet’s laboratory where it was flattened, 
filed down to the correct weight, melted in a furnace at 1000 degrees Celsius, 
flattened into ribbons, bathed three times in nitric acid and annealed in a blow 
flame.81 The process confirmed the purity of the gold and the loss of weight during 
the process was recorded. The assay report might be used at a later date as evidence 
of the purity of a bar should any disputes arise.82 Following the assay process chips 
were re-wrapped and returned to the refinery where they were collected until there 
was enough to make a new bar. 
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Figure 6. ‘RMR Refined Gold Bar, 1933’83 
 
 





     Michael Bonavia, a former employee at N M Rothschild & Sons (1931-1935), 
gave an account in London Before I Forget of gold being delivered from the 
Refinery to New Court: 
The most interesting feature of that side of the courtyard was the Bullion 
Room. Day after day plain box-like motor vans with no distinguishing marks 
would back up to the door of this room and, entirely casually, a cargo of gold 
bars would be unloaded by passing from hand to hand. The bullion van 
resembled a small furniture removal van; the guard was merely one ex-
                                                
83 RAL, 000/376/4, Royal Mint Refinery, ‘Refined gold bar showing Royal Mint Refinery assay mark 
and unique serial number.’ 1933; The image provides a close up view of the ‘chop’ and unique bar 
number; Prior to 1954 it had not been necessary to include a serial number for each bar. It is observed 
in records for the Royal Mint Refinery that this practice had been adopted at the refinery much earlier 
as a form of quality control practice. In 1967, following a raid on the refinery’s bullion van whilst it 
made deliveries in London, the refinery stamp and unique serial numbers on each gold bar enabled 
police to identify the stolen gold, which lead to the arrests and prosecutions being made. 
84 RAL, 000/374/4, Royal Mint Refinery, ‘Loading of Gold into Bullion Van for dispatch’, 1933. 
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policeman in bowler hat and raincoat, looking on as the golden millions were 
transhipped. No armed guards, no men in uniform, no special protection for 
the vehicle. It was an age of confidence, not obsessed by security.85 
 
Bonavia may not have been aware of the additional security instigated at the refinery 
from January 1932. At a cost of £1 3s 1d per day, plus 5/-d a week for plain clothes 
allowance, the services of a Metropolitan police officer was engaged to be stationed 
at the refinery.86 Security at other firms was stepped up following an incident in 
October 1933 when a box of gold, being transported through the streets of London 
bound for the offices of the Sheffield Smelting Company was stolen. The gold, 
valued at £10,000, was stolen in broad daylight. It was believed that the robbery was 
the first in a series of organised thefts of bullion, no subsequent arrests were made, 
no bullion recovered and the costs fell on the insurers.87  Wilson observed that the 
incidents resulted in much ‘vexed and unwanted publicity.’88 
 
     Today the 1933 images offer the researcher a point of entry for further 
investigation. Hardt and Brennen observed that the ‘photograph provides a rare 
opportunity to observe and interpret actual conditions of the past and, in light of our 
knowledge, confirms its usefulness as a historical document.’89 The series is 
enhanced by the accompanying written account of operations at the Refinery 
published by The Times, together with White’s account and that of Ronald Palin, a 
former employee of the Rothschild Bank, in Rothschild Relish. Palin’s account, 
which spanned the 30 years of his employment at New Court, offers his reminisces 
of the Refinery and of his former work colleagues. Life at New Court was compared 
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with belonging to the ‘best club in London’.90 However, the type of clerical work 
undertaken in the merchant bank’s Bullion Department, located at New Court, and 
the manual labour of those employed at the Royal Mint Refinery were worlds apart. 
The secret world of the Refinery held some fascination for clerks engaged at New 
Court. Palin recalled that ‘of all the firm’s activities refining and dealing in gold and 
other precious metals were perhaps the most glamorous and interesting.’91 Behind 
the scenes more of the routine chores, dealing with paperwork, insurance and 
shipping of gold, were undertaken by Herbert Elton.92 Palin recalled that Elton ‘did 
get away sometimes from the world of paper and abstractions into the glittering 
presence of the metal itself and his great joy was to visit the Refinery’.93 Part of the 
fascination for Elton was the French influence, which was retained well into the 
1940s. Tales of the ‘Frenchies’ who made up the original workforce of the Royal 
Mint Refinery back in the mid-nineteenth century, were passed down through 
generations of Rothschild employees.  
 
     The early French character of the London refinery was attributed to the first 
workforce being recruited from an area of south Normandy in France. It was their 
skill in the metal industry that had attracted Michel Poisat, an associate of the Paris 
House of Rothschild and the first manager of the London refinery. Following a 
general recession in the south Normandy area from 1846 to 1851, and the 
deterioration of economic conditions coupled with bad harvests, the dislocated 
workforce had been recruited for London.94 Here they assisted Poisat, whose task it 
was to install and train the new workforce in the secret art of refining of gold and 
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silver bullion, on behalf of the Rothschild family. The lure to London for this early 
workforce was economic stability, the entitlement to a generous pension and 
subsidised accommodation located in buildings adjacent to the refinery.95 Whilst 
working conditions were demanding, the remuneration on offer to the staff of the 
refinery was better than most employers. Further perks enjoyed by this early 
workforce included daily supplies of cider for French workers, beer for English 
workers, and for those that ‘done the drinking’ the deposit money payable on return 
of the casks was divided equally.96 French workers enjoyed a month’s paid leave 
each year and once qualified many were entitled to a generous pension. Once retired 
some returned to France and built a house for themselves and family.97 The flow of 
workers across the Channel continued until the early 1900s, with successive 
generations being engaged at the refinery well into the twentieth century.98 
 
     In 1996 Spencer Richards, a former employee of the Refinery, made contact with 
a number of descendants of the workmen who had been engaged at the refinery, on 
upon retiring had returned to south Normandy. Robert Marois, a French researcher 
investigating the history of workers at Raphael, responded to an appeal by Richards 
and sent letters to pensioners living in the region who shared the surname of workers 
once at the refinery. Through the co-ordinated efforts of Marois and Richards a 
number of descendants were traced. Andre Michel who had lived at one of the 
worker’s flats in Royal Mint Street as a child, was the only person to have visited the 
Refinery. The daughter-in-law of Adolphe Amiard, a foreman at the Refinery in 
1896, also came forward with information. Richards recorded that towards the end of 
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the meeting Mme Amiard announced ‘Ceux qui ne sont pas chez Rothschild sont des 
imbeciles!’ (Those who are not with Rothschild are idiots).99  
 
     Additional information about the Refinery is provided by Patricia Sommer-Buess, 
the daughter of George Buess, the manager at the Refinery between 1912 and 1937. 
Buess highlighted the long association her own family had with the Rothschild 
family. Sommer-Buess identified a family connection to at least eight of the seventy-
six workers employed at the refinery in 1905. The names of all the workers at the 
refinery surrounded the photograph taken on an outing to Eastbourne in 1905.100 
Tragically, her grandfather, Eugene Lois Antoine, died in an accident at the refinery 
in 1916. His daughter, Patricia’s mother, married George Buess, who was first 
engaged as a clerk at the refinery in 1898, following a personal introduction by his 
aunt, who at the time was employed as a governess by the Rothschild family. In 
1912 George was elevated to the position of refinery manager and remained in the 
position until his retirement in 1937. He was the only member of staff to hold a set 
of keys for the large safe at the refinery, which regularly held a million pounds worth 
of gold and silver bars awaiting transfer to the Bank of England. On the rare 
occasions he was unable to go to work his brother-in-law, Alfred Antoine, Clerk of 
Works at the Refinery, would call at the family home in Pinner and collect the keys 
to the safe and return them at the end of the day.101 During periods when security 
needed to be heightened, due to gangs of thieves operating in the area, detectives 
would be appointed to escort Buess on his way home through the narrow and dark 
alleys to Aldgate Station.102 
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Figure 8. ‘RMR Workforce 1905’103 
 
He was remunerated well in his position as manager. In 1916 he received an annual 
salary in excess of £1,000, plus a bonus of £300 at Christmas.104 The bonus system 
was another perk for employees and was a form of profit share. Details of the bonus 
system operated were set out for employees in April 1913 and stated that ‘it is in the 
power of every individual workman to contribute towards an increase in profits of 
the Refinery.’105 Suggestions offered to staff to enhance profits included punctuality, 
good workmanship, care of machinery and tools and ‘more especially by strict 
economy in the consumption of electricity, gas, water.’106 Accordingly to the 
Partners it was ‘in the hands of the workmen themselves, individually and 
collectively, to affect the profits of the House, and at the same time to increase their 
own remuneration.’107  
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105 RAL, 1/127/1/230, ‘Royal Mint Refinery notice to staff’ (April 1913).  
106 Ibid. 
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In 1935, in an attempt to increase the profitability of the firm, a proposal to upgrade 
the treatment plant at the Refinery was put together, which involved replacing the 
old chemical method of silver treatment to the new furnace refining method. The 
vacant basement at Royal Mint Street was selected as the best location to house the 
new equipment required for the upgrade. In addition to a new furnace and a set of 
rolling mills with annealing, slitting and blanking machines were also to be housed. 
Draft plans were produced in 1936 adapting the layout of the existing refinery and 
incorporating part of the site owned in Cartwright Street. The original frontage onto 
Royal Mint Street was also to be updated. The new layout of the refinery provided 
messing, changing and cooking facilities, rest rooms and other facilities. An 
analytical laboratory was included in the redevelopment. In the spirit of the original 
1884 agreement a small number of flats for senior employees, were incorporated into 
the rebuild.108 Work was completed in 1938 under the control of George Buess, until 
his retirement, and thereafter Arthur Kimpton.109 The new rolling mills were 
installed on the second floor of the Royal Mint Refinery; the floor had to be 
strengthened to take the weight of the modern equipment. However, as war became a 
reality plans were soon afoot to move the newly installed equipment to the shadow 
factory at Tring. Victor Rothschild was charged with setting up and moving all but 
the gold refining operation away from Royal Mint Street to the recently converted 
factory formally the Old Silk Mill, part of the family estate at Tring (discussed in 
chapter 6).  
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In conclusion operating a refinery presented a unique experience for N M Rothschild 
& Sons. It offered the merchant bank access to a highly lucrative industry, and a 
greater presence in financial areas of gold producing countries. It was thought that 
access to gold would enhance market confidence in the merchant bank and provided 
the firm with a global presence. Rothschild profited from the acquisition of the lease 
for the Royal Mint Refinery following the acceleration in gold sent to London for 
treatment. Further advances in gold production forced Rothschild to modernise and 
upgrade equipment at the refinery. However, rather than being innovative Rothschild 
followed the example of their close competitor Johnson Matthey & Company. 
Rothschild was able to purchase the freehold of the Royal Mint Refinery and 
surrounding properties, and later benefited from these acquisitions. The Refinery was 
extended outside the original footprint; the additional land purchase easily 
accommodated the enlarged venture when the need arose. 
 
     In 1852 Anthony de Rothschild had been fortunate that he was able to call upon 
his uncle James to assist with setting up the London refinery. The good reputation of 
the refinery was paramount. Workers were engaged for their specialist knowledge 
and technical expertise of the refining process. As other refining ventures became 
outdated Rothschild seized upon the opportunity to purchase and extend their own 
refining capabilities. The main hindrance to the venture was conflict. Business at the 
Refinery was severely curtailed during both the Boer War and the First World War. 
Partners at Rothschild took a keen interest in the refinery. Charles, and later his 
cousin Anthony, were both familiar with the daily operation and took a keen interest 
in the venture.  
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Literature about refining practices is sporadic. Whilst limited, the account presented 
by White of the daily operation and atmosphere of the refinery is valuable to 
understanding the business, especially when used in conjunction with photographs 
taken for The Times special editorial in 1933. Reports prepared for the refinery and 
notes on improved techniques, and details of the early workforce, albeit all 
contribute to an introductory understanding of the venture at a particular period in 
time. 
 




The legacy of World War 1, 1919-1924 
  
This chapter considers the strain placed on business at the Royal Mint Refinery 
following the disruptions of the First World War. N M Rothschild & Sons was a 
global venture and was consequently reliant upon international co-operation between 
countries. In the immediate post-war period business had to be adjusted to contend 
with wider fundamental economic, political and social changes. The business was 
exposed to the enormous international economic dislocation, fragmentation of the 
old economic system, geopolitical changes across Europe; for example the 1917 
revolution in Russian and the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire together with the 
increased importance of the New York financial market following the wartime rise in 
economic importance of the United States of the America.110 From 1918 Rothschild 
sought to re-establish itself in the international arena by boosting confidence in its 
financial position, despite increased competition that threatened lucrative areas of the 
banks activities. One of the traditional areas of Rothschild expertise that required 
adjustment during this period was gold.  
 
     The chapter first reviews Britain’s pre-war and war-time relationship to gold, 
levels of production and market control will be presented. This will be followed by 
an overview of the pre-war and wartime treatment of gold at the Royal Mint 
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Refinery. Second, the announcement in 1919 that a native refinery, Rand Refinery 
Limited, would be established in South Africa reveals the lengths adopted at the 
Bank of England (the Bank), compelled to control the supply of gold in the post-war 
years of financial reconstruction. Rothschild was party to a number of the Bank’s 
plans for market manipulation. The role played by Rothschild and the threat the new 
native refinery posed to the treatment of gold in London will be discussed. Finally 
the impact the opening of the new Rand Refinery had upon the Royal Mint Refinery 
will be considered.  
 
From 1800 the framework of the London gold market had become a ‘close 
corporation’ with few players. With the rapid acceleration in world gold production 
levels from 1850 the market opened up to involve more participants but it remained 
tightly controlled. The Bank of England held a central position, surrounded by a 
number of well established players. As world circulation levels of newly mined gold 
increased many of the old restrictions that had once curtailed the outward movement 
of gold from certain countries ended. The surge in gold discoveries and new 
production methods increased the availability of gold and its free flow around the 
globe. Increased demand for gold was fuelled by the emergence of an international 
economic monetary system based upon this yellow metal. Controlling gold supplies 
became a profitable and desirable business prospect. 
 
     Van-Helton has suggested that London’s position as the world’s primary, and 
preferred, gold market was a reflection of the expertise and experience gather in the 
City of London (the City) and was reinforced by four key links. First, London had 
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the only genuinely unrestricted market; it was free from ‘gold premiums, central 
bank interventions and soon, nothing impeded the import and export of precious 
metals.’111 Second, a consequence of the Bank Charter Act of 1844, London 
provided a guaranteed market and minimum purchase price for gold of £3 17s 9d an 
ounce.112 Third, the City was the hub of the global patterns of trade and payment 
flows, with its myriad of financial institutions and other services it provided the 
Witwatersrand mines; insurance, brokerage, Stock Exchange, banking, refining 
facilities, recruitment of technical personnel, and the bill on London was an 
internationally acceptable means of payment. Moreover, in the City the majority of 
mining companies were incorporated as limited companies, raised working capital 
on the Stock Exchange, held their annual general meetings, head offices were located 
there and credit and overdraft facilities were arranged with banking capital against 
anticipated revenue from weekly gold sales.113 Finally, and more importantly for the 
fortunes of the Royal Mint Refinery, the Transvaal possessed no mint or refinery, 
and as such British banks and other African states and colonies would not recognise 
a Transvaal hallmark or coins minted in Pretoria.114 With a lack of treatment facility 
shipments of raw gold continued to be sent to refining houses in London. Between 
1904 and 1910 imports of gold increased from £16.3 million to £34 million.115 The 
gold was treated by the three principal London refining houses, Johnson Matthey & 
Company, the Rothschild Royal Mint Refinery and H L Raphael & Sons 
(Raphael).116 
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     In earlier times the London refining houses had found it necessary to compete 
against each other to secure the weekly consignments of raw gold that had been 
boxed up and transported first by coach, later by rail, to Cape Town and Durban, 
where it was dispatched by ship to London. Upon arrival the directors of the 
refineries had donned ‘their frock coats and top hats and headed into the City each 
morning to call on the banks, brokers and shipping agents to compete for the 
incoming shipments.’117 However, by the turn of the twentieth century the flow of 
gold had increased so much as to fill the full capacity of the refineries and 
competition became meaningless.118 In 1906 Rothschild, Raphael and Johnson 
Matthey entered into a formal agreement that fixed the treatment price of gold in 
London. Under the terms of the agreement all gold entering London would be 
divided between the three firms in more or less equal portions and treated at a fixed 
cost of 3d an ounce.119 Gold treated at the Royal Mint Refinery increased from the 
1905 level, 3.3 million ounces, to 6.8 million ounces in 1913.120 Once treated the 
finished gold bars were offered for sale on a Monday morning in the London market 
by one of the approved brokers.121 In addition to refining costs, gold producers were 
also responsible for freight charges, insurance, and any brokerage fee charged for the 
sale of the consignment. Van Helten calculated that additional costs incurred could 
                                                                                                                                     
shipping and refining costs. However, additional transport time meant any saving became negligible. 
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be as much as 15 per cent, which meant that the standard price of an ounce of gold 
(£3 17s 9d) could be whittled down to around £3 10s.122 
 
     By 1914 gold was the buttress of the international financial system, 59 countries 
were on a gold-exchange standard.123 Bullock has observed that ‘by the [autumn] of 
1914 the world had become gold-conscious’ remarking that ‘mankind prefers gold to 
any paper money, silver, or commodity money, that politicians manufacture.’124 On 
the outbreak of war the international monetary system collapsed forcing countries to 
abandon gold as a monetary regulator and once more prompted restriction in the 
movement of gold. The demand for gold did not diminish for the instability of paper 
currency created a buoyant market for gold and the British Government were in the 
fortunate position at the outset of the war to be able to take a immediate steps to 
secure full control over the gold production of the British Empire, which accounted 
for nearly 70 per cent of the total world gold supply.125 The Bank of England took 
immediate action to protect Britain’s premier standing in the world economy as it 
entered into a special wartime agreement. On 14 August 1914 the Bank entered an 
agreement with the Union of South Africa’s Government, the South African Banks 
and the mining companies to purchase all gold produced in South Africa for a fixed 
rate of £13 17s 9d per standard ounce. In return for this exclusive deal, referred to as 
the August Agreement, producers received 97 per cent of the value of gold 
immediately with the remaining balance paid upon receipt of the gold in London.126  
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     Russell Ally has argued that the Bank had effectively commandeered the South 
African gold because rather than being the voluntary agreement the authorities later 
insisted it had been, the Union government, bankers and mining companies had no 
real alternative but to agree to it.127 Even so Ally conceded that when it became too 
dangerous for weekly shipments of gold to continue, the advance payment was in 
essence an interest free loan, which saved the South African economy from certain 
ruin.128 Nevertheless the August Agreement was a contentious issue, which 
generated resentment amongst many of the South Africa gold producers and was a 
cause for the renewed calls for a native gold refinery in South Africa. For Britain the 
agreement meant it secured a steady supply of gold from South Africa during the 
period of conflict, which provided the necessary purchasing power for arms from the 
United States, despite much of the gold mined remaining in South Africa and being 
held on account. A decision taken to protect the gold from falling into enemy hands 
as the risk from U-boat attack upon shipping heightened, which disrupted marine 
transportation links. In addition, during the period of conflict, world gold production 
levels fluctuated, a consequence of the shortage of manpower following the 
diversion of workers into both the forces and the production of munitions; in South 
Africa a record high of just over 23.5 million ounces of newly mined gold was 
recorded in 1915 the figure was not bettered until 1932.129 
 
     The legacy of war had taught the British government that gold was a commodity 
that needed to be tightly controlled. When the conflict ended in 1918 it left its mark 
on the international economy fracturing links once made by gold. Derek Aldcroft 
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observed that ‘a war on a scale larger than any before conceived possible could not 
fail to leave its mark on the economic and social life of the world economy.’130 
Whilst no official restrictions were imposed immediately by Britain for the 
ownership of gold, unlike the United States, which upon entering the war in 1917 
banned the export of gold from its shores; this was possibly out of protectionism of 
its existing gold reserves and also as a reaction to the inert gold production in 
America since 1905.131 In contrast to Britain, the American stock of gold had 
dramatically increased over the previous four years and the vaults of the Federal 
Reserve, in its role as regulator of the economy and banker to the US government, 
held over 415 million ounces of gold, in addition to Treasury holdings were 
calculated in excess of 475 million ounces.132 In Britain much of the monetary gold 
had been removed from everyday circulation and replaced by notes. As the war 
ended the depleted stocks of British gold needed to be replenished. Ally suggests 
that the Bank could no longer rely upon traditional relations and had to find new 
methods to ‘control and manipulate the international’ supply as it attempted to 
bolster international confidence in the London financial market.133 
 
     One method initiated by the Bank of England, in an attempt to stop gold 
gravitating towards markets in New York was to enter a new agreement with the 
representatives of the South African gold mining companies. In return they could 
expect to receive the highest price obtainable for their gold at the point of sale. The 
1919 ‘July Agreement’, as it was referred to, acted as a guarantee that ensured gold 
would be shipped to London for sale. Unlike the wartime August Agreement, under 
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the new July Agreement the Bank became a receiving depot for gold, and the 
producers remained free to sell at the market price. Upon receipt of the gold the 
Bank made an advance payment to the producers bank equal to 77s per standard 
ounce of raw gold, which was later repaid at a special rate of interest from the 
proceeds of the sale of gold; the Bank made no charge for its services and purchased 
gold at 77s 9d per standard ounce. Subject to a six month cancellation notice either 
side had the option to cancel the agreement, which formed the basis for the daily 
gold fix in London. 
 
     Rachel Harvey in her study of the Gold Fixing in London suggested that the July 
Agreement reclaimed and secured London’s supremacy in the international financial 
arena. It provided a thoroughfare, or clearing house for gold. Harvey detailed an in-
depth account of the development and infrastructure of the post-war gold market that 
emerged in London. N M Rothschild & Sons played a significant role in the 
reconfiguration of the gold market. The Bank appointed Rothschild as its agent, due 
to the pivotal role played by the firm as banker, refiner and existing agent for many 
of the South African gold producers that stood the firm in good stead. As agent for 
the Bank Rothschild’s own position to gold was reinforced and the firm assumed an 
administrative control over all gold entering London.134 Gold was sold through 
Rothschild to the London bullion brokers. The terms of the agreement stated that: 
All fine gold available on any day will be delivered by the refiners to 
Rothschild. Rothschild decided at 11 o’clock each morning, having regard to 
the various exchanges, what was the best sterling price which could be 
obtained... the brokers were given the opportunity of bidding and would 
obtain their requirements if the price they bid equally or exceeded the 
realisation price fixed by Rothschild.135 
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The first Gold Fixing in London took place on 12 September and the price was fixed 
at £4 18s 9d per ounce.136 However, despite acceptance by the South African gold 
producers of the July Agreement a degree of bitterness remained as their gold 
remained tied to London. 
 
     The Royal Mint Refinery emerged from the conflict in a strong position, 
regardless of the significantly reduced levels of gold imported into London during 
the years of war records showed that 17.5 million ounces of gold was treated. 137 
Rothschild sought to return quickly to the pre-war operating practice when it had 
received regular batches of unrefined gold mainly from the Cape. The turning point 
came in 1919 when shipments of gold flowed to London and it soon returned to its 
pre-war speciality of bulk refining, processing large quantities of bullion for 
governments, banks, gold producers and bullion brokers.138 By the end of 1919 the 
Refinery had treated nearly 10,500 million ounces of gold.139 The Refinery 
benefitted from the new treatment method introduced by Charles de Rothschild in 
1912. The Lodge-Cottrell equipment brought a number of operational benefits; 
increased refining capabilities, shorter processing time, and prove more cost 
effective. Overall the operation would benefit from a lower loss of gold particles, 
which in turn reduced overheads and the general costs of refining. In 1919 the 
Rothschild refinery was well placed to cope with the increased demands the backlog 
of gold presented.  
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     By 1919 Johnson Matthey had embraced the technological advance in metallurgy, 
which had been advanced through the development and production of war-time 
munitions at its factory. In the immediate post-war the firm seized upon the new 
opportunities the advance presented and increased its activities. It expanded the 
scope of its refining capabilities and added the treatment of platinum and light 
engineering, including rolled and liquid gold, to its portfolio. The operational change 
set them apart from Rothschild, projecting them forward in the post-war era better 
prepared and able to offer specialist services to industry. Unfortunately the Raphael 
refinery, despite extending the scope of its war-time production capabilities, failed to 
realign its business after the war and became a victim of financial difficulties in the 
turbulent economic climate.140 The small void left by Raphael’s departure was filled 
by the Sheffield Smelting Company.141 
 
     Johnson Matthey’s post-war expansion went beyond British shores. The firm 
proposed a merger with the Sheffield Smelting Company and one of the biggest gold 
and silver houses in America, Handy and Harman, with a view to form an 
international smelters and refiners.142 The move would have created one of the most 
influential and precious metal businesses in the world. Board members at the 
Sheffield Smelting Company rejected the offer, despite the firm being in a dire 
economic position. Nothing came of the intended merger. Ronald Wilson, in his 
history of the Sheffield Smelting Company, considered that Johnson Matthey were 
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‘uninhibited by a policy of standing still.’ 143 Wilson suggested that Rothschild and 
the Sheffield Smelting Company had a close working relationship. It was certainly 
close enough for Rothschild to offer financial support once it learnt of the financial 
problems the firm faced.144 Despite the offer the crisis eased and business increased. 
All three firms maintained a good working relationship mainly because each had its 
own sphere of expertise and as such generally avoided any direct competition. 
 
The main challenge for the London refining houses came directly from plans put 
forward in 1918 by the Chamber of Mines (the Chamber) to establish a native 
refinery in South Africa. The Chamber founded in 1889 was made up of 
representatives from the principal South African mining community. Its function was 
to provide a platform for greater co-operation between the growing forces it 
represented the interests of its members, and promote the development of the 
industry.145 Support for the Refinery had gathered pace during the conflict when the 
production of gold from the empire, and the maintenance of a steady supply were 
described as being ‘of the greatest imperial importance’ to the British 
Government.146 The contribution this made to the war effort was acknowledged by 
the gold producers, who were fully aware that supplies presented Britain with an 
economic advantage over other financial markets. 
 
     Evelyn Wallers, President of the Chamber of Mines 1914, 1916-19 and 1924, had 
frequently raised concerns during the conflict over access to a steady supply of gold 
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for the British Government. 147 He feared that falling production levels, escalating 
extraction costs and increased overheads might render many of the lower grade 
mines in South Africa operationally unviable.148 He noted that the Bank of England 
had not helped the situation by maintaining the same fixed price of gold since 1914, 
and had failed to review the price. Despite appeals and Wallers’ general anxieties 
being known, in addition to events being reported in confidential government 
reports, no action was taken to redress the situation by the British Government.149 
British control of empire gold was tested in 1918 when a number of gold producers 
from South Africa attempted to ship and sell consignments of gold in the New York 
market. The shipment was stopped and an announced made that the act was 
considered ‘unpatriotic’.150 The significance of such a move is not be underestimated 
and should be viewed as a direct challenge to British authority. 
 
     In September 1918 at a meeting of the Chamber of Mines the main topic on the 
agenda was the Transvaal gold situation, which was reported as having become 
‘serious’. Wallers informed members that out of 49 contributing companies, just 
under half were reportedly making losses and he feared that the end was in sight for 
many of these mines. He suggested that ‘it would be a pity if the actual closing down 
of some mines was required to bring home the real position.’151 A post-war industry 
review to find savings in gold production advocated that overheads could be cut if a 
native refinery were established closer to the source of production.152 London, 
however, continued to do nothing. Russell Ally, in his research into war-time Anglo-
African relations, highlighted the rising tension and mounting pressure on the Bank 
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of England to control gold output, which was crucial in safeguarding Britain’s 
position in the world economy, and any alteration to this relationship would have 
affected Britain’s economic standing.153 Therefore, perhaps the reluctance of the 
British authorities to intervene or instigate changes was merely an attempt to 
maintain the existing status quo for as long as possible. 
 
     The establishment of a native refinery was advocated by the Union Government 
and advanced by leading mining officials. Samuel Evans, Chairman of the Crown 
Mines Company 1909-35, advanced the nationalist argument. He actively 
campaigned for greater autonomy for the mining industry in South Africa. Evans 
argued that when in 1910 when the Union of South Africa had received dominion 
status the gold producers should have been placed in the ‘same favourable position 
as the gold producers in Australia and Canada.’154 Evans observed that the producers 
of both countries had retained control over native gold and had no restrictions 
imposed on the markets in gold could be sold in.155 Support for the present campaign 
increased following the temporary establishment of a refinery and Mint in Bombay 
in 1917, which had aggrieved a great number of producers in Africa.  
 
     Evan’s campaign promoted the collective dissatisfaction felt by producers at 
having to continue to send gold for treatment to London, a move considered no 
longer beneficial as it was detrimental to profits and restricted the markets in which 
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their produce could be sold on this basis the following offer was made to the British 
Government: 
The Chamber will advance to the Government as and when required, the 
amount necessary to erect and fully equip on a suitable site on the 
Witwatersrand, preferably on the railway, a Refinery and Mint sufficiently 
large to deal with the whole annual output of British South Africa, including 
Rhodesia, say up to 12,000,000ozs of bullion per annum.156 
 
A number of additional provisos were put forward; the right to tender for the minting 
of other governments’ coins; and no restrictions on the exportation of the output of 
gold.157 Evans anticipated the news would not be greeted well by the London refiners 
and commented that ‘the proposals to refine and mint in South Africa [were] bound 
to meet with the strongest opposition from them as well as from the Bank of 
England’ he concluded that ‘as far as I can see they have no argument beyond an 
appeal to prejudice.’158 The final part of the report addressed the future distribution 
of gold. India, Egypt, the Far-East and South America were pinpointed as target 
export markets, with direct shipping rather than sending gold via London.159 The 
report laid out economic savings on offer for the South African gold industry. 
 
     News of the new Refinery first appeared in the British press in April 1919. It was 
reported in The Times that the Union Government had plans to pass legislation to 
treat gold in South Africa, instead of sending it to London.160 Further reports that 
appeared in The Times suggested the rapid and successful war-time development of 
South African industries had ‘conjured up the vision in the minds of certain people 
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that South Africa [was] destined to greatness as a monetary centre.’161 Despite plans 
still being in their infancy, it was quickly announced that the new refinery would 
save the gold industry in the region of between £300,000 and £400,000 each year.162 
By July operational issues had been resolved and the location of the mint and 
refinery was to be erected at Germiston, south of Pretoria, which was favoured over 
Johannesburg due to the location of the garrison that would provide additional 
protection. It was also felt that the central gold reserve should be situated in the 
Union capital.163  
 
In London, Johnson Matthey and Rothschild joined forces sharing information about 
the unfolding developments for the planned new refinery. Representatives from both 
firms approached Governor Cokayne at the Bank of England for regular updates. 
However, it was suggested by Cokayne that the present situation was a consequence 
of the earlier failure by both Rothschild and Johnson Matthey to pass on the earlier 
savings, after the upgrade in machinery in the pre-war period when treatment costs to 
gold producers who felt aggrieved at being overcharged.164 In response both firms 
reviewed the treatment costs and a reduction of 1d per ounce of gold was made. 
George Buess observed that the Governor seemed pleased that Rothschild had taken 
steps to reduce costs. However, it was noted that he was of the opinion that ‘the 
matter had now gone so far that nothing would prevent the producers from 
establishing a refinery in South Africa.’165 When pushed further by Rothschild as to 
whether the Royal Mint Refinery had a future, Governor Cokayne was unable to 
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provide any real guidance, although he suggested that ‘if he were in the position of 
the owners of that institution he would certainly not close it.’166  
 
     Sir Lionel Phillips, London representative of the Central Mining & Investment 
Corporation Ltd., was more forthcoming regarding developments overseas and kept 
Rothschild and Johnson Matthey informed. He urged both London refiners to work 
with the gold producers. Johnson Matthey was keen to offer assistance and establish 
a refinery in South Africa.167 Johnson Matthey encouraged Rothschild to join them 
in the overseas venture. However, Rothschild had already reviewed its options and 
had made the decision that ‘there was no advantage in helping the South Africans to 
cut our own throats and that New Court could on no account join in establishing or 
running a refinery at that distance from London.’168 In the meantime another threat 
was looming as plans were forming at the Bank of England to establish and operate a 
new refinery in London. 
 
     Early in 1919 plans were conceived at the Bank of England to establish and 
operate a new London refinery in a bid to foster greater control over the London gold 
market. The Bank was keen to strengthen relations with the South African gold 
producers ahead of the completion of the new Rand Refinery. It was reported that the 
‘Crown [was] anxious for the Bank’s to undertake this business.’169 Governor 
Cokayne informed Johnson Matthey and Rothschild of the Bank’s plans and 
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observed that it was not ‘intended to be hostile to the existing refiners’.170 Both firms 
received a summons to attend the Bank and were quizzed about the daily operations, 
price structure and treatment methods favoured. However, rather than use their 
refining expertise as consultants for the new build the Governor turned to Sir 
Thomas Kirke Rose, chemist and assayer at the Royal Mint, Tower Hill, and Sir 
John Cawston, Royal Mint, Ottawa (later Deputy Master Royal Mint, Tower Hill) to 
make the project a reality. Once the Bank had established that it was not beyond its 
powers, or prohibited under the Bank Charter of 1844, the chlorine system of 
refining was agreed upon and the St Luke’s Refinery was established. Keen to press 
on with the project by mid March building work was underway. The key principal in 
construction was that economy be paramount. St Luke’s Refinery was to be 
established on land already owned by the Bank in Baldwin Street, close to the City. 
Before building work began the site had to be cleared, which proved no mean feat as 
at the time it accommodated 300 persons. Financial inducement, assistance with 
removal costs to properties in close proximity and the lure of lower rents enabled the 
Bank’s agent, Mr Goodman, to successfully clear the site.171  
 
     Construction costs, including the freehold of the site, amounted to £100,000 and 
an additional £18,000 was spent equipping the refinery. It was agreed that R Pearson, 
an employee of the Royal Mint in Ottawa, for a modest increase in his salary would 
be seconded to the Bank to manage the new St Luke’s Refinery for a year. Pearson, 
an experienced refiner had worked at the Royal Mint in Australia and had assisted 
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with the installation of the new refinery at the Royal Mint in Ottawa in 1916.172 
Slightly later than anticipated the first batch of gold was delivered and treated at St 
Luke’s Refinery on Monday 15 November 1920.173 Astonishingly the Bank 
announced that the Refinery was prepared to ‘refine at cost’ in order to retain 
business in London.174 A risky strategy designed to attract gold to the new facility, 
but more to the point it address the long standing complaint of the gold producers of 
the high treatment charges in London. 
 
     In 1922 operations at the Rand Refinery began. It was a foregone conclusion that 
once the new South African refinery was fully operational the quantity of gold 
requiring treatment in London would diminish. The Rand Refinery became the 
largest refinery of its kind in the world, with the capacity to treat over half the 
world’s output of gold.175 Earlier fears became a reality and gold was diverted away 
from London to the new treatment facility. The future outlook of the gold refining 
industry in London was bleak. One of the first casualties was the St Luke’s Refinery 
as it became increasingly difficult to attract raw gold to the new London facility.176 It 
limped along until March 1923 before it finally closed, having produced only 51,000 
gold bars.177 A cable was sent to Pearson, by then working at the Royal Mint in 
Pretoria, that the ‘Bank desires to liquidate Refinery. Is any machinery or equipment 
wanted in South Africa.’178 Johnson Matthey and Rothschild were unable to fend off 
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competition from the new Rand Refinery and lost the market dominance they had 
enjoyed since the middle of the nineteenth century. Faced with the prospect of no 
gold to treat Johnson Matthey suspended its gold operation, deciding to concentrate 
on the treatment of platinum. 179  Much of the equipment was dismantled and offered 
to the Chamber of Mines.180 Rothschild continued to treat parcels of gold, although 
greatly reduced in size, which arrived in London. The operation increased its 
treatment of silver and also diversified into the treatment of copper foil and other 
metals. 
 
One of the strengths of the London financial market had been the unrestrictive 
movement of gold. As such any restrictions to the free movement of gold would 
hinder Britain’s post-war recovery. In 1920 a disturbing trend emerged as gold 
imported into Britain no longer balanced the large outflows of the metal leaving the 
shores.181 Paul Einzig, the economic historian, calculated that in 1920 there was a 
deficit between imports and exports levels of just below £42 million.182 Concerns 
were vented over the large outward movement of gold from Britain, a topic that 
dominated the period due to the prevailing desire for the British economy to return to 
the gold standard. Rothschild and Johnson Matthey both acted as consultants to 
Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England from 1920 to 1944, who sought 
their advice over the matter. 
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     Norman consulted both firms over his plans to restrict the movement of bullion 
and they assisted with the drawing up of the preliminary paper which resulted in the 
eventual implementation of the Gold and Silver (Export Control) Act 1920. The Act 
was an attempt to tighten controls over the import and export of bullion, and control 
the melting of coin by licence only. The new legislation received fierce opposition in 
the both the House of Commons and House of Lords. The main objections were 
directed towards possible adverse effects, as rather than the desired free movement 
of gold it was feared that the implementation of such restrictions would be 
detrimental: 
To put a permanent prohibition on the matter of export, you naturally prohibit 
the import, because nobody is going to send gold they produce to this country 
for sale if they know perfectly well that on arrival in this country that gold is 
going to be seized by the Government … They lose all control of it. Only 
certain people under certain conditions will be allowed to export it. The 
consequence will be that you will stop the inflow of gold into this country the 
moment the producers of gold know that they or anybody else are not to be 
allowed a free market in the commodity.183 
 
It was not in the interests of either Rothschild or the London bullion market in 
general for gold exports to be limited by such legislation. However, Rothschild was 
appointed licence controller by the Bank of England and thus implemented the 
distribution of licences on the bank’s behalf. Norman had full confidence in the 
ability of the Rothschild bank and held them in high esteem. He said that ‘the more I 
hear about the business the more convinced I am of the desirability of arranging that 
all gold exported under such Licences shall be shipped either by yourselves or by the 
Bank of England.’184 Nevertheless, export levels subsided only to improve again by 
1924 to just below £14 million. It is debateable if there was a direct correlation 
between the downturn of export levels and the implementation of legislation 
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alone.185 However, for Rothschild the Act reinforced its relationship with the Bank 
of England and provided the opportunity for them to exert their control over gold 
and the import and export of a much sought after commodity. Rothschild used their 
knowledge of and influence over the London bullion market to secure a coveted 
working relationship with the Bank of England and used the notoriety afforded to 
entice business from across the Atlantic to New Court. 
 
     Throughout the 1920s Rothschild continued to build on the firm’s connection to 
gold whilst strengthening its international position. Representatives of Rothschild 
frequently travelled to the United States to promote foreign exchange business. In 
reports back to London it was Rothschild’s consistent connection to gold, through 
the shipments it arranged to Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in New York, that ‘excited the envy 
of the whole banking world.’186 This was important for Rothschild because formal 
advertising was not in the normal remit of a merchant bank. Cowles observed that ‘in 
those days it was considered inexpressibly vulgar for a merchant bank to solicit new 
business, even to advertise.’187 She noted that it was an unwritten rule that 
Rothschild scrupulously observed.188 The general Rothschild philosophy was that 
potential clients ‘know where we live… it they want to do business with us let them 
come and talk to us.’189 During the inter-war period international promotion of 
Rothschild fell to Samuel Stephany, general manager at the merchant bank. Stephany 
overseas on the firm’s behalf and in the 1920s was a regular visitor to the United 
States. His remit was to promote and increase the foreign exchange business for the 
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bank. In his regular reports to Rothschild, Stephany inform the London office that 
disappointingly level of interest in the foreign exchange side were low but it was 
Rothschild connection to gold shipments that generated the most interest. In one 
report he wrote that: 
Every shipment is the subject of 2 newspaper paragraphs, once when it is 
dispatched and again when it arrives. Our gold is as you know, practically the 
only business done for private account, all other arrivals here being for the 
British and French Governments and the United States Federal Reserve 
Bank. The New York Banks are anxious to participate in the publicity 
obtained from these Gold importations and in every case I have been 
confronted with a request to share the gold business in return for business 
given by the Banks to us.190  
 
Stephany received numerous enquiries from American brokers seeking access to 
gold shipments. He sought the advice of the London office as he felt unable to take 
further action to accommodate the requests, as he did not wish to unbalance the 
bank’s existing relations with Kuhn, Leob & Co. Stephany believed it would be 
difficult to obtain any additional business but passed details on to New Court of 
various New York financial houses that were all ‘very anxious to obtain part of the 
gold shipments.’191 Rothschild were in a pivotal position as the owners of a major 
refinery, agents for and intermediary between the South African gold producers and 
the Bank of England affording them special privileges over competitors. Clearly the 
Royal Mint Refinery was a valuable asset in the overall business portfolio of N M 
Rothschild & Sons, for it reinforced its relationship to gold and increased 
opportunities and access to other markets.  
 
     The profitability of the Royal Mint Refinery at the beginning of the 1920s 
increased. Company accounts reveal that both Charles and Anthony, received 
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£15,000 each from the venture in 1920.192 Under the bonus scheme that operated at 
the Refinery workmen also benefited. In 1920 the total bonuses paid out amounted to 
£2,225; this reflected a percentage of the annual profit, and was distributed according 
to length of service and wage level per worker193 The number of regular staff 
employed at the Royal Mint Refinery fluctuated between 100 and 130 men.194 Due 
to the nature of the work, few women held permanent positions at the refinery. 
However, wives of refinery workers stepped in to assist with busy periods and 
weighed and wrapped gold bars. Temporary staffs were engaged when the volume of 
work dictated. During one busy period Elton, who worked in the bullion office at 
New Court, organised a gang of casual workers from the docks to unload gold and 
silver. Palin recalled that ‘the refinery was kept busy when the Chinese Government 
decided to encash their vast stocks of silver sycee and Maria Theresa dollars… as it 
arrived at London Docks it was transported to the Refinery in huge articulated meat 
lorries.’195 Lorries queued outside the refinery gates packed with sycee (Chinese 
silver ingots).196 To clear the metal staff worked three eight-hour shifts a day, seven 
days a week. 
 
     Wages and bonus payments fluctuated. The annual wage bill at the Refinery for 
1919 was in the region of £34,500 and had decreased to around £24,500 by 1923. 
Figures expressed in Table 3, demonstrate the variation in profits made at the 
Refinery. Whilst company profits fluctuated they do not drop proportionately, 
despite the significant reduction in treating gold, any loss appears to have been 
compensated for by the increased levels of silver requiring treatment. Partners drew 
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equal salaries from the business and these fluctuated and were linked to the 
performance of the venture. Wages for the two groups of workers at the Refinery, 
English and French, declined between 1920 and 1924 and although bonuses 
continued to be paid they were not fixed and decreased overtime. Table 3. does not 
reveal the number of employees per year and whether these altered. If numbers had 
reduced it would have been through natural wastage, retirement, rather forced 
redundancies. From 1922 the rapid hike in expenditure for utilities gave great 
concern and workers were told to keep refinery costs to a minimum. Unfortunately 
there are no later records that might over a comparison to be made. In 1923 the 
overall management of the refinery passed to Anthony, on the death of Charles.  
Table 3. ‘RMR Profit 1920 to 1923’ 
Bullion Private Journal entry 1920 1921 1922 1923 
End of Year Profit £34,690 £43,203 £39,348 £45,629 
Anthony de Rothschild £15,000 £20,000 £15,000 £17,000 
Charles de Rothschild £15,000 £20,000 £15,000 £17,000 
Bonus paid to staff £2,275 £1,845 £2,205 £2,430 
English Workmen Wages £27,375 £27,268 £26,680 £20,985 
French Workmen Wages £7,146 £6,420 £5,391 £3,572 
Gold treated at RMR 
 (gross weight ozs) 7,888,525 5,473,640 2,530,719 1,642,061 
Silver treated at RMR  
(gross weight ozs)  22,687,327 31,457,316 42,621,684 44,456,854 
Utilities 
(Gas/Electric/Water) £10,439 £11,418 £33,688 £24,557 
Coal and Coke £8,249 £9,273 £6,809 - 
Source: RAL, V11/90/1, Bullion Private Journal and 148/24/3- RMR Silver and Gold Treated – 




In conclusion, control of South African gold was considered paramount to Britain’s 
economic recovery in the immediate post-war period by the Government and the 
Bank of England. The fear was that any loss of British control would advance the 
post-war position of the New York financial market. The Bank of England 
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manipulated market forces in order to retain control over new gold production from 
South Africa. For its part N M Rothschild & Sons, through its association with the 
bullion trade, was well placed to secure a prominent position and assisted the British 
authorities to secure shipments of gold to London. Appointed agents to the Bank, the 
relationship of the merchant bank to the financial markets was strengthened. The 
close relationship with producers and the ability to utilise the existing network of 
reliable contacts helped to make this possible. Trust and reliability were key factors 
in Rothschild success. These also featured in the relationship between the merchant 
bank and successive Governors of the Bank of England, Cokayne and Norman. 
Rothschild was able to secure a place at the centre of the London bullion market and 
through their control of gold reinforce their international standing. 
 
     In 1919 the biggest challenge to Rothschild came in the form of the Rand 
Refinery. The Bank of England rather than ease the burden added to that of the 
London refiners and established St Luke’s Refinery in direct competition. Once the 
Rand Refinery became fully operational the venture failed. Johnson Matthey 
mothballed its gold treatment plant and Rothschild diversified into other profitable 
areas of operation. 
 
     The Royal Mint Refinery continued to be a viable and profitable concern in the 
Rothschild portfolio. Rothschild strategy, to make a small amount at each stage of 
production, suggests that the Refinery was only one of the activities the merchant 
bank complimented the other profitable activities; these included mineral 
exploration, mining ventures, transit insurance, refining, broking and foreign 
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investments. Profits generated by the Refinery in no way compared with those on 
offer in some of the deals the merchant bank was involved with. However the 
Refining operation provided a handsome profit for Partners and workmen. The 
refinery provided a steady regular income for its workforce and offered a secure 
pension upon retirement. Generally the men that entered the employ of the Refinery 
clocked up impressive numbers of years working there, in some cases this extending 
to over 40 years. The management of the refinery during the 1920s fell onto the 
shoulders of Buess. The partners were happy to leave the daily running of the 
operation to him. The Rothschild partners did maintain a keen interest in the 
operation. The legacy of Charles was the upgrade of equipment in 1912, which 
certainly gave a stay of execution for the venture in the immediate post-war period. 
Financial hardship and lack of gold for treatment was a threat to economic success. 
The business operated in an international environment, which in the post-war period 
was marred by external shocks and movement restrictions. However, the refinery 
managed to survive no employee was laid off, even when gold reduced to a trickle. 
Perhaps this is why Palin believed the Rothschild operated in a feudalistic style. It 
was the philanthropic approach taken by Rothschild, and the many acts of kindness 
bestowed upon their employees, which ensured the loyalty of the workforce. 
 




A Dull Period? 1925-1931 
 
This chapter will examine the impact Britain’s introduction of the Gold Standard Act 
1925 had upon the Royal Mint Refinery. The legislation fixed the price of gold 
brought and sold in the London market. The Refinery operated in an international 
sphere and gold was sent to London from all corners of the British Empire. Profit 
was the main factor that influenced market orientation and gold was automatically 
sent to the market that would yield the greatest financial return. The Royal Mint 
Refinery was forced to adapt to a new set of challenges and how it rose to these will 
be examined. As will be shown, refinery records indicate that the business 
experienced a significant decline in gold treated by the firm between 1925 and 1929. 
But rather than the ‘dull period’ recorded by staff at the Refinery, my research 
suggests that the period was one of much activity. Reasons for decline and how 
Rothschild filled the void left by gold is considered. Was this an isolated experience 
unique to the Royal Mint Refinery or had it been common amongst the other London 
refining houses? As had happened previously agreements were drawn up between 
the main refiners and the terms of these will be discussed. The review of the period 
ends in 1931, which coincides with Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard. 
 
Britain’s return to a gold standard exchange was announced by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Winston Churchill, in the Budget Speech of 28 April 1925. As it did 
before World War 1 Britain’s currency would have a set value against gold, which 
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fixed its parity against other currencies on the gold standard. 197 The Gold Standard 
Act 1925 came into effect the following day and the price fixed at $4.26, the same 
exchange rate as prior to the outbreak of War in 1914. Export restrictions, introduced 
under the Gold and Silver Act 1920 (discussed in chapter 3), were automatically 
removed. In the economic malaise of the post war era, unlike the gold standard of the 
pre-war days, the issue of gold coins was deemed by Churchill to be an unnecessary 
and an ‘unwarrantable extravagance’ that the financial stringency of the day would 
no longer support.198 Churchill appealed to all classes in the public interest ‘to 
continue to use notes and to make no change in the habits and practices they [had] 
become used to in the last ten years.’199 A further proviso of the Gold Standard Act 
suspended the general public’s right to tender bullion to the Royal Mint to be coined; 
in future only the Bank of England (the Bank) would hold this role. The Bank was 
placed under an obligation to sell gold bullion in amounts of not less than 400 fine 
ounce at a fixed price of £3 17s 10d per standard ounce.  
 
     The return to a gold standard exchange had been part of the British government’s 
planned post-war reconstruction. The plan attracted much controversy at the time, 
and even today continues to receive attention from scholars. However, one area that 
has been largely neglected was Churchill’s ambition that Britain’s return to gold 
offered a revival of international and inter-imperial trade. He hoped that one 
uniformed standard of value over the wide area of the British Empire would make it 
‘like ships in a harbour whose gangways are joined and who rise and fall together 
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with tide.’200 It anticipated a revival would ensure Britain, if not the central position, 
a leading place in world financial systems.201 Peter Clarke in Keynes, The Twentieth 
Century’s Most Influential Economist noted that Britain’s return to gold had been out 
of necessity as ‘London’s financial prestige had been at stake’.202 He observed that 
‘the gold standard was the symbol… the bankers article of faith it meant that the 
pound would be as good as gold and that the pound could look the dollar in the 
face.’203 The gold standard provided stability in exchange rates because gold had 
universal acceptability. Gold at that point in time, more so than paper currencies, 
carried confidence. Britain’s return to gold gave the world a trading and financial 
centre that commanded confidence and enabled the settlement systems to work. 
 
     The argument that 1925 was a turning point in Britain’s post-war economic 
recovery has been advanced by a number of historians. William A. Lewis, for 
example, considered 1925 as ‘a cheerful year both in economics and politics… The 
dark days of post-war dislocation seemed to have been left behind and the prospects 
seemed good.’204 The short boost coincided with Britain’s return to the gold 
standard. Aldcroft observed that throughout the extended period prior to the return to 
gold the ‘faith in the power of the gold standard was unquestioned.’205 He noted that 
‘each country thought of itself as attached to gold rather than attached to other 
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countries currencies through gold.’206 Aldcroft considered that the settlement of 
reparations and the signing of the Locarno Pact in 1925 were contributing factors 
that reduced tension and friction in international affairs – a bonus for a merchant 
bank such as N M Rothschild & Sons involved in international finance.  
 
     The London gold market failed to benefit from the fixed rate of exchange. On 28 
April 1925, the same day as the budget speech and the day before the gold standard 
came into force, Rothschild sold 224 bars of gold on the London gold market at a 
rate of 86/d per fine ounce. The following day gold bars were offered for sale at the 
quoted price of 84/11½d per fine ounce. No gold was sold until 5 May when 73 bars 
were sold at a price of 84/11¼ per fine ounce.207 The passing of the Gold Standard 
Act meant that the price of gold reverted to the old statutory price of 1914. The Bank 
of England guaranteed to buy or sell unlimited quantities of gold at fixed prices at a 
buying price of 84/9¾d per fine ounce, 77/9d per ounce standard ounce, and a selling 
price of 84/11½d per fine ounce, 77/10d½ per standard ounce.208 Following the 
return to a gold standard the daily price of gold continued to be fixed each morning 
at eleven o’clock at the Rothschild bank. Throughout the period the price of gold 
generally fell between the two Bank of England fixed prices, although periodically 
small fluctuations occurred.209 Gold from the British Empire constituted the majority 
of business transactions through the London market. The Bank of England also 
offered gold held for sale on behalf of clients at the daily fixing, only purchasing the 
gold at the statutory price for the Bank’s own reserves if no higher price could first 
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be obtained through the market.210 During the first two weeks following the 
restoration of the Gold Standard there were small demands for gold bars amounting 
to £2,100,000, which increased to £2,500,000 the following week. Thereafter the 
amount purchased improved almost weekly until it reached £8,651,000.211 The gold 
holding of the Bank of England at the end of 1925 stood at £142,763,880.212 By 
1928 most of the principal countries had returned to a gold standard. 
 
     According to the annual round up of the bullion market, presented by Samuel 
Montagu & Co., 1926 was a year of ‘disappointment and anxiety’.213 The immediate 
impact of the gold standard was to fix a price for gold. For the gold industry the 
fixed price meant a loss of profit, less investment potential, effectively the return to 
the gold standard stalled development of the gold industry.214  Although on a 
positive note the company’s bullion letter recorded that: 
Further advances have been made in international amity, exchange 
difficulties and the new national or more stringent tariff barriers created by 
the new national entities and other countries have still continued to hamper 
World Trade – so vital for the recuperation of labour and capital.215  
 
It was observed that  ‘the most interesting feature of the year has been the reduced 
demand from India’ with ‘direct shipments made from Durban to Bombay showing a 
reduction of about £4,000,000’.216 The decline clearly had a positive impact on the 
amount of gold shipped to Britain from the Transvaal and Rhodesia as imports 
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increased from the 1924 figure of £23,750,000 to £33,000,000.217 The gold export 
market also experienced some alterations in the world flow of gold. A fixed price on 
gold meant that profits made from purchasing gold had decreased and as a result 
fewer shipments of gold were sent to America.218 An enormous fall in shipments, 
from 3,860,000 ounces in 1924 to just 59,219 ounces in 1925, was reported by The 
Economist who blamed the downturn on Britain’s return to a gold standard. It was 
suggest that the introduction of the Act caused sterling currency to appreciate to a 
point at which gold was no longer as remunerative to the South African producers as 
sales to other parts of the world.219 Throughout 1925 a considerable quantity of gold 
exports, £12,500,000, in large consignments were conveyed by air to Germany.220 
The Bank of England was able, until September when continental demand increased, 
to secure a good portion of gold received by London each week, but the overall net 
holdings of the Bank, since returning to the gold standard, reduced from just over 
£11,000,000 in January to £5,424,000 by December.221 
 
     An employee of Rothschild remarked that the instigation of the gold standard in 
1925 marked a ‘dull period’ for the London gold market.222 Records at the Royal 
Mint Refinery support the statement. Initially a slight improvement in gold treated 
by the refinery was recorded for 1925 at just below 2.5 million ounces.223 However, 
decline soon returned to the refinery and from 1926 treated gold steadily dropped 
each year before an all time low was reached in 1929 when gold treated stood just 
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above 800,000 ounces.224 The main reason for the decline was due to profits; 
producers sought the market that presented the greatest profit for their gold. It was 
recorded that ‘the bulk of the South African production no longer came direct to the 
Royal Mint Refinery for realisation, since it was dealt with through the South 
African Reserve Bank or direct shipments from Durban to India.’225 In the twelve 
months preceding the reinstatement of the gold standard over half the gold produced 
in South Africa was sold locally, which had led to a change in exchange rates 
between Britain and South Africa. The Economist reported that: 
whereas, the union currency commanded a premium over sterling, the 
position gradually became reversed, and since May last, with the exception of 
a short period towards the end of the year, a premium was obtainable on 
transfer of funds from London to South Africa. This indicates a great change, 
and is the natural effect of the altered method of selling gold on the balance 
of trade between the two countries.226 
 
Thus another obstacle was placed in the way of the profitability of the Rothschild 
refinery that would need to be overcome. Supplies of gold in the London market 
remained comparatively low. The weekly shipments of gold bars from the Rand 
Refinery were now only offered when the price obtainable was in excess of the Bank 
of England price, sales were still made through Rothschild, and any unabsorbed gold 
was purchased by the Bank of England at the buying price.  
 
     The reintroduction of the gold standard, to all intents and purposes, marked the 
end of the African Gold Realisation Account operated by Rothschild. Although the 
impact was not immediate, by the end of May 1926 the first signs of strain appeared. 
Correspondence from the National Bank of South Africa alluded to the decision to 
withdraw from the Pool Account from 30 June 1926. The Pool Account had been set 
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up by Rothschild in 1919, following the re-establishment of shipments of gold from 
the South African producers to London immediately after World War 1. All gold had 
been sold on arrival in London and every transaction was passed through the Pool 
Account, profits were divided quarterly amongst members, in proportion to their 
contribution of fine ounces.227 The Pool Account enabled producers to act as a 
collective and to hold a degree of autonomy over the market. By 1926 this was no 
longer the case. In order to regain control and increase profitability the National 
Bank of South Africa sought to resume pre-1919 arrangements with Rothschild and 
Johnson Matthey. It proposed that gold requiring treatment would be divided equally 
between the two firms at the fixed price of the day. Whilst Johnson Matthey was 
eager to agree to the request Rothschild were reluctant to enter an agreement of this 
nature and cited a number of obstacles that stood in the way of making a profit from 
such a deal. The main concern was that during the earlier arrangement the price of 
gold hardly fluctuated from the Bank of England’s buying price of 77/9d per ounce 
standard, whereas the price now fluctuated between the Bank’s buying price and 
selling price. The view held was that it seemed: 
bad business for the refiners to agree to buy gold at a price which they cannot 
foresee and cannot control, unless they were [confident] that they would be 
able to refine in time to sell the total amount at the price at which they 
[contracted] to buy it.228  
 
The market was based on supply and demand and the price of gold reflected this. 
Therefore, had a refiner purchased gold at the Bank of England’s official selling 
price of the day of 84/11½d and the following day demand for gold diminished the 
refiner may only have realised a price of 84/9¾d, being the buying price for the day. 
Rothschild rejected the offer and explained the difficulty in reverting to pre-war 
trading conditions, despite some reassurances offered by the National Bank of South 
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Africa to include ‘reasonable safeguards’ in any agreement to counteract any 
anomaly. The Bank of England subsequently retired from the Pool Account together 
with several of the other sellers. 
 
     The implications of the decision taken were recorded by Rothschild who observed 
that ‘it seems useless to run a Pool Account on behalf of the remaining sellers’ for if 
various sellers decided to act independently it would have the effect of reducing the 
official gold price, except when demand exceeded the supply.229 It was therefore 
decided to suspend the account and inform all remaining members that: 
owing to complication of there being several sellers and in consequence of 
our inability to influence the price of gold, we shall no longer be able, in 
acting selling agents for them, to give them preference over other sellers, but 
that if they so desire we should be pleased to continue the Pool Account, 
reducing our charges to a minimum it should, however, be understood that 
we anticipate that the official price will rarely, if ever, exceed the Bank of 
England buying price, and that their production will be treated pari passu 
with other supplies.230  
 
A modest commission rate of 1/4 0/00 was offered to those who wished to retain 
membership to the Pool Account for gold sold in the market at 84/10⅛ d or over. A 
commission of 1/16 0/00 was charged in respect of all gold deposited at the Bank of 
England, these charges being debited to the seller. The South African Mines (gold 
refined at the Rand Refinery), Rhodesian Mines (gold refined in London) and the 
West African Mines (gold refined in London) made up the members of the revised 
Pool Account. The account was also used to distribute profits received from the 
interest of early payments (approximately 1d per ounce) and also the saving on 
shipping charges, etc., (in the region of 5d per ounce) when the policy of selling 
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South African gold ex- Durban was adopted.231 All gold was subsequently offered up 
at the gold fix by the Bank of England; through its appointed agent, Rothschild, 
which continued to sell South African gold in the London market. 
 
     During 1927 there was a significant drop in the amount of gold sent to the Royal 
Mint Refinery. Profits were affected by the lack of gold sent to London. Over the 
next two years the downward trend continued until 1929 as shown in Table 4. This 
also shows the subsequent effect the suspension of the Pool Account after 1926 had 
upon the Refinery. 
Table 4. ‘RMR Gold Treated 1925-1931’ 
Royal Mint Refinery Gold Treatment 
Year Oz. Year Oz. 
1925 2,362,370 1929 802,840 
1926 1,327,582 1930 5,592,160 
1927 891,025 1931 4,913,267 
1928 851,978     
 
Source: Compiled from RAL/148/24/3 –RMR Silver and Gold Treated from 1905 
to 1948. 
Table 5. ‘World Gold Production, 1925-1931’ 
World's Gold Production, 1925-1931 
 Year Oz. Year  Oz. 
1925 19,025,942 1929 19,500,152 
1926 19,349,118 1930 20,836,318 
1927 19,431,194 1931 22,818,701 
1928 19,700,049     
Source; Sharps & Wilkins' Bullion Circular Review of 1935, p.7. 
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An interesting feature of the period is that there is no correlation between the 
decreased business levels at the refinery and the variation in world gold production 
levels, which overall remained stable throughout the period with only minor 
fluctuations being recorded, as expressed below in Table 5. 
 
The pursuit of profit was the main factor that attracted gold to London. The last 
major gold rush had occurred in 1884 when the South African gold discoveries were 
made. Investment in the late 1920s mining industry was not as attractive as it had 
once been due to the increased difficulties in the recovery of gold and steep 
production costs that diminished an investor’s return. All of which contributed to the 
lack of incentive to increase world output. A report on the prospects of the South 
African gold mines published in The Economist, directed readers to prevailing 
factors that had saved the industry in the past ‘more than once the mining industry 
has been threatened by rising costs and has been saved by circumstances, which 
could not have been foreseen.’232 These circumstances were not present at this point 
in time. Despite the ability and enhanced skills of mining engineers’ and 
metallurgists’, which had further developed by the early 1930s, the gold industry had 
to wait until after the abandonment of the gold standard in 1931 before experiencing 
the next great leap in the profitably of gold production. 
 
N M Rothschild & Sons followed a well tried and tested business strategy in pursuit 
of profits. Michael Lisle-Williams identified a number of strategies engaged by 
merchant banking dynasties, particularly those under family control such as 
Rothschild, in order to fully exploit commercial opportunities. He observed that prior 
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to 1957 merchant banks were united behind the leadership of the Bank of England, 
and that any power struggles were hidden behind an impenetrable wall of silence.233 
N M Rothschild & Sons was larger than most of the other London establishments 
and had more power globally. The Royal Mint Refinery fitted into the overall 
business portfolio and strategy employed by the bank. The research of Miguel 
Lopez-Morell and Jose O’Kean highlighted patterns of behaviour, target sectors that 
attracted and influenced Rothschild to pursue business within certain chosen sectors. 
They identified certain prerequisites, which included trade sectors where there was a 
rigid demand, a highly concentrated supply and a large control of the product 
market.234 It was shown that through monopolistic practices and cohesive 
agreements Rothschild was able to develop control, directly and indirectly, in four 
international markets of various products; mercury, lead, copper and nickel and 
pyrites.235 The findings of Lopez-Morell and O’Kean could be applied to 
Rothschild’s relationship to gold, which exhibited a number of the variants 
presented. One key practice was the extensive research undertaken by Rothschild to 
acquire in-depth market knowledge; no investment was entered into blindly. In 1886 
the Exploration Company, an enterprise initiated by Nathaniel de Rothschild (1840-
1915), 1st Lord Rothschild, and Hamilton Smith, an American mining engineer was 
part of the resources Rothschild employed. The Exploration Company sponsored 
mining enterprises, through their involvement Rothschild gained an early foothold in 
many of the South African gold mines.236 The main element of the strategy was to 
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either assume administrative monopolies or take control of the leading business of 
the respective sectors. An example of this was the administrative control Rothschild 
gained over areas of the gold trade (discussed in chapter 3).  
 
     The monopolistic relationship of Rothschild was replicated and reinforced 
through the merchant banks relationship with the developing South African gold 
trade.237 Rothschild was able to build a platform for investment by offering finance 
to newly established mining ventures. Members of the Rothschild family also 
privately purchased share options in their own right, boosting market confidence.238 
Much of the administration for the mining syndicates was undertaken by firms 
located in London. Annual profits and dividends were generally paid in sterling. 
Rothschild would probably have facilitated a number of these transfers. Rothschild 
also profited from transhipping gold to London through the connection to the 
Alliance Insurance Company and freight insurance.239 Once gold reached London 
refining became part of the transaction. Through the credibility of the Royal Mint 
Refinery they were able to form special relationships with the Bank of England who 
entrusted the firm with the task of administrating the gold fix and had trusted the 
firm to issue licences that controlled the export of gold. However, as will be seen in 
the research into Partnership and Collaboration and Supply and Demand, there are 
                                                
237 In 1936 the cost of opening up a new mine was estimated to cost in the region of £500,000. A 
development period of 4 to 5 years before construction commenced was not unusual. It was 
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certain conditions when the Rothschild business strategy did not work. Johnson 
Matthey was the main rivals of the Royal Mint Refinery. Johnson Matthey hindered 
the overall control of gold that required refining. Also, Rothschild was less able to 
develop relations with gold producers outside the British Empire. How Rothschild 
dealt with Soviet gold after 1925 provides evidence of how political relations 
affected the market. 
 
     By 1925 the Royal Mint Refinery relied on gold produced in areas of the British 
Empire: gold sent from West Africa kept the refinery afloat. The strong market 
position in gold held by Rothschild had gradually diminished partly due to the 
opening of the Rand Refinery in 1923, which now treated much of the South African 
gold, and also because of Johnson Matthey. 240 From 1925 Johnson Matthey 
commanded a greater market share of gold sent to London for treatment. Both 
factors affected the profitability and performance of the Rothschild venture that was 
forced to compete for the depleted stocks of gold sent to London. The outlook for the 
Royal Mint Refinery was rather henceforward gloomy. 
 
Johnson Matthey, through a series of mergers, had strengthened and increased the 
share commanded by the firm in both the London market and internationally. Both 
refiners frequently tried to outbid each other for work. Despite the increased 
competition both firms held specific areas of expertise; the Rothschild refinery was 
recognised for its capacity and ability to undertake bulk refining contracts, which 
other London refiners were not capable of handling. Johnson Matthey specialised in 
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the treatment of platinum and as demand for platinum diminished the firm sought 
alternative work. Donald McDonald, an employee of Johnson Matthey, recalled that 
‘the earning power of the business was severely affected by the conditions of trade 
outside especially by the weakness of the platinum market.’241 The position of the 
firm was exacerbated following increased competition from German refiners, who 
by 1925 dominated the Scandinavian market. However, Johnson Matthey was able to 
offer customers a better deal for silver and fabricated metal. Although, in respect of 
bullion McDonald observed that competition was soon eradicated as the London 
firms would quote the same price and remarked that ‘unless a product of our own 
refinery was available there was nothing in it.’242 
 
     Most London refineries were affected by the downturn in business and 
subsequent attempts to fill the void left by gold were often thwarted. In the case of 
the Sheffield Smelting Company attempts to move into the new stainless steel 
market flopped. The period 1925-8 was recorded in the company’s history as dire.243 
The firm was not of the same calibre refiner as Rothschild or Johnson Matthey, and 
was unable to take advantage of same network of agents as the two larger firms. The 
venture stayed afloat with the help of Rothschild and Johnson Matthey who 
frequently passed business on. Also the firm was able to secure a contract with the 
Rand Refinery to treat the refinery’s ‘sweep’, which ensured its survival during the 
lean period.244 
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     According to McDonald, Johnson Matthey took advantage of the slack period to 
forged ahead with plans for modernisation adopting new refining techniques and 
moved into new areas of chemical research. Whilst there is little doubt that the firm 
took the lead over other refiners the advice of senior Rothschild employees was 
frequently sought. This offers an example of duopoly for direct competition slowly 
evaporated as both firms entered into a number of joint ventures. The close working 
relationship with Rothschild presented Johnson Matthey with a mechanism for 
international settlement as well as financial backing and security. In addition they 
were able to take advantage of the greater refining capabilities of the Rothschild 
venture, and the Lodge Cottrell vaults owned by the firm provided Johnson Matthey 
with an additional resource to attract foreign business. However, it was Johnson 
Matthey not Rothschild who had the foresight to break into the Soviet market and 
were able to purchase Russian residues from various gold refining operations, these 
had contained platinum and various other rare metal of little contemporary value; 
one example was Rhodium of which they later became principal suppliers.245 
 
     Part of the reorganisation of Johnson Matthey had involved the relocation of the 
refining operation, which had once sprawled across various locations in the City of 
London. These were subsequently brought together in a brand new purpose built five 
storey building located 12 miles from Hatton Garden at Brimsdown, near Enfield, 
North London. The move enabled the firm to specialise in the development of 
chemical practice and it invested heavily in a new laboratory. Although the main 
offices remained at Hatton Garden the Brimsdown location offered less restrictions 
than the built up City environment. The Sheffield Smelting Company also took 
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advantage of the lull in trade and introduced a variety of improvements to its 
operation. Some readjustments took place at the Royal Mint Refinery, mainly the 
improvement to the laboratory research division. Part of the planned improvements 
had been the engagement of specialised staff. Arthur Hunt was employed by the 
refinery in 1925 because of his extensive knowledge of platinum. Whilst at 
university Hunt had researched arsenical compounds – now referred to as chemical 
warfare agents. However, it was not until 1932 that improvements and upgrading of 
buildings and equipment were conceived by Rothschild. 
 
     It is interesting to note that the 1926 Samuel Montagu annual bullion review, 
following a review of gold levels and suggested remedies for improvements, made 
reference to Soviet gold output. It was suggested that if given ‘encouragement and 
protection’ Soviet gold production could be significantly increased.246 The Annual 
Bullion Review reported that: 
The Soviet Government has come to a friendly arrangement with the Lena 
Goldfields; this fact and the discovery of other gold bearing deposits in 
tributaries of the Lena, make the Soviet proportion of world gold supplies 
more promising than during recent years. Provided prospectors be given due 
encouragement and protection, the world’s production of gold could be 
substantially increased by systematically working the richly mineralised areas 
of Siberia.247 
 
The prospect of another Californian, Australian or South African gold strike created 
much excitement. A new find would boost the world’s production of gold 
substantially. This was news that would have been welcomed at the Royal Mint 
Refinery as shipments of gold sent to London from Africa had dwindled. The gold 
presented a renewed source of supply as Lena had been a customer of the Rothschild 
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refinery prior to the outbreak of the First World War, if only gold could be attracted 
to London.248 Part of this attraction depended upon Anglo-Soviet trade relations and 
the establishment of trading links.  
 
Historically, prior to 1914, gold productions levels in Imperial Russia had been 
sizeable, despite the primitive methods of mining used. Between 1914 and 1922 gold 
production levels had almost ceased to exist. Under the leadership of Lenin (1917-
1924) increased gold production levels was not regarded as being high on the list of 
priorities. Unlike a capitalist system, where holding gold was a necessity, in a 
socialist framework it was believed that gold would hold little value and become 
useless. One observer noted that ‘the Government itself owned all gold, as it did all 
minerals’ and whilst it was ‘trying hard to mine its other minerals such as iron, 
copper, zinc, and the like because these were recognised as useful under 
socialism.’249 Attention to gold was scant and the central Government held little 
interest in the metal, it did little to prevent the large scale gold smuggling operations 
that took place across the southern borders. 
 
     In 1921 Lenin wrote that gold might be used ‘to cover the walls and floors of 
public lavatories.’250 However, until the socialist paradise had been created, he 
conceded that the new Soviet State would need to store its gold in order to ‘sell it at 
the highest price, buy goods with it at the lowest price’ for ‘when living among 
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wolves, howl like the wolves.’251 Between 1922 and 1927 gold production levels, 
although sporadic, increased. Sabotage and the lack of resources to replace broken 
machinery meant that only easily extractable gold close was mined. Under Stalin 
(1924-1953) the gold industry entered a period of modernity and the Soviet Gold 
Trust was formed in 1927. Mining methods and engineers were recruited from the 
United States and introduced American working practices in a bid to improve 
production levels of the Soviet mines.252 By 1928 the number of mining schools had 
been increased and existing mining academies brought up to date with the latest 
methods of gold extraction in order to keep up with the increased demand for 
technical personnel. The industry underwent a radical overhaul and by the mid 1930s 
gold production levels had more than doubled to 5 million ounces a year, overtaking 
that of the USA, Canada and Australia. Despite the improvements to the Soviet gold 
industry output continued to lag behind South Africa’s.  
 
     One of the Britain’s principal post-war policies followed throughout the early 
1920s had been the normalisation of trade relations with the new Soviet State. In 
reality events were more complex and should not be oversimplified. Although an 
Anglo-Soviet accord between the two nations was agreed in 1920 it was subject to 
the enactment of four key points, which would allow trade barriers to be removed.253 
The failure to act on all points, in particular the recognition of the Soviet government 
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to pay compensation to private citizens and the settlement of other debts thwarted 
initial attempts to re-establish a full trading cycle. Strong opposition had come from 
bankers in the City of London, represented by Montagu Norman. The essence of 
their argument was that ‘no agreement should be signed unless the Soviet 
government recognised all rather than only some classes of debts contracted by 
themselves and by previous Russian governments.’254 However, the Soviet 
government was keen to establish trade links but on their terms. Notice of trade 
intentions were laid out in a telegram sent on 24 December 1920 between the Soviet 
representative in London and his colleagues in Moscow. It was noted that ‘we must 
first draw England and other countries into commercial and business intercourse 
with us; it is necessary that no commercial concessional interests should become so 
firm, that our refusal at the peace conference to pay old debts shall not result in a 
new blockade or intervention.’255 As gold was one of the only commodities the 
Soviets had to trade with, and one that was highly desirable amongst capitalist 
societies, there is no doubt that Britain took full advantage of the situation and 
regular shipments of gold found their way to London. Clarke suggested that supplies 
of gold were drawn to London simply as a reflection of the capital as a financial 
centre, with the presence of bullion dealers, brokers and banks that had the expertise 
and connections to dispose of large quantities of gold quickly through an established 
and stable wholesale market.256 Samuel Montagu’s 1927 annual bullion letter 
reported £4 million of Soviet gold had been sent to London. Nevertheless the 
                                                
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid., p. 426. 
256 Clarke, The Golden Thread, p. 64. 
Chapter 4: A Dull Period 
104 
 
window of opportunity was only opened for a short period before relations became 
strained.257 
 
The monopoly once enjoyed by Rothschild and the ability to secure a large 
proportion of the new supplies of the gold from South Africa lay in the past. In the 
future the playing field was much more level. The influence Rothschild once had 
over newly produced gold would be regularly challenged and it was the pursuit of 
the highest profit to be made on gold that would determine where shipments would 
land. The increased levels of Soviet gold production presented an ideal business 
opportunity for Rothschild, who sought to establish trading links with the emerging 
market. The opportunity would also no doubt have benefited the Royal Mint 
Refinery as the rough gold bars required treatment to bring them up to acceptable 
quality before being sold on the London market. 258  
 
     In 1926 N M Rothschild & Sons actively engaged in gold transactions with The 
Standard Bank of Russia. Over £500,000 worth of gold bars owned by the Russian 
bank lay in the merchant bank’s vault. Rothschild was eager to strike a deal to put 
the gold to commercial use and offered its Russian clients a chance to make a profit 
on the gold rather than leave it to collect dust. Various terms were put forward by 
Rothschild, which included the loan of the gold for a six month; in return for a good 
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rate of interest and the exact amount of gold returned at the end of the term. 
Alternatively, Rothschild was happy to dispose of the gold on the Bank’s behalf in 
return for a small fee. The move would certainly have boosted the confidence of the 
financial markets for the merchant bank, to have access to a vast quantity of the 
highly desirable gold. It is unclear from records when the gold was received, if it had 
been treated at the Royal Mint Refinery or more importantly what became of it. 
However, it does indicate that Rothschild was keen to take advantage of the 
expanding Soviet gold production and had attempted to establish direct trading links. 
Unfortunately for Rothschild it was Johnson Matthey that succeeded in forging 
Soviet trade relations through the official Trade Organisation in London and had 
secured a large silver refining contract in 1925.259 In addition both the London 
refineries faced an increased threat from German refiners as shipments of Soviet 
gold were sent there.260 
 
     In 1928 Rothschild recorded that ‘as practically no refinable gold now comes to 
this country, the importance of attracting as much gold as possible to the open 
market in London cannot be overlooked.’261 The reported shrinkage in the world 
production levels of gold was a key feature during the period and concerns were 
regularly expressed for the static output. Fears were heightened when in 1928 reports 
over the ‘exceptionally heavy’ outflow of gold from the United States, worth 
approximately $500 million dollars, were published.262 The greater portion, around 
$308 million dollars, of gold had gone to France; only $32 million dollars had made 
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that during 1928 extensive imports of bullion and specie from Russia to Germany, in the region of 45 
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it to Britain.263 Germany also presented a threat as between July and December 1927 
nearly £20 million of gold had been purchased through the London market.264 
 
     Despite the best efforts of the Royal Mint Refinery 1929 represented the worst 
year for gold refining in the history of the firm. As indicated in Table 6 below, gold 
treatment at the refinery hit rock bottom. In 1930 a sharp recovery was experienced. 
The recovery coincided with the crash on Wall Street. John Giuseppi, in his study of 
the Bank of England, observed that the ‘Wall Street crash strengthened London for a 
while.’265 Renewed confidence in the London market meant that it became a safe 
haven for gold. It was not long before the ripples from Wall Street were felt 
elsewhere. Giuseppi suggested that ‘the nadir was reached in 1931, which saw the 
greatest financial crises ever known.’266 Unsurprisingly, therefore, Britain abandoned 
the gold standard in September 1931. The system broke down not because of any 
weakness but due to excessive debts, nationalism and political fear that stopped the 
free flow of goods and funds.267 The immediate results of abandonment were not 
serious, rather than being detrimental it marked a turning point in Britain’s economic 
recovery. The market remained buoyant and the price of gold was allowed to find its 
own level floating between £5.50 and £6.34 per ounce; the dollar remained stable at 
$20.67 per ounce.268 The move meant that gold flowed into London attracted by the 
price it commanded. 
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Table 6. ‘RMR gold treated, 1925-1931’ 
 
Source: RAL, 148/24/3, Gold and Silver Treated 1905-1948. 
     The increased price paid for gold in London attracted huge consignments of gold 
coin from India. Hoarders tempted by the profits that could be made sent regular 
shipments of gold coin to the Royal Mint Refinery to be turned into 400 ounce bars 
and placed for sale on the London market. In November 1931 Alliance Assurance, 
the marine insurers of the Royal Mint Refinery, confirmed an uplift from the normal 
sum insured for gold held at the Refinery from £300,000 to £700,000, which 
reflected the higher levels treated.269 The increase in the price of gold also provided a 
renewed incentive in Africa to search out new deposits of gold and improve deep 
shaft mining techniques. The plateaux in gold levels disappeared as new discoveries 
were made on the far West Rand and the South African production rose. By 1933 
world production of newly mined gold were recorded as reaching 25 million 
ounces.270 The boost in production was reported at the Royal Mint Refinery; the 
                                                                                                                                     
unviable mines became profitable. The value of the assets of Gold Fields doubled overnight. By 1934 
Company profits had increased from the 1931 level of £438,000 to £1,388,000. 
269 RAL 148/12, ‘Alliance Assurance Company, London to Bullion Department, N M Rothschild & 
Sons’, 12 Nov 1931. 
270 Green, ‘Precious Heritage’, p. 469. 
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work lost by the opening of the Rand Refinery in 1922 was finally offset by sizable 
shipments of gold sent to London from the goldfields of West Africa. 
 
To sum up Britain’s return to the gold standard in 1925 had a significant impact on 
business at the Royal Mint Refinery. The fixed gold price selected by the British 
Government rendered an immediate and significant drop in the profit margins for 
gold producers, which ultimately affected the levels of gold sent to the London 
market for treatment and sale. Branded by Churchill as an ‘unwarrantable 
extravagance’, gold was effectively removed from everyday life as the Bank of 
England were no longer obliged to sell gold in quantities of less than 400 ounce bars. 
Interestingly this took place with limited resistance. The lure of higher profits meant 
that other markets were sought. London was no longer the preferred market of the 
South African producers. This had a negative impact on the Royal Mint Refinery. 
During the first period of the gold standard the refinery fared badly as work 
gradually dried up. The future viability of the refinery depended on finding 
alternative sources of business to fill the void left by gold. The crisis drew London 
rivals together and Rothschild and Johnson Matthey forged links in a bid to stave off 
competition from European refiners. Johnson Matthey took advantage of the 
eradication of competition between the London refineries to embark on a radical 
overhaul of its operation. Rothschild remained suspicious of Johnson Matthey. 
 
Hopes were raised when reports of a Soviet gold rush reached London. At first the 
news was welcomed at the Royal Mint Refinery. However, Rothschild was unable to 
apply their well formatted business strategy and assume control of the emerging 
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market, or even to receive a guarantee that Soviet gold would be sent to London. 
Failure to secure the emerging Soviet market highlights the longevity of the 
relationship between Rothschild and many of the South Africa gold producers. 
Direct and indirect relationships reinforced London as the main sphere of financial 
influence for the South African mining industry. Part of the reason for the failure to 
secure Soviet gold must be attributed to diplomatic relations, which played a 
significant role in where to market its gold. Research into the emerging markets 
highlights the venerability of Anglo-Soviet trading relations in the inter-war period. 
Links between the two nations were not strong enough to assume that London would 
be the preferred market for Soviet gold. The pursuit of profit dictated where large 
consignments of Soviet gold were sent and many found their way to Germany over 
London. 
 
By 1929 gold treated at the Royal Mint Refinery was at an all time low. Rather than 
being a ‘Dull Period’ in the history of the refinery it was an extremely busy time 
which saw every effort being made to ensure that the Refinery continued to trade. 
Circumstances, however, went beyond Rothschild’s immediate control, the opening 
of the Rand Refinery in 1922 and the introduction of the gold standard in 1925, were 
to blame for the dire position at the Refinery as work dried up. Rothschild did not 
suffer alone the squeeze was felt by the other London refineries. The fixed price for 
gold meant that there was less return on investment and even less incentive for 
producers to increase their overheads to find new gold supplies. The gold industry 
stalled. A slight recovery came in the form of the Wall Street crash of 1929. London 
became a safe haven for gold and shipments became more frequent. By the time 
Britain abandoned the gold standard in September 1931 business at the Rothschild 
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refinery was on its way to recovery. The higher price for gold attracted both newly 
mined and gold coin to the refinery, both required treatment before being sold on the 
London market. The Royal Mint Refinery started the 1930s treating 5,500,000 
ounces of gold, by 1932 this had which subsequently increased to 12,500,000 
ounces.271 
                                                
271 RAL,148/24/3, ‘RMR Silver and Gold treated from 1 Jan 1905- 31 Dec 1948’. 




“Gold Rush”, 1931-1936. 
 
This chapter examines the effects on the Royal Mint Refinery when Britain left the 
gold standard on 19 September 1931, having struggled through three years of intense 
crisis. Sterling broke free from its fixed parity and depreciated and set a course out of 
depression for the British economy as exports became competitive and credit 
cheaper.272 One immediate outcome was a rise in the gold price, which reached 
unprecedented levels. During the previous 100 years the price had remained 
relatively stable, subject only to small fluctuations. The abolition of the fixed price 
ushered in a period of exceptional activity in the London gold market, attracting both 
newly mined and pre-owned gold sold as scrap, which consisted of second-hand 
jewellery and gold coin.273 
 
     The effects these changes had on business at the Royal Mint Refinery will be 
considered. The chapter begins by examining the performance of the Refinery staff 
and how they coped with the unique features of the period. In 1932 trade was brisk 
and the workforce was kept busy treating large consignments of gold. Once cast into 
400 troy ounce bars the gold was generally offered by Rothschild for sale in the 
London market. Initially staff coped well with the demands placed upon them. 
However, the volume of work also meant that mistakes were made and allegations of 
fraud were brought by one customer. Material collated for use in defence against this 
allegation offers a rare insight into this exceptionally busy period and reveals much 
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about the daily operation of the Refinery. These papers also provide a better 
understanding of internal working relations and those of Rothschild with other 
London refining houses and bullion brokers. The second half of the chapter charts 
the change in pace at the Refinery. The gold rush came to an abrupt end in 1934 
when the United States introduced a new fixed price of gold of $35 an ounce. The 
new price reversed the recent trend and gold shipments once destined for London 
diverted to American and French markets attracted by the higher prices on offer. 
Gold sent to the Royal Mint Refinery disappeared and Rothschild was forced to 
canvass for work abroad. Unfortunately refining charges at Rothschild were too high 
to compete with its continental rivals and needed to be adjusted if it were to attract 
business to London. However, the downturn proved temporary, for the inflated 
United States gold price also stimulated new gold exploration in East and West 
Africa and soon Rothschild secured new agreements to treat gold from these new 
emerging areas of supply. 
 
Britain’s lead in abandoning the gold standard in 1931 was not followed 
immediately by all countries. It was still possible to sell unlimited quantities of gold 
to France, the United States and a few other countries at fixed buying prices in terms 
of francs, dollars etc. For several months the price of gold bore more relation to the 
French fixed price rather than to the United States price; the situation changed after 
January 1934 following the introduction of the United States fixed price for gold at 
$35 an ounce. Since Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard the general trend for 
the London gold price was upwards, due to sterling’s decline against other 
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currencies.274 According to Samuel Montagu’s bullion review for 1931 the price of 
gold rose by 40 per cent above the gold currency price in the London market.275 
Together with the fall in commodity prices since 1929, the price rise triggered new 
gold production as extraction costs fell. At the time of Britain’s departure from the 
gold standard the subsequent rise in the price of gold had not been fully anticipated 
but gold producers and associated industries experienced an extremely profitable 
year in 1932 and the outlook remained favourable for 1933: the industry anticipated 
gold production levels for Canada and the Transvaal would exceed £90 million.276  
 
     In addition to increased levels of newly mined gold, the price rise also stimulated 
a reverse trend for gold once destined for India. Since the second half of the 
nineteenth century India had been a large purchaser and importer of gold from 
London. Gold was traditionally regarded as a good store of value for Indians and 
preferred over other assets. Most of the gold, together with other imports and the 
products of their own gold mines, went into the hoards of the princes, the business 
magnates and the banks.277 Agricultural problems in India in the late 1920s led to the 
reverse of trade and the tide accelerated after 1931 as profit taking began, namely the 
heavy dishoarding by the wealthy people of India. The return flows of gold between 
1931 and 1938 were estimated to be in the region of 28 million ounces of gold, 
which were sold for sterling.278 One American banker remarked at the time that the 
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sales were ‘sure proof that God is an Englishman.’279 In Britain members of the 
general public sold used gold in jewellery and coins form in such quantities as to be 
referred to afterwards as the ‘Gold Rush’ of 1932.280 
 
In 1932 the Royal Mint Refinery possessed the greatest refining capabilities of all 
the London refining houses. In July the treatment capacity increased further with the 
installation of a new oil fuelled electrostatic precipitator. The equipment was 
considered ‘the first and best of its kind’ to be employed for the recovery of precious 
metal fume.281 It was anticipated that the large outlay for the new equipment would 
be part funded by the sale of recovered metals from the old plant and increased 
future earnings the new machine would provided. 282 The outlay for the new 
equipment suggested that Rothschild saw a future for the refinery and had 
confidence in continuing the operation and they were prepared to commit a 
substantial sum of money. Despite a series of challenges since 1919 the outlook for 
the refinery was promising. The main setbacks had been being the establishment of 
the Rand Refinery in 1922, followed by Britain’s return to the gold standard in 1925 
when the outlook of the London refining houses appeared bleak, so much so that 
Johnson Matthey had scrapped much of its gold refining capability, a decision the 
firm reversed in 1932. 
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    Profits at the Royal Mint Refinery for 1932 exceeded those in previous years. In 
addition to fees for the treatment of gold, Rothschild also received an administrative 
fee to cover the sale and distribution costs for the refined gold. During busy periods 
these fees came under scrutiny at the Bank of England. Anthony de Rothschild, 
partner of N M Rothschild & Sons, defended the charges and thought them not 
excessive for the amount of work involved; rather he believed them to be inadequate. 
In his general observations on recent changes to the market Anthony wrote in an 
internal memorandum to Clement Cooper, head of the Bullion Department at New 
Court, that: 
Gold is a Goddess and in this country the Bank of England is her chief priest. 
Since the war the Goddess has become more remote from this workaday 
world and her chief priest, having surrounded Her with increasing mystery 
and austerity, would I am sure frown on any attempt to cheapen her service. 
You will remember that before the war anybody could take gold to the Mint 
and in due course receive an equivalent amount of gold in minted sovereigns. 
If one did not wish to wait for ‘due course’ one could take the gold to the 
Bank of England who would forthwith deliver sovereigns there against, 
deducting about 1½ per cent for this facility (to cover costs of minting and 
interest for the period). The facility has, alas, gone but the charge of 1½ per 
cent remains. If the Chief Priest considers 1½ per cent a proper charge for 
merely handling gold, what will he think of a mere acolyte like NMR 
reducing their already miserable commission of ¼ per cent?  I do not know 
who has suggested commission reductions but I am sure that if you agree it 
will be at the cost of offence to the Bank of England.283 
 
Rothschild continued to receive the fixed rate, which remained unchanged until it 
was later abolished in 1967.  
 
     The Royal Mint Refinery was not the only venture to gain from the increased 
activity of 1932. In general the gold rush provided a much needed boost to the 
London gold refineries. Published histories of Johnson Matthey, Sheffield Smelting 
Company and the bullion broker Mocatta & Goldsmid all record industry wide 
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improvements. It was widely agreed that the gold rush marked a turning point in the 
fortunes of the firms. In June 1932 Johnson Matthey, in a bid to capture some of the 
large profits on offer, reversed their earlier decision and re-introduced the treatment 
of gold. A new refinery similar in size and capacity to their former operation was 
hastily erected. Incorporated into the new design was the most up to date refining 
equipment: six refining gas fires and one melting fire, with an improved production 
capacity of 100 bars (400 ounces each) of fine gold per 24 hours.284 Donald 
McDonald, in his history of Johnson Matthey, recalled that in 1932 ‘every part of the 
business was under great strain, long queues formed in the Front Office from 8 in the 
morning onwards and the clerks did a 12 or 14 hour day.’285 Ronald Wilson, in his 
history of the Sheffield Smelting Company, noted that the period stood out as being 
one in which the luck of the firm turned. He recalled the strain the company was 
placed under during the gold rush: 
the price of gold [jumped] overnight from about four guineas to five pounds 
an ounce. It continued to rise to six guineas in December and thereafter to 
fluctuate. Quickly the public seized the opportunity of selling unwanted 
jewellery and great quantities were bought by retail jewellers throughout the 
country. Some sellers bought new goods to the value received for their old 
gold, some spent the proceeds other ways; either way the economy of the 
country benefited by this release of spending power, and it was increased by 
the realisation of great hoards of sovereigns, purchased for seven shillings 
and sixpence over their face value; similarly with half- sovereigns, two-
pound and five-pound pieces.286 
 
Likewise Timothy Green, in his history of Mocatta & Goldsmid, wrote that 
‘Mocatta’s weighing room and vault… was crammed with transhipments [of 
gold]’.287 February and March of 1932 marked the height of the gold rush; the 
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catalyst was the legalisation of the sale and export of sovereigns from February 
1932.288 
 
     Comparisons between the experiences of the 1930s and those of the first decade 
of the twenty-first century, following the steep rise in the price of gold in 2008, can 
be made. On both occasions the price rise sparked a flurry of media advertisements 
offering ‘Cash for Gold’.289 In 1932 adverts were accompanied by a growing army of 
doorstep callers who ‘saw great opportunities in the situation.’290 During the most 
recent renaissance for gold from 2008 an avalanche of television adverts appeared 
urging the general public to send unwanted items of gold through the post to national 
collection points. In the rush of 1932 collection points were set up in the high street 
by jewellers and pawnbrokers, who in turn sent parcels of gold for treatment to one 
of the refineries. Johnson Matthey dealt with approximately 600,000 sovereigns and 
over 400,000 ounces of gold in old and used form during the gold rush. Generally 
the daily number of parcels received was 955; during the busiest week this increased 
to 4,688 parcels.291 The main problem faced at Johnson Matthey was a shortage of 
manpower due to a lack of available melters. The issue was resolved by drafting in 
senior staff, directors and pensioners of the company to weigh the incoming gold and 
assist in administrative tasks. Similar difficulties were reported at the Sheffield 
Smelting Company. The firm dealt with 8,600 parcels in March 1932; at its peak 600 
parcels a day were received. The number of staff engaged in normal trading periods 
was 14, but in March this swelled to 50. In the first three months of 1932 Lionel 
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Readman, head of the scrap-buying department, worked 400 hours of overtime.292 
Initially most of the consignments, apart from sovereigns, were sent to London and 
sold to the Royal Mint Refinery. However, when Rothschild increased its charges it 
became more profitable for the company to undertake their own refining. In order to 
cope with the increased volume of metal treated the old sulphuric refinery was put 
back into service, which worked alongside the new electro-refinery.  
Table 7. RMR Treated Gold 1905-1952. 
 
 
Source: RAL,148/24/3, ‘RMR Silver and Gold treated from 1 Jan 1905- 31 Dec 1948’. 
 
Company profits for 1932 were £27,182. Unfortunately, there is limited evidence 
about the Royal Mint Refinery during this period and precludes the same kind of 
details shown above. However, the chart above illustrates the sharp increase in gold 
treated at the Refinery. In addition company accounts record an improvement on 
previous years. In addition the 1932 bullion ledger show that gold bar serial numbers 
ran from R1 to R28076. For 1933 the number of bars produced was slightly less and 
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the serial numbers ran from R1 to R21317.293 The period was exceptional in the 
history of the Royal Mint Refinery. The volume of business tripled. Therefore is of 
no surprise that mistakes were made. Whilst most were easily rectified others proved 
more difficult to resolve and once some semblance of normality returned to the 
industry Rothschild was forced to defend the reputation of the Refinery. 
 
Once the gold rush started to subside Samuel Abelson, the senior partner at S S 
Abelson & Company, contacted Rothschild and reported a small discrepancy on the 
firm’s account. The error was blamed on the exceptional busy period experienced by 
both firms and the strain placed on them. S S Abelson & Company was an 
established family firm of bullion dealers and refiners, which also manufactured 
platinum sheet and wire at premises in Coswell Road, London. Although Abelson’s 
had never been a regular customer of the Royal Mint Refinery, they were known to 
Rothschild who had dealt with them for about ten years. During the gold rush of 
1932 Abelson’s were overwhelmed with the quantities of scrap gold requiring 
treatment. Generally Abelson’s used the services of the Sheffield Smelting Company 
during busy periods. However in 1932 it had been too busy treating its own 
consignments and had no spare capacity to take Abelson’s business, which was 
turned away. Abelson approached Rothschild for assistance and a deal was struck; a 
fee of 5d per ounce for melting, refining and assaying gold was agreed. The 
discrepancy amounted to £73.18 and Arthur Kimpton, the senior bullion dealer at 
New Court, offered Abelson £41 16s 9d, as a goodwill gesture, towards the 
discrepancy. Kimpton hoped the matter was settled. Abelson rejected his offer and 
the attempts to placate him failed. Further correspondence about the matter followed 
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and was referred to Clement Cooper, head of the Bullion Department at New Court. 
Abelson wrote to Cooper that:  
Frankly, I wish to forget all about the ‘Gold Rush’ as soon as possible. It 
includes all sorts of unpleasant incidents and concentrated excitement, which 
I personally could have done well without. I have stacks of matters still, 
which I have to consider and deal with before I have finished with the whole 
maddening affair.294 
 
Despite having sympathy for Rothschild for the strain the firm had also been under, 
Abelson was unwilling to dismiss the outstanding monies due to him. His position 
was made clear when he wrote to Rothschild that the £41 16s 9d was ‘a proposition 
that I cannot see my way clear to accept, being so certain of the facts.’295  
 
     Abelson’s claim against Rothschild escalated further when additional 
discrepancies amounting to £400 were discovered. The amount related to skimmings 
that apparently Rothschild had not returned with consignments of gold. Abelson 
requested that Rothschild ‘should meet me in this matter, even if I have to make 
some loss myself on balance, so that in the future, we can get together again to do 
business, for although I admit the rush is no longer with us, I am still getting lots of 
gold.’296 Rothschild rejected the request. Abelson remained undeterred and 
continued to make reference to the ‘fair number of errors’ made by Rothschild on the 
firm’s account.297 The reference related to an error made on a separate occasion 
when a number of administrative discrepancies had been discovered. Although the 
errors had been rectified immediately, it transpired that an outstanding balance of 
£5000 initially assigned to Abelson’s account should have been debited to the 
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account of the Sheffield Smelting Company. Abelson’s pent up feelings about his 
treatment by Rothschild spilled out into his next letter and reference was made to a 
previous encounter with Cooper. Abelson recalled that Cooper had: 
charged an additional penny per ounce for giving [Abelson] an immediate 
cheque, which by the way, you did not have to meet until the next day, so 
you were out of no money, and this charge of penny per ounce works out at 
23 ½ per cent. True I agreed to this charge but it was unfair.298 
 
Abelson was bent on pursuing the latest matter and felt unable to ‘modify [his] view’ 
and demanded a cheque for £473 17s 12d.299 Rothschild remained unmoved in the 
rejection of the claim against the refinery. The matter reached a stalemate.  
 
     At the end of May Abelson again contacted Rothschild and informed them that 
further discrepancies on his account had been discovered. This time he claimed 
£1000, which represented the loss of 187 ounces of gold missing from a 
consignment of 20,000 ounces of gold, and a further 168 ounces missing from a 
separate consignment of 30,000 ounces. Abelson believed that Rothschild had failed 
to return the skimmings from both consignments. He alleged that as ‘the metal was 
skimmed and the skimmings were thrown on the sweep heap, no allowance was 
made for the scrapings etc.’300 Once again he put the error down to the pressure 
during the period of the ‘gold rush’ and observed that: 
We were all rushed off our feet in those days, and I suggest that your operator 
treated my gold thinking that it was your own stock. It may be suggested that 
the loss in weight was made up to me in improvement in the Assay. I have 
explored this line of thought but the results of the Assays are in my opinion 
worse, not better, being in the neighbourhood of .400 rather than .475 which I 
used to reckon on.301 
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Rothschild remained unmoved in their rejection of the allegations made against 
them. Unlike fine gold, where a loss of approximately 1 per cent of the overall 
weight can be expected during the treatment process, the loss in weight during 
refining of an assortment of scrap items was always higher. Abelson was 
unconvinced and although he considered himself as ‘a practical man’, with years of 
experience in melting metal, he had ‘never known a bar to be melted without some 
small loss in weight, but the losses as shown by your account, are extraordinary, and 
impossible.’302 Skimmings from such parcels generally consisted of iron springs 
taken out of watch cases etc., and as a rule accompanied the treated gold when it was 
returned to the customer. However, according to Abelson no skimmings were 
returned to him and he accused Rothschild of having ‘metal belonging to me of that 
value.’303  He conceded that although the total value owed to him was higher he was 
prepared to make a loss if Rothschild would meet him on this matter so that ‘in 
future, we can get together again to do business, for although I admit the rush is no 
longer with us, I am still getting lots of gold.’304 Rothschild continued to deny the 
allegations made against the refinery. 
 
     One of the problems with Abelson’s claim was that he had not presented any 
formal proof in support of the amount claimed. Despite this he remained adamant 
that ‘you [Rothschild] are mistaken.’ Abelson readily accepted that he had recently 
made a number of mistakes’ himself. He suggested that Rothschild were not perfect 
and that ‘we all make our fair percentages of mistakes.’305 Abelson wrote to 
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Rothschild admitting that ‘frankly, all sorts of figures and facts seem all wrong.’306 
He chalked up his mistakes as ‘another sign of the abnormal times through which we 
were working, and now that things have settled down a bit, I desire to get these 
things finally settled.’307 Abelson was sure that ‘Rothschild would not wish to take 
advantage of the possible carelessness of one of their staff.’308 
 
     On 14 July 1932 the tone of Abelson’s letters became angrier as further 
discrepancies came to light. He informed Rothschild that:  
[the new] discrepancies are so great between the value received from you, 
and the amount paid for the same. We are getting out particulars of our claim. 
It has taken a long time, but we are amazed at some of the things that are 
coming to light. There seems to be no question that we have been under-paid 
thousands of pounds.309  
 
A few days later, having undertaken an extensive examination of the accounts, 
Abelson claimed that the underpayment to his company had escalated and now stood 
somewhere in the region of £4000-5000. He informed Rothschild that the:  
crux of the position from our point of view is that owing to the extraordinary 
conditions of work at the Refinery, assays have come through incorrectly, 
fluxes have been thrown on one side, and skimmings have been ignored, and 
here undoubtedly, is a case where some reasonable compromise should be 
effected for this matter cannot be allowed to rest in its present condition.310 
 
Rothschild stood their ground and rebuffed all allegations made against the refinery.  
 
     At the beginning of June Rothschild launched an informal investigation into 
Abelson’s allegations. What puzzled staff most was the length of time it took 
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Abelson to present his grievance. It had taken ‘two months to examine a dozen 
accounts’.311 Initial findings suggested that: 
The fact is that these miscellaneous parcels of jewellery that were sent to us 
to be melted contained many articles which were only partly Gold: watches 
with enamel decorations, small steel springs and screws, lockets with glass 
and enamel, pieces of jewellery with various attachments and fittings other 
than Gold. This jewellery was most carefully melted, the pot being scrapped 
after casting and the scrapings added to the bar. The skimmings are made up 
chiefly of steel watch-springs and other metal fittings with a higher melting 
point than gold.312 
 
It was suspected that Abelson was under the misapprehension that re-melted 
jewellery would be of a higher quality than the assays had proved. When checked 
against other consignments treated at the Refinery, skimmings from Abelson’s 
consignments were consistent with other parcels. The general experience of other 
parcels of mixed jewellery was that a loss of 1 per cent on average was recorded. 
Therefore, the loss at only 168 ounces from the reported 30,000 ounces of jewellery 
Abelson had sent to the refinery was less than would have been anticipated. 
Rothschild was astounded at the ‘extraordinary lack of interest in the outturn of 
[Abelson’s] consignments to the Refinery until nearly two months after our account 
sales had been in his possession.’313 The general custom of the bullion trade was that 
in the event of a dispute over the loss of weight, or assay, on a consignment it should 
be raised immediately. In London it was known that the complaint must be made 
within two days and in the country, making allowances for posts, within four days 
after receiving the Account Sale. The reason for this was that gold was bought on the 
basis of the price on the day after delivery to the refinery. This allowed the purchaser 
sufficient time to refine the gold and sell the resulting fine gold bars at the same 
price at which he paid. The practice at Rothschild was that the sample or dip sent for 
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assay would be kept for a period of fourteen days, and if any questions were raised 
as to the accuracy of the assay a retrial could then be made. 314 The seller was 
entitled to have the retrial made by the same assayer or nominate another. If no 
complaint was made within the period the reserve assay piece was, with others, 
refined and realised in the usual way and there was no method of checking later on 
the assay.315 At no time did Abelson contact the refinery to make a complaint within 
the stated timeframe. For the gold bars produced for Abelson the scrap had been sent 
to one of the four assay firms approved by the Bank of England and an independent 
gold content arrived at. If Abelson had contacted the refinery earlier the bars would 
have certainly been retested. 
 
     Throughout the summer Rothschild continued to deny the allegations against 
them. It was hard for them to know how best to prepare a defence as so far it was all 
hearsay and no formal claim had actually been received. Rothschild concentrated on 
investigating three areas of practice at the refinery. The in-house report produced 
concluded that:  
1.The conditions of work at our Refinery are indeed extraordinary, in the 
sense that they are perfect and unchallengeable. 
2.The correctness of assays, carried out by official assayers to the Bank of 
England, is indisputable. 
3.The scrupulously careful treatment, to which all fluxes and skimmings are 
subjected, leaves no question of doubt as to the inclusion of their exact 
values.316  
 
The matter lay dormant on file until information gathering resumed in November. 
This time guidelines and procedures to be adopted in the event of a dispute arising in 
the future between a customer and the refinery were circulated to members of staff. 
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     In addition to in-house enquiries outside support was canvassed by Rothschild in 
an attempt to collate and compare treatment records with other refiners. Johnson 
Matthey and Sheffield Smelting Company were approached to find out if either had 
undertaken any work for Abelson or received similar complaints from their own 
customers. In addition the bullion brokers Mocatta and Goldsmid, for whom 
Rothschild had undertaken some of the melting work for Abelson, were approached 
to establish if they had received any complaint about Rothschild’s work from 
Abelson. A number of assayers, in particular Daniel C Griffiths & Company, which 
had completed the assays on the Abelson consignments, were contacted to establish 
if in their opinion pieces treated on behalf of Rothschild were ‘well-melted and 
homogeneous bars’.317 A request was made to see if any of the assayers would 
provide evidence of ‘good’ melting at the Royal Mint Refinery.318  
 
     Support for Rothschild was split. Handwritten notes made by members of staff at 
the Refinery record the responses. Against Johnson Matthey, the main competitor of 
the Royal Mint Refinery, it was recorded that the Matthey ‘obviously disliked 
Abelson’ and thought him ‘mad if he actually took matter to court.’319 The bullion 
brokers Mocatta and Goldsmid, who were in a difficult position as Abelson had been 
a client of the firm for some time, sided with Abelson. Mocatta believed the ‘matter 
was one for settlement’ and thought that ‘[Abelson] had probably legitimate ground 
for grievance whether he could substantiate it or not.’320 Rothschild recorded that 
‘Edgar had a soft corner in his heart for Abelson, although he was admittedly a bit of 
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a nuisance.’321 Mocatta implied that scrapings from pots on their own consignments 
had not always been forthcoming, implying that ‘R’s employees scraped quantities 
of gold from the bottom of the pot!’ Rothschild had been ‘rather appalled’ by the 
suggestion and asked Edgar Mocatta what he thought happened with the gold? When 
challenged ‘he pretended he had not made the suggestion seriously’.322 As Abelson 
was also a customer of Mocatta, who had also sent some scrap on behalf of Abelson 
to Rothschild it transpired that it may well have been down to Mocatta to instigate 
proceedings against the Refinery for any outstanding monies.323 Finally 
representatives of the Sheffield Smelting Company, Morton and Legg, observed that 
when discrepancies had arisen in the past with the Royal Mint Refinery it had been 
customary that once the assay had been checked an average would be agreed 
between both firms. Their relationship with Abelson was regarded as satisfactory. 
The ‘notes’ recorded that ‘Legg is obviously friendly disposed towards Abelson.’324 
Morton, despite having experienced losses for consignments of jewellery, confirmed 
that he had been happy with the work of the Royal Mint Refinery. It was also 
disclosed that Morton had received an approach from J J Edwards & Co., Abelson’s 
legal representatives, to act as a witness for the prosecution, a request he chose to 
decline. When pressed on the matter it transpired that Morton had ‘possibly in the 
heat of the moment’ made some damaging remarks to Abelson about the Royal Mint 
Refinery ‘and [was] most anxious not to have to repeat them in the witness box.’325 
 
     In late November Abelson finally instituted formal proceedings against the Royal 
Mint Refinery. Three allegations against Rothschild were listed:  
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1. Owing to carelessness and lack of skill in melting there was unnecessary 
loss of weight after melting (gold bars of whatever fineness should lose 
nothing in melting and jewellery of whatever quality should not lose more 
than ¼%) 
2. Pot scrapings and skimmings have not been accounted for. 
3. All gold has been so badly melted that the dip pieces sent to the Assayers 
do not correctly represent the quality of the gold.326  
 
The matter was referred to Freshfields Solicitors, who generally acted on behalf of N 
M Rothschild & Sons. The line of defence taken centred on the general practice in 
the refining industry, in particular how ‘skimmings’ were dealt with at the refinery. 
It also transpired, during their own investigations, that Rothschild had made an 
overpayment in favour of Abelson’s firm of £700.327 
 
     Mr Henderson, an independent expert in the practice of refining, was asked by 
Freshfields to draw up a report on the treatment practice at the Royal Mint Refinery. 
Following his visit to the Refinery he concluded that: 
The entire operation has been carried out with meticulous accuracy 
sufficiently often to satisfy the experts at the Refinery that in the case of 
standard parcels, i.e. gold articles from which base metals (watch movements 
etc.) have been extracted with reasonable care, the loss in melting will 
represent approximately 1 per cent of the gross weight.328 
 
However, the demonstration provided to Henderson was not an accurate reflection of 
the working practice adopted for the period in question. For the actual procedure 
carried out at the refinery during the height of the gold rush had been altered to cope 
with the high demands placed upon staff, including the fact that the Chief Clerk had 
taken over some of the Manager’s responsibilities.329 Freshfields findings concluded 
that the allegations made by Abelson against the Refinery of fraud and carelessness 
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had no basis, and as they were unsupported by specific data or evidence the case 
should be passed over. 
 
Abelson was not of the same sentiment, and appealed to Legge, Manager of the 
Sheffield Smelting Company, to assist him to bring the matter to a speedy 
conclusion. Abelson in his letter to Legge wrote:  
Pledging my honour that it is a fact that Rothschilds have had delivered to 
them gold far in excess that they have paid me for, but, of course, without 
their knowledge. I feel certain that the heads of Rothschilds would not want 
to take advantage of the fact that through accidents and over rushing certain 
mistakes have occurred to their benefit.330 
 
In the background Abelson was under pressure from his own legal team to furnish 
them with copies of invoices in support of the claim. Sir Patrick Hastings, a barrister 
who generally worked on high profile legal cases, had been engaged to pursue the 
claim against Rothschild. Abelson failed to provide the supporting evidence. It 
transpired that Abelson was of the opinion that Rothschild ‘in common fairness’ 
should offer a ‘compromise along reasonable lines… and not a flat refusal of all 
discussions as if I were a criminal asking for a pound of flesh to which I was not 
entitled.’331 Legge urged Abelson to stop his pursuit of the matter through the courts 
but Abelson was adamant that his solicitor and counsel were confident that they 
would win the case against Rothschild and that ‘’tis merely a question of how 
much.’332 Abelson hoped that an ‘honourable and reasonable solution’ would be 
arrived at without need for the matter ending up in front of a judge. He was quietly 
confident that Rothschild would try to avoid the courts for ‘they have had their faces 
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smacked twice in this matter they cannot see their way clear to take another 
chance.’333 
 
     On 27 February 1933 Rothschild launched a counter claim to recover the £700 
overpayment made to Abelson. Attached to the claim were a statement in support 
prepared by Cooper and a witness statement provided by an experienced refiner 
employed by Johnson Matthey who came down in support of Rothschild.334 It took 
one week for Abelson’s solicitors to contact Freshfields with a notice of 
discontinuance of proceedings against Rothschild. Abelson dropped all allegations 
and had finally taken the advice offered by Edgar Mocatta and Morton; both had 
interested themselves in the matter.’335 In the meantime Mocatta and Morton had 
visited Rothschild and attempted to resolve the matter amicably. They had been 
anxious to justify Abelson’s actions. Both felt that Rothschild had ‘adopted a rather 
superior attitude and gave no indications of being amenable to anything but 
irrefutable facts’ they wanted Rothschild to be aware of ‘extenuating circumstances 
for Abelson’s behaviour’ and urged them to drop the claim for £700.336 It transpired 
that if Rothschild were to pursue a counterclaim against Abelson, then he would 
have no alternative but to declare his firm bankrupt. If this happened it meant dire 
consequences for the Sheffield Smelting Company as Abelson owed the firm an 
outstanding debt of £1,500, the remnants of a larger debt of £6,000. Mocatta 
appealed to Rothschild for lenience towards Abelson so that the matter could be 
abandoned amicably by both parties. Rothschild agreed, but only as abandonment 
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would indirectly help the Sheffield Smelting Company and plans was devised for 
both parties to abandon their claims.337 
 
     Following the end of his claim Abelson’s solicitors wrote again to Freshfields and 
expressed their client’s regret at having brought a claim against Rothschild, stating 
that: 
our client’s one desire is to be able to look upon the matter as one of past 
unfortunate history and he instructs us to give you his assurance that so far as 
he is concerned he has no intention of referring to it in the future in any way 
to any of his customers, business acquaintances, or at all.338 
 
Rothschild’s out of pocket expenses to defend the initial action came to £466.16.4d, 
and had the counter-claim for £700 been pursued an additional fee of £300 would 
have been charged. However, the stakes had been much higher for the reputation of 
the Royal Mint Refinery had been at risk.  
 
     Lessons were learnt from the experience at the Refinery. On reflection warning 
bells had sounded but were not heeded at Rothschild on Abelson’s first approach. 
The Sheffield Smelting Company had normally dealt with Abelson’s melting, but 
had been too busy with their consignments. No objection was made for Abelson to 
move to Rothschild. The profit on Abelson’s business for Rothschild was 
insignificant and work had been undertaken mainly to oblige Abelson, and to relieve 
the pressure for other firms. In normal circumstances Rothschild steered away from 
dealing with retail trade business. Generally work originated from the banks or 
                                                
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid., ‘Edwards, Leese & Munns, to Freshfields Solicitors’, 8 Jul 1933. 
Chapter 5: Gold Rush 
132 
 
bullion brokers and one or two private firms. During March 1932 considerable 
quantities were received from these quarters without incident. 
 
     In October 1933 an internal report into the ‘Suggested ways in which the 
procedure adopted by the Royal Mint Refinery might be improved’ was produced. 
The report reviewed working practices at the refinery and identified a number of 
areas for improvement: distributing a notice to all customers stating standard 
charges, general tariffs and terms and conditions of business, the introduction of 
receipts for all clients presenting bullion for treatment, clear recording and adjusting 
of consignment weights after melting, improved recording of experiments, records of 
bullion losses to be kept and reference made to them, improved recording of 
weighing consignments including first weight, and final weight after melting 
including adjustments for pot scrapings and skimmings, and all assay results to be 
copied and kept with sale accounts. In addition a number of staff issues were dealt 
with; duties and responsibility for each member of staff were more clearly defined, 
and more importantly security at the refinery was increased and record cards for all 
employees, including a photograph, were introduced (see below example below for 
G Hendley)339 This last practice continued right up to the sale of the refinery in 1967. 
The declaration signed by all employees at the refinery was updated and a clause 
added giving consent to be physically searched at any time. The informality and 
casual basis of management at the refinery had eroded as formal procedures were 
introduced.  
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The pressure on the Royal Mint Refinery began to ease as the ‘Gold Rush’ subsided. 
The Refinery ticked over with the profitable trade from India. Between 1932 and 
1935 there was a steady flow of gold from India back to London. Price was the main 
factor in the return flow but widespread famine in India also contributed to the large 
amounts of gold shipped to London from Bombay.341 It was one shipment of Indian 
gold received at the Royal Mint Refinery that was featured in The Times special 
supplement the ‘Gold Number’ ( discussed in chapter 2). The special editorial 
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covered the various aspects of the gold industry and provided an in-depth 
examination of gold in the British Empire and dominions.342 It included features on 
gold exploration, finance, transportation, trade uses, advances in production levels 
and refining techniques and the sale of gold. The Gold Number highlighted Britain’s 
association with gold through the ages and acted as a reminder of the importance of 
the City of London as a financial hub, which at that point still remained central to the 
international economy. 
 
     The articles featured in the Gold Number projected Britain in a positive and 
supportive role with gold producers around the globe. The United States gold 
industry was not overlooked and the articles included one about American gold 
mining. Readers were reminded that production levels in the US had peaked by 1915 
at a maximum output of 4,887,604 fine ounces and that by 1927 the figure had 
decreased to around 2,100,000 fine ounces. 343 Cost was the key factor behind the 
decline. The majority of gold mined in the United States was low-grade ore, which 
meant that extraction costs had to be balanced against and the market price of gold. 
At $20.67 an ounce for gold in 1932 there was little incentive to increase production 
levels. 
 
     The production of the special editorial coincided with the arrival in Britain of 
over a thousand delegates from sixty countries gathered in London for the World 
Economic Conference starting on 12 June.344 Discussions at the conference centred 
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on measures to fight global depression and revive and stabilise international currency 
rates. In the months leading up to the event international media interest in gold 
increased. This intensified when in March a moratorium was declared in New York 
and foreign exchange dealings were suspended for 10 days.345 An embargo was 
introduced by the US authorities on all banking transaction including the export of 
gold. In April President Roosevelt issued the executive order ratifying the embargo, 
although gold exports continued to be permitted by licence. The decision to prohibit 
the export of gold had been an unexpected turn of events and subsequent legislation 
made it a criminal offence, with severe penalties attached, for any American citizen 
to hold more than $100 in gold coin or certificates after 1 May 1933.346 The 
suspension lasted until 1975. 
 
     According to Christopher Price the move was ‘perceived as a struggle for 
supremacy between the pound and the dollar.’347 In January 1933, when Franklin D 
Roosevelt was inaugurated as President of the United States of America, he inherited 
a bitter legacy: severe unemployment, bank failures and falling prices. In a bid to 
overcome these difficulties Roosevelt set a course aimed to re-inflate the economy. 
He planned to raise prices and increase the money supply in an effort to improve 
confidence, get business moving and create jobs. Roosevelt expressed his fears for 
the economy during the first inaugural address in March 1933 that ‘happiness lies 
not in the mere possession of money; it lies in the joy of achievement, in the thrill of 
creative effort.’348 The following week he set his plan into action and suspended the 
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gold standard so that domestic policies could be implemented without the constraints 
imposed and at the same time banned citizens from owning gold. Roosevelt feared 
that if inflation struck, it would lead to a decline in the exchange value of the dollar 
and cause an outflow of gold.349 
 
     Roosevelt’s advisors looked at historical trends in the gold price over the previous 
century as part of their efforts to find a solution to the country’s economic problems. 
They observed a direct correlation between periods of increased economic activity 
and a price rise against sudden surges in gold supplies; triggers appeared around the 
gold discoveries of California and Australia in the 1840s and1850s, and South Africa 
in the 1880s. Unfortunately in 1933 world gold production was relatively static, and 
had been for the previous decade. Therefore the only alternative was to raise the gold 
price, which in turn would increase the value of existing stocks and thus enhanced 
the basis of the money supply.350 During the autumn of 1933 the price of gold 
increased from the old base rate of $20.67. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. described how 
Roosevelt, over breakfast, set the price:  
While Roosevelt ate his eggs and drank his coffee, the group discussed what 
the day’s price was to be. The precise figure each day was less important than 
the encouragement of a general upward trend. One day Morgenthau came in, 
more worried than usual, and suggested an increase from 19 to 22 cents. 
Roosevelt took one look at Morgenthau’s anxious face and proposed 21 
cents. ‘It’s a lucky number,’ he said with a laugh, ‘because it’s three times 
seven’.351 
 
Mocatta & Goldsmid annual circular for 1934 observed that such tactics seemed 
irrelevant to some professionals in the gold market, noting that they were ‘purely 
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sentimental’.352 On 31 January 1934 a final rise took place and the new fixed price of 
$35 an ounce for gold was announced, as was the return of the United States to an 
international gold standard. A further announcement was made that the Assay office 
would take ‘any and all gold tendered in acceptable bars at the new fixed rate of $35 
an ounce’ in addition it ‘would sell gold, if the export point was reached, to foreign 
central banks of countries still on the gold standard.’353 France, Holland, Belgium, 
Italy and Poland made up what became known as the gold bloc and benefitted from 
the new ruling.354 Switzerland, although on the gold standard, was excluded due to 
some restrictions that disqualified them. Tim Green observed that ‘at first the 
London gold market was not quite sure the Americans really meant what they said. 
An open offer of $35 an ounce for gold sounded too good to be true.’355 The 
increased price meant that gold bought in London and sent to the US would generate 
a profit of more than 3s per ounce. 
 
     The London brokers took advantage of the profits on offer and sent enormous 
shipments of gold across the Atlantic. Rothschild during this period bought, and 
shipped to New York, nearly a million ounces of gold. The premium varied from 
between 2s 6d and 2s per ounce.356 Mocatta & Goldsmid estimated that in the first 
month after the dollar increased the Bank of France lost over £40 million of gold.357 
One result following large movements of gold in 1934 was the creation of an 
international London Good Delivery List. This was a hastily compiled list of twenty 
approved refineries and mints in eight countries together with specifications for 
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universally acceptable bars produced after discussions between representative of the 
Bank of England and London gold market. Green noted that ‘the agreement was an 
achievement for London, clearly establishing its market, offering a unique brand for 
high-quality bar gold. This 1934 list was a landmark in the market’s evolution.’358 
An extended list was produced in 1936 and the number of refineries extended to 28. 
Two of the British refineries no longer in operation were included as the bars 
produced by them continued to be in circulation. 
 
     Throughout the 1930s, generally speaking, the flow of gold was to the USA. 
Between 1934 and 1938 the flow was at its height and United States reserves rose 
from $4 billion to $13 billion.359 In 1935 Fort Knox in Kentucky was built to house 
the inflated reserves.360 By 1937 rumours spread that the United States authorities 
were concerned about the rapid rise in commodity prices and also the vast quantity 
of gold attracted. Panic ensued as reports spread that the administration was 
considering revaluing as opposed to devaluing the dollar. In April and May the mere 
suggestion that the gold price might move to the old statutory price of $20.67 saw a 
large proportion of hoarders’ stocks of gold for sale on the London market. Due to 
the uncertainty of the New York gold price the only buyer was the Bank of England, 
which took all supplies offered at a reasonable discount that it was able to fix. It was 
not long before the tide turned again. With a fall in the price of commodities and the 
continued depreciation in the French franc, confidence in gold, or rather lack of 
confidence in currencies, tempted hoarders to replenish their stocks.361  
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Traditionally consignments of gold were transported by sea. Insurance marine 
underwriters promoted the ideal mode of transport as ‘the fast mail and passenger 
liner fitted with a strong bullion room and belonging to a nationality and ownership 
which [enjoyed] the highest reputation for safe navigation’.362 This continued to be 
the best mode of transport for destinations such as Africa and United States but from 
the mid-1920s air transport was favoured for transporting gold between London and 
continental Europe. According to Rothschild refinery records the first consignment 
of bars was dispatched by air to Belgium in 1926, insured for £100,000. The use of 
air transport continued to rise. In 1931 air services between London and Paris were 
overwhelmed with the volume of gold being airlifted. It was recalled that:  
The ordinary passenger and mail services proved quite inadequate to meet the 
demand for air transport, and for weeks passenger machines were converted 
into freight carriers and extra aeroplanes were dispatched – usually in the 
very early hours of the morning.363 
 
Initially £500,000 was the maximum consignment that could be sent by air, which 
increased to £750,000 with the advent of larger and more powerful aircraft.364 
During this exceptionally busy period passengers travelling with Imperial Airways 
were unaware of the precious cargo on board. Green described how ‘the passengers 
all sat in wicker chairs tied to the floor of the plane... and the coin boxes were tucked 
under the seats. No one had any idea they were sitting on a fortune’.365  
 
     Advances in the aviation industry also speeded up the development of new gold 
fields in East and West Africa. The London refiners turned to these new areas of 
development in search of new sources of gold requiring treatment as native refineries 
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had yet to be erected. In particular focus centred upon the rapidly developing British 
East African Colony of Kenya and the Mandated Territory of Tanganyika. An early 
prospectus informed the potential investor that following the recent rise in the gold 
price ‘many mines formerly considered unpayable, owing to the low grade of the 
ore, now became attractive propositions’.366 For the first time in years it became 
easier to attract investment for the gold industry and raise capital in large quantities. 
In addition to the economic rewards on offer the prospectus highlighted improved 
infrastructures across the continent that led to better communication and transport 
links, contributing much to the development of these new areas of production. In 
particular, advances in the aviation industry enabled surveys of previously uncharted 
territories to be made as new aerodromes sprang up. Equipment and labour could be 
airlifted into areas with no existing infrastructure. Only once the goldfield proved 
successful would road links need to be constructed to main branch line railways and 
aerodromes, which obviously kept investment costs to a minimum. The pamphlet 
listed the advantages of investing in the developing goldfields and the high returns 
on offer. In 1937 Rothschild, in anticipation of a return of newly mined gold to the 
Royal Mint Refinery, planned an overhaul of its operation and also expanded the 
range of activities produced at the Refinery. The improvements were funded with 
profits generated during the gold rush of the early thirties. The Royal Mint Refinery 
was about to enter a new era.  
 
In conclusion, Rothschild benefitted from Britain’s departure of the gold standard 
and the subsequent rise in the gold price. The ‘Gold Rush’ of 1932 was highly 
profitable and profits generated were reinvested in new equipment and an upgrade to 
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the property. When allegations over fraud were made Rothschild stood its ground 
and denied any wrong doing. Support for Rothschild was split. However, the claim 
was eventually withdrawn and the only loss was the payment of legal costs to defend 
the reputation of the venture. Correspondence reveals much about the day to day 
operation and also illuminates inter-working relations amongst the refineries and 
brokers.  
 
Business at the refinery remained brisk. Whilst there was a small downturn in gold 
sent to London for treatment when the dollar price increased and fixed at $35 an 
ounce. Rothschild continued to profit as it made commission on gold bars sent to be 
sold in New York. Eventually the inflated dollar price stimulated new discoveries of 
gold in West and East Africa and it was these rising markets and new outlets of gold 
production that Rothschild concentrated on attracting to London to be treated by the 
Royal Mint Refinery. 
 




The Shadow and Impact of World War 2, 1937-1944 
 
This chapter examines the impact World War 2 had on business at the Royal Mint 
Refinery. In 1937 the introduction of Rolling Plant extended the range of products 
manufactured by the venture. Faced with the prospect of war, treatment of gold and 
silver at the Refinery reduced and gave way to the production of munitions. As the 
demand for munitions increased so the scale and pace of work intensified. It was up 
to Rothschild to ensure its workforce remained on task and motivated. The 
precarious location of the Refinery on the edge of the City close to the docks meant 
once enemy air attacks on London began work was frequently interrupted. The 
decision was made, with financial assistance from the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production, to establish a shadow factory at Tring. In 1941 the bulk of the operation 
and workforce transferred to the new site at Tring and for the remainder of the war 
and operated in the relative safety of the Buckinghamshire countryside. In London, a 
small workforce remained at the Refinery that dealt with small amounts of gold for 
industrial use, and later in 1943 produced small gold bars for export under special 
licence on behalf of the Bank of England. The period under review ends in 1944 as 
Rothschild faced the problems of readjustment in the post-war era. 
 
     The chapter is structured as follows: first the position of the Refinery in 1937 will 
be discussed. Second, how the business adapted and coped with the demands of war 
will be examined. Finally, on the outbreak of war the core activity at the Refinery, 
gold, was placed under government control and restrictive movements imposed. The 
effects this had on the venture will be considered. A study of the Refinery during the 
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Second World War highlights the challenges faced by the Royal Mint Refinery and 
the contributions it made. In answering the call for arms, working practices, methods 
and management styles required adjustment. In a survey of the home front it was 
observed that ‘industry responded. The mighty industrial workshop began to work at 
full speed.’367 In addition the strength of the response from British civilians grew day 
by day as the workforce ‘built ships, they made munitions, tanks, aeroplanes and 
cloth... they toiled long, denying themselves leisure and many of life’s little 
luxuries.’368 All areas of people’s lives changed as they were exposed to enemy 
attack and became firemen and fire-watchers, Home Guards and rescue workers. 
Examples of these experiences of war are found in the history of workers at the 
Refinery. Also illuminated by the account of the Refinery in war is Britain’s changed 
relationship and diminished access to gold produced in South Africa, which in the 
post-war period had significant implications at the Royal Mint Refinery. 
 
In 1937 the management of the business had changed very little since the death of 
Charles in 1923. Overall control of N M Rothschild & Sons remained in the hands of 
Lionel and his younger brother Anthony. Victor, son of Charles and cousin of Lionel 
and Anthony, joined the merchant bank briefly before taking up a position on 
Winston Churchill’s staff in 1939. Victor had a passion for scientific research and 
following the death of his uncle Walter 2nd Lord Rothschild, he inherited the title, a 
fortune, and Tring Park Estate. He had entered the Bank at the insistence of his 
mother, Rozsika, on a trial basis.369 One of the first tasks assigned to him was to 
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produce a survey of how best the Royal Mint Refinery might contribute to future war 
efforts in the manufacture of munitions and metallic industrial products. Victor in his 
review considered the economic position of the business as it stood in 1937, and 
subsequently raised a number of concerns with Lionel and Anthony about its 
continued viability. By 1938 treatment levels of gold had fallen to less than 1.8 
million ounces of gold and 7.8 million ounces of silver.370 Victor observed that the 
Refinery struggled to keep up with the firm’s main competitor Johnson Matthey, 
despite the recent injection of capital used to upgrade the building and equipment. 
Johnson Matthey streamlined its operation, to meet the requirements of a changed 
world in which the firm specialised in chemical and metallurgy methods of the 1920s 
and early 1930s, and concentrated its efforts in the treatment of platinum and liquid 
gold.371 Johnson Matthey took advantage of cheap short-term finance to grow the 
business; part of the expansion included a purpose-built five-storey property to house 
refining plant and increased investment in its laboratories as it became deeply 
involved in the chemical trade.372  
 
     Rothschild partners were aware of the growing gap in treatment levels between 
the two refineries. Anthony had even tried to disguise the growing division and 
found it necessary to withhold certain information about the refining capabilities of 
                                                                                                                                     
remarked that Victor ‘found it boring and depressing’. Victor only served briefly for on the outbreak 
of war he became a counter-sabotage officer of the British War Office. In recognition of his service he 
received both the George Medal, for dangerous work in hazardous circumstances, and the US Legion 
of Merit in recognition of his valuable contribution to the success of the United Nations and an 
enduring achievement in the high cause of Anglo-American co-operation. He was described as being 
‘one of the world’s greatest experts in military intelligence’. Victor’s aversion to banking meant that 
he did not return to the Bank instead he pursued a glittering academic career as Head of the Think 
Tank, only returning to the bank by invitation as chairman in the mid-seventies for a short period. 
Stepping down he observed that ‘the pace is too hot for someone of my age.’ Eventually he returned 
to N M Rothschild & Sons in 1975 and remained at New Court for a further twelve years.  
370 RAL, 148/20, ‘Silver & Gold Treated from 1 Jan 1905 to 31 Dec 1944’, 19 Oct 1945. 
371 McDonald and Smyrk, The History of Johnson Matthey, vol 3, p. 10.  
372 Ibid., p. 50. 
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Rothschild from Johnson Matthey, so as not to renege on the silver treatment 
agreement (discussed in chapter 2) between the two refineries. Anthony wrote that at 
the time ‘RMR could not produce an equal output and if we admitted the inability it 
would have been disastrous for the future division of business.’373 Under the 
circumstances Anthony felt he had no alternative but to agree to the higher limits 
requested by Johnson Matthey, which the Royal Mint Refinery was incapable of 
producing. Anthony, when explaining his logic to Victor, wrote: 
I cannot help feeling that you will think it somewhat Irish or peculiar first of 
all to make a definite offer to produce a certain amount of fine silver per 
week and then afterwards to set to work to find out if and how one can do it. 
But this is the way things happen at New Court, perhaps also elsewhere.374 
 
One solution that would increase treatment levels was Sunday working. It was 
estimated that a 30 per cent drop in output occurred if the plant was stopped for the 
weekend.375 Anthony was against Sunday working and was of the opinion that 
‘continuous working over the weekend for a long period of time is undesirable.’376 
Arthur Kimpton, general manager at Rothschild, suggested that it might be possible 
to arrange shifts so that the men could take it in turns to have a full day off during 
the week, which meant the plant could be kept going. The possibility of Sunday 
working did not sit well with Stanley Smith, the newly appointed manager of the 
Refinery following the retirement of George Buess (manager 1919-1937), and Smith 
immediately set out to find a resolution for the potential problem.377 Smith’s solution 
was additional machinery to be erected at the Refinery to cope with the increased 
demand. The cost was estimated at £500 and in order to avoid a nine month delay 
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was payable immediately.378 Anthony’s response recorded that ‘I am not keen on 
increasing the capital put into the refinery unless there is an exceedingly good return 
for it. I have been looking through the refinery accounts for the year and they are 
somewhat depressing.’379 The lack of enthusiasm to invest in the refinery reflected 
the static position of the business. The accounts showed that profits had dwindled 
from previous years and the immediate future looked bleak. As it transpired the 
additional work failed to materialise, so the treatment capability of the refinery was 
not tested and no additional outlay was made as Rothschild received a warning from 
Johnson Matthey that the deal might collapse. But what is highlighted by the episode 
is that the Rothschild operation had failed to keep pace with the Johnson Matthey 
enterprise, which during the previous two decades had invested and increased their 
market share. 
 
     Rothschild made some investments and improvements at the Royal Mint 
Refinery. The upgrade of the building, facilities and equipment in the 1930s had 
been one of the last tasks performed by Buess in his role as manager. Smith had been 
appointed manager shortly after completion. One of the early concerns raised by 
Smith had been over health and safety procedures at the Refinery, in particular 
working hours and protective clothing and masks. Arthur McIvor in research into 
British working conditions, occupation and health noted that after 1918 ideas from 
work studies filtered through to industry and ‘Welfarist’ employers tended to 
improve conditions to ‘best practice’, although the majority only provided a basic 
minimum standard. 380 McIvor highlighted evidence that ‘workers, managers and 
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employers became more aware of the interrelationship between occupation and 
health and from such consciousness evolved self-help and collective strategies to 
minimise risk’.381 Smith’s promotion of health and safety measures coincided with 
the introduction of the Factory Act 1937. The Act legalised the maximum 48-hour 
working week, regulated permissible overtime to a maximum of six hours per week, 
introduced rest pauses and guidelines on weight carrying, extended medical 
inspection and made the provision of washing, seating and cloakroom facilities 
compulsory in all factories.382 Much of the required compulsory facilities had 
already been incorporated into the upgrade at the premises. Bathing and catering 
facilities had undergone extensive modernisation (see below). 
Figure 10. ‘RMR Canteen Kitchen and Bathroom’383 
  
     McIvor emphasised that ‘a wide gulf could exist between legislative provision 
and actual work practice.’384 Smith’s concern became a reality shortly before the 
start date of the new legislation when an employee was severely injured whilst 
working on one of the guillotine machines. An internal investigation into existing 
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measures at the refinery resulted in a more comprehensive induction for staff being 
implemented and regular checking of machinery being carried out.385 This event, 
together with Smith’s appointment, prompted a reorganisation at the Refinery and a 
definitive chain of command was introduced. Ken Belcher became Smith’s assistant, 
and Smith was also encouraged to draw on the knowledge and experience of Bill 
Williams and Arthur Kimpton, and Fred Dowe continued to take charge of the scale 
room, clerical work and the payment of wages.386 Under the terms of Smith’s 
engagement it was up to him to ensure Partners were kept fully updated on all 
matters concerning the daily operation of the Refinery; copies of all letters had to be 
forwarded to them at New Court and purchases were to be made by Kimpton. The 
hiring and firing of staff had to be approved by the Partners but small pay increases 
were to be at the manager’s discretion. How the Refinery fitted into the overall 
business portfolio of N M Rothschild & Sons is reflected in the statement made by 
Anthony regarding the success of the Refinery. He said that the Refinery’s success 
‘depends on the united efforts of all concerned, both at the Refinery and New Court, 
the closest consultation and co-operation is necessary, and the Partners hope and 
believe that this will continue without friction.’387 Victor became the eyes and ears 
for Lionel and Anthony as he carried out regular visits to the Refinery and kept them 
informed by letter of events and any concerns he had. 
 
     Victor’s letters reveal for the first time much about the concerns Partners had 
about the Refinery. It was probably the first time these concerns were committed to 
paper for in the past much of the discussions surrounding the operation had been 
                                                
385 RAL, 148/18, Notes on accident, May 1938. 
386 RAL, XI/111/908 Royal Mint Refinery 1937-1946, ‘Draft Memorandum’ 12 Oct 1937. 
387 Ibid. 
Chapter 6: The impact of World War 2 
149 
 
carried out in the privacy of the Partners Room at New Court. Letters recorded a 
variety of issues at the Refinery, including pilfering.388 Incidences of theft, although 
rare, did occur. George Buess’s daughter reported one such incident her father had 
spoken of: 
From time to time there were thefts within the foundry, as it was not always 
easy to find employees who could resist the temptation of daily handling gold 
and silver. The refinery was enclosed within high walls and closed by a huge 
wooden door which was only opened to allow the vans from the Bank of 
England to come and fetch the bars. There was a small door for pedestrians, 
and in it there was a peep hole, through which visitors could be identified. 
One day an employee was suspected of the theft of gold shavings. This was 
investigated, and it was found that a tramp was in the habit of coming around 
every few days at lunch time, and that the employee in question would hand a 
sandwich to him through the peep-hole. A detective operating in the foundry 
found this suspicious and arrested the tramp and the employee. On searching 
the home of the latter, they found a tea caddy on the mantelpiece in the 
kitchen filled with gold shavings.389 
 
It was also mooted that another employee of the refinery, dismissed for theft, was 
later observed working as a guardian to the Crown Jewels at the Tower of London.390  
Refinery records frequently contain incidents of theft; generally Rothschild 
dismissed the employee and details were passed over to the police for prosecution. 
 
     Correspondence generated during Victor’s time at the refinery not only recorded 
ongoing events but also reveals something about the dynamics of the Bank itself. His 
involvement at the Refinery was perhaps one way of grooming him for a future role 
he might hold at the Bank.391 Perhaps it was hoped that the refinery would hold more 
appeal for Victor, like his father Charles, as having scientific interest rather than the 
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facts and figures side of banking. Or it may have been that Victor’s involvement in 
the refinery was a way to keep him occupied and out of the way. 
 
     During the 1930s the operation had undergone various alterations and regular 
modernisation of working methods, and the treatment of copper and a number of 
other metals had been added the primary focus continued to be the treatment of gold 
and silver. In the past continuity of staff had been important as techniques were 
handed down through generations of workers. However, from the mid-1930s it 
became a hindrance once modern equipment that required different skills started to 
be introduced. The new Rolling Plant, installed primarily for the manufacture of 
silver coinage, required expert knowledge to ensure strict control of gauge, as 
precision was paramount.392  
 
By 1938 attention at the refinery had turned to the production of munitions. The 
report prepared by Victor had identified the range of activities on offer that might 
assist with government rearmament plans. The Refinery introduced anodising; a 
process for protecting aluminium and its alloys from oxidising by electrolytic 
treatment in the chromic acid bath, and Cadmium Plating. The process for 
electrolytically depositing cadmium directly upon steel and iron was much in 
demand and used for aeroplanes parts. As was pressure and die casting; a process 
where molten metal is forced by high pressure into a mould cavity and is shaped.393 
The success of die casting depended on the finish and accuracy of the die. Building 
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costs to adapt the existing Refinery site in Royal Mint Street for these processes 
were estimated at £13,000. An additional £15,000 and £20,000 was estimated for 
plant and equipment.394 Rather than trade under the existing name of N M 
Rothschild & Sons or the Royal Mint Refinery it was suggested that a small private 
company be formed under the title of Shield Alloys and Die Casting Limited. The 
main reason for the anonymity was that unlike the refining business, where clients 
came to you, in the engineering trade it would be essential to advertise and chase 
business, which was frowned upon by the Partners. 395 Initial plans were that all work 
would continue to be undertaken at Royal Mint Street, utilising the existing 
workforce.  
 
     Anthony had made tentative enquiries and approached various government 
departments to discuss the facilities on offer at the refinery, and how best they might 
be engaged in the production of munitions. One approach was made to Sir Thomas 
Inskip, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence 1936-9, who had spoken at an annual 
luncheon Anthony had attended for the National Union of Manufacturers in London. 
Anthony, in his letter to Inskip, let it be known that space could be made available 
for the production of munitions and that the refinery was already equipped with 
suitable machinery for any type of work involving the rolling and stamping of 
metals.396  It was also noted that the premises had already been inspected and 
approved by the War Office and Air Ministry as suitable for the manufacture of 
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certain munitions, and that the firm had already submitted a tender for a supply of 
detonators.397 
 
     In 1940, following Anthony’s approach to the Ministry of Co-ordination of 
Defence (established in 1936) the Refinery was placed under the supervision of the 
newly formed Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP). David Edgerton explained in 
Britain’s War Machine that ‘one of Churchill’s very first acts on becoming Prime 
Minister was to create a new Ministry of Aircraft Production, under Lord 
Beaverbrook. Beaverbrook wanted a rapid increase in production.’ 398 Churchill’s 
approach to beating the enemy was ‘not with large masses but with comparatively 
small numbers of men armed, equipped and trained to the highest degree (airmen, 
tank troops, navy).’399 In August 1941 Churchill agreed with Frederick Lindemann, 
his personal adviser, ‘that leaving workers in industry to provide the population with 
“reasonable amenities” even at the expenses of, say the infantry’ was essential.400 
Edgerton noted that ‘one of the main aims of the rearmament programmes was to 
build up a powerful air force that could bomb Germany.’401 Overy and Wheatcroft 
have pointed out that from 1936 the expansion of the Air Force got underway and 
expenditure had already trebled.402 According to Calder:  
Between 1936 and 1945 the Government spent nearly four hundred million 
pounds on buildings and plant for the aircraft industry; this included both 
‘shadow factories made from scratch and extensions to existing firms, and 
the expense was spread over nearly 2,800 premises. At its peak some 14,000 
engineering works were employed on MAP contracts.403  
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Around the same time Johnson Matthey was also placed under MAP control to 
supply vital materials, components and assemblies. A selected number of Managers 
and key personnel were informed that they had been classified by MAP as being in 
‘reserved occupations’ and therefore were not free to enlist.404 Bullion melters, 
assayers, analytical chemists and non-metal rollers were among those classified as 
‘reserved occupations’, whether or not of military age, so there was no great exodus 
from the industry.405 Members of staff at the Rothschild operation fell into these 
categories, which ensured a team of experts were readily available at the Refinery. 
The MAP utilised the rolling skills available at the Refinery to roll copper slabs, cast 
by Enfield Rolling Mills, into thin strips just 0.004 inches thick for the manufacture 
of aircraft radiators, though the main bulk of the country’s production was based in 
Birmingham. The installation of half-ton capacity tilting furnaces casting brass 
billets followed the metal being extruded by the Delta Metal Company, for the 
manufacture of shell cases. The production capacity at the Refinery grew to a weekly 
output of around 300 tons of billets.406 In addition MAP asked staff at the Royal 
Mint Refinery to plate very fine molybdenum and tungsten wire with gold and silver 
for use in radio transmitters. At the time only manufacturers in the United States 
produced such a material. Staff at the London refinery designed and constructed the 
specialist machinery and succeeded in producing the special wire plating; the wire 
continued to be produced by the firm until 1965.407 
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     The change in scale and pace at the Rothschild refinery was reflected in the 
willingness of the Partners to again invest in the future of the Refinery and to 
commit large sums of money. Investment extended to the search for new premises as 
space was at a premium at Royal Mint Street and larger premises to accommodate 
the die casting machinery would be required if Rothschild was successful in securing 
government contract. Part of the initial search turned up a property on the banks of 
the river Thames. A cautionary note appears on the paperwork regarding the location 
of the proposed site ‘in view of air raids’, which may account for the final choice of 
additional premises away from the City.408 
 
     Smith had received a good deal of encouragement from officials at the MAP for 
the production of detonators. It was anticipated that at the very least a couple of 
lathes would be required, in addition to other specialist equipment meaning a fairly 
substantial outlay for the Partners. Smith was an advocate of the die casting process, 
and with over twenty years experience produced a specialist report into how 
Rothschild could develop this area of production further. At his suggestion a couple 
of machines were purchased and the staff began experimenting.409 The War Office 
wrote to Rothschild at the end of March asking the refinery to quote for a fuse made 
by the die casting method. Since they were still in the early experimental stages, 
Rothschild declined the offer for the time being.410 Cost was a major factor in any 
agreement for munitions, in particular the large outlay that would be required for the 
purchase of new machinery. Although the Partners were willing to invest in the 
future of the Refinery it is apparent that some friction existed between Victor, 
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Kimpton and Smith over the issue of finance. Victor, when discussing with Lionel 
costs to accommodate the new lines of production, observed that ‘I cannot help 
feeling that Kimpton is trying to rush us a bit. As you yourself said, this has been a 
bee in his bonnet for a considerable time’ adding that: 
the moment we decide to carry out any of the suggestions, even those of a 
temporary nature, which Kimpton wants, it automatically involves us in a 
very heavy expenditure, because these temporary modifications will have to 
be followed up by a rebuilding plan... it will be very expensive.411 
 
In his response Lionel took a more relaxed view; having spoken with Kimpton he 
had been assured that nothing further would be done until everyone had discussed 
things over lunch at New Court.412 
 
     However, by the end of 1938 a number of unconnected events happened that 
affected the future plans at the Refinery. Smith left, having been recruited by MAP 
as a factory inspector and Bill Williams was appointed manager at the Refinery in 
his place. Victor was not destined to stay long at the family firm and his involvement 
was interrupted in April 1939 when he was appointed to a newly formed sub-
committee of the Chemical Defence Committee and his involvement with the family 
business dwindled thereafter. In addition gold business at the refinery had been 
drastically cut as it became increasingly more expensive to ship gold. Insurance 
Underwriters demanded full war risk premiums on gold shipments.413 Effectively the 
move ruled out arbitrage business, with the exception of those who were prepared to 
ship gold without insurance cover. When war finally broke out it paralysed 
production and transportation links. 
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Overy and Wheatcroft observed that from the start British rearmament was planned 
with the idea of a potential conflict in 1939.414 Whilst Britain had not been militarily 
naked she had not possessed ‘great military strength’ and it had taken a minimum of 
four years of detailed plans and economic mobilisation to rearm.415 Overy and 
Wheatcroft suggested that the Government received the backing of the nation during 
1939 ‘as the British public adjusted itself to a war mentality.’416 Orwell captured the 
contemporary mood for the anticipated war when he wrote ‘it’s in the air you 
breathe.’417 The declaration of war on 3 September 1939 was accompanied by a 
flurry of government legislation imposing official controls. New Ministries were 
immediately set up for Supply, Food, Economic Warfare, Information, Home 
Security and Shipping, closely followed by War, Transport and Aircraft Production. 
Under special powers given to new and existing Ministries security, food, finance, 
international trade, currency, commodities, information, labour, movement, 
transport, manufacture and health for the whole nation were successfully taken under 
government control within a few months.418 The Home Office, responsible for 
internal safety through the police and fire brigades, was extended to include Civil 
Defence against air raids; responsibility for Civil Defence subsequently passed over 
to the new Ministry of Home Security. In addition there was a Ministry of Works 
and Building, while Ministries of Fuel and Power followed in 1942 and for Town 
and Country Planning, Civil Aviation and Reconstruction between 1943 and 1945.419 
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     The moment war was declared, under the Defence (Finance) Regulations 1939, 
the free gold market was closed and all private transactions banned, gold dealings 
had to be made through official channels only.420 Simultaneously, various banking 
regulations came into force, and the Bank of England (the Bank) took control of 
fixing the price of gold. On 5 September the Bank set the price of gold at 168s, 
which remained unchanged for the duration of the conflict.421 Sharps & Wilkins 
Bullion Review for 1939 listed four specific areas that affected the gold industry. 
First, the re-imposition of gold embargoes; second, the transfer of £350,000,000 of 
gold held by the Bank of England to the Exchange Equalisation Fund; third, the 
acquisition by the British Treasury at the outbreak of war of all gold bullion and coin 
held by anyone resident in the UK, under the Defence (Finance) Regulations and 
finally, the abnormal amount of gold exported to the United States.422 Between 
January and August 1939, gold shipments had reached record proportions as gold 
with a value of over £360 million was exported to the United States.423 According to 
Sharps & Wilkins ‘much of the gold represented hoarded metal released by foreign 
holders, who owing to their continued uneasiness regarding the European political 
situation preferred dollars in New York to gold in London.’424 The amounts of gold 
stored in London, and business transactions became increasingly less. Already, as a 
result of the Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928, a large percentage of gold had 
been collected in 1931 when the Bank of England had exercised its power to call in 
amounts of gold in excess of £10,000. In September 1939 bankers were asked to 
surrender the estimated £200,000 of gold in British vaults, which took nearly a year 
to collect. In addition Bullion Office records at the Bank of England reveal that 
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nearly £43.5 million of hoarded gold coin was taken in by the Bank in the first year 
of war and the amount stood at nearly £451 million at the end of the war in 1945. 425 
The coin was collected directly or through authorised dealers, who paid 39/3d for 
sovereigns from the general public. It was impossible to establish the true value of 
hoarded gold that would have been disposed of through unofficial channels. 
However some of the gold coin was purchased by jewellers at inflated prices as high 
as 57/-d, in 1942, and it is thought that much of the coin eventually found its way 
into the Bank.426 Within the first year of war gold estimated at £700 million had been 
sent from Britain to either Canada or New York.427 
 
     Shipments to Canada had begun in the spring of 1939 as it had been felt advisable 
to build up gold stocks in North America against possible shortages of liquid funds 
there. In May the opportunity presented itself for large consignments of gold to be 
sent to Canada, carried by cruisers escorting the King George VI and Queen 
Elizabeth on their official visit. By the end of June over £80 million of gold was 
stored at the Bank of Canada.428 Alfred Draper, using archive records at the Bank of 
England, captured the race to save European gold in the extraordinary operation 
instigated by the Bank. 429 Enormous quantities of gold were spirited away aboard 
Royal Navy frigates for safe keeping in Canada and North America. The largest 
consignment was sent in the first week of July 1940, when it was recorded that there 
were nearly £200 million of gold on the water, which was possibly the greatest 
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amount of gold ever risked at one time.430 Niall Ferguson argued that ‘as national 
financial systems buckled in the face of invasion and aerial bombardment, gold was 
the one asset that proved indestructible. It was Britain’s ability to ship it in large 
quantities to the United States in 1938-1940 that kept the flow of imports coming 
across the Atlantic.’431 Bolton, Bullion Department manager at the Bank of England, 
reflected later on the ‘enormous risks’ taken though ‘happily we [the Bank] did not 
lose one bar of gold throughout the period.’432 It was fortunate for the Bank no losses 
were reported as the consignments of gold were not insured since they could never 
have been replaced.433 No more shipments took place after August 1940 until 
February 1941. 
 
In London many of the financial institutions in the City had precautionary plans in 
place, which were invoked on the outbreak of war. David Kynaston, in his study of 
the City at war, wrote of the inevitable shrinkage of the population in the City, a 
response to ‘military call-up’ but also from ‘many members of staff engaged in 
routine work also evacuated from bomb-threatened London, as wealthy City partners 
made good use of their liberal supply of country houses in order to accommodate 
them.’434 Many of the City establishments had started planning for war far in 
advance of 1939 and details concerning resources and mobilisation of workforces 
regularly appear in the published history of many City institutions. For example the 
war-time planning of the Bank of England, Midland Bank and Lloyds Bank 
resembled the execution of a well thought out military exercise, necessary for the 
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mobilisation of a large workforce; in the case of Midland and Lloyds both had the 
additional pressure of keeping large number of branch offices across the country 
open for business.435 Dennett suspects that ‘precautions probably did not differ from 
those taken all over London.’436 She holds up the preparations for war the law firm 
Slaughter and May as being typical. Slaughter and May were fortunate that the 
building they occupied had a sub-basement that could be equipped well in advance. 
Staff were asked to provide a ‘blanket, and a mackintosh, boots and gloves made of 
rubber to be stored there. Gas masks and torches were to be carried at all times.’437 
Rothschild was one of the companies with access to a country estate and used the 
family estate at Tring. 
 
     Only sketchy details survive of the precautionary planning undertaken at N M 
Rothschild & Sons. With the younger workforce called up, most of the remaining 
staff, which by then consisted of mainly women and older men whose job could be 
done outside the City, were evacuated to the country mansion residence at Tring. 
Victor had inherited Tring in 1937 following the death of his uncle Walter. On 
taking up residence N M Rothschild & Sons took on responsibility for its upkeep.438 
Business records were duplicated and coupons and bonds, collected over the counter 
at New Court, were sent daily to Tring to be processed. Palin, an employee of 
Rothschild based at New Court during the war, wrote in his own account that it 
became ‘a fortress manned only by a small garrison of men whose presence in the 
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City was necessary to keep the place going.’439 The London office came under the 
leadership of Brooks, who according to Palin, ‘remained staunchly at the helm 
during the day and commanded the fire-watchers by night.’440 Palin recalled that: 
During the daylight alerts we descended to the basement and sat on tin boxes 
in the stone-flagged passages until the sound of the ‘all clear’. The efficiency 
of the New Court fire brigade saved the building from destruction by 
incendiary bombs; it could not have protected us from the high explosives 
which flattened wide areas of the City all around us. Throughout the war 
New Court suffered nothing worse than windows broken and doors blown in 
by blast and the superficial damage to the roof which the incendiaries 
inflicted in the few seconds before the watchers got to them. The building 
and out jobs were still there when we came back to them.441 
 
One visitor to the City, whose husband generally lunched once or twice a week at 
New Court, described a journey and visit to Rothschild on the morning of the 30 
December 1940, following the severe bombardment of the City the previous 
evening. Their progress across London was slow and was undertaken on foot as they 
were forced to make a ‘wide detour through the streets littered with burning rubble 
and oozing with water’ to get to New Court. Mrs Robert Henrey on arriving at New 
Court recalled that: 
On this nightmare morning, because of the bomb that had fallen on one side 
of the street so that there was nothing but smouldering ruins in the 
carriageway, it was not possible to enter the bank by its beautiful courtyard, 
and the side entrance had to be used. The historic building remained standing 
by a miracle though most of the windows were broken and all the smells of 
the street, burnt paper, charred wood, a damp mustiness and white winter fog 
rolling up from the Thames came through the casings. Mr Anthony de 
Rothschild lunched almost every day in a room where fine oil paintings of 
the family through its many generations embellished the walls, and where a 
merry fire burned in an old-fashioned grate. Well-groomed footmen, who had 
know the partners since childhood, silently passed round dishes while 
eminent people discussed politics and foreign affairs with the moderation 
expected of men in high position. On this occasion the steps were coved with 
broken glass and a messenger, wearing a top-hat and carrying a rolled-up 
umbrella, was brushing the dust from his coat. Mr Anthony led his guests to a 
small room below stairs where he often slept during the air raids and where 
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the housekeeper served them with cold tongue and chutney. There was no 
coffee because the gas was cut off. This perhaps was to prove one of the 
strangest lunches served at New Court.442 
 
It was not unusual for directors and partners of institutions to stay overnight in the 
City. Kynaston wrote that ‘[Governor] Norman himself was now sleeping at the 
Bank [of England] 2 or 3 nights each week and occasionally a lowly member of staff 
would sight that still alert and vital figure wearing a dressing gown emblazoned with 
a dragon.’443 Following a visit by Anthony to Governor Norman at the Bank of 
England in December 1941, Norman wrote in his diary ‘[Anthony] seems 
overwrought and worried. Lionel seriously ill and future uncertain.’444 The strain on 
Anthony de Rothschild began to tell, as the conflict deepened and bombs continued 
to fall reducing much of the City to a bombsite. Lionel died in January 1942. Prior to 
his death it was announced that N M Rothschild & Sons had formed a private 
company, Rothschild Continuation Limited, which ensured that if both Partners died 
the business would carry on till new partners assumed control.445 However, business 
in the City had virtually dried up and in almost all the merchant banks it was ‘care 
and maintenance’ that preoccupied Partners.446 In spite of its central location, 
though, the Rothschild bank and its staff escaped any serious physical damage and it 
emerged relatively unscathed in 1945. 
 
The Royal Mint Refinery also escaped serious damage, despite its close proximity to 
the London docks. In 1939 a third of Britain’s imports arrived via the Thames.447 
The enemy persistently targeted the river intending to disrupt supplies and damage 
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shipping. Daily business operations at the Refinery were frequently subjected to the 
general disruption of services such as water, gas and telephone.448 The majority of 
the workforce at the Refinery, like those at New Court, had been evacuated away 
from London to Tring. However, unlike the New Court employees who worked at 
the mansion, workers from the Refinery were relocated to the new shadow factory 
established by Rothschild at Tring. In London a workforce of just over 50 remained 
to manage the premises, mainly those engaged in treating the gold and silver that 
turned up sporadically. During the war the site of the Refinery was designated as a 
‘key point’ of national importance and it became the duty of staff to provide 
information concerning property damage and numbers of casualties in the vicinity of 
Royal Mint Street and the surrounding area to the authorities.449 On the flat roof, 
accessible through the messroom door, was the lift shaft and next to this stood an air 
raid shelter for use by the night time firewatchers and two large acoustic horns for 
the detection of enemy aircraft.450 
 
     Staff at the Refinery kept a daily spotter’s log to record activity and enemy bombs 
in the immediate vicinity of Royal Mint Street. The first entries appeared in the log 
in July 1940. At first, despite the warning sirens being sounded, staff at the Refinery 
continued to work through the raids. By August 1940 the number of entries had 
increased, and the busiest period was during the second half of August when both 
day and night raids took place on the outskirts of the City.451 During September there 
were greater periods of disruption at the Refinery. Gas and telephone lines were 
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frequently suspended and refinery staff took to sleeping in the vault rather than 
attempting to return home.452 
Figure 11. ‘RMR Workman's flat’453 
  
 
    The main contributors to the log were Arthur Hunt and Ken Belcher. Hunt had 
overall responsibility for air raid precautions and just before the outbreak of war had 
taken the spare bedroom in the Refinery’s top floor flat, the home of the resident 
cook, Lily Vining.454 His own family were evacuated to stay with relatives in Stoke 
and he joined them every third Sunday for an overnight visit. Hunt recorded that his 
return train journey to London generally took him in excess of 10 hours.455 Hunt’s 
wife and son often made the journey to London to visit him at the Refinery.456 A 
number of times during the war Hunt and Belcher’s wives worked at the Refinery 
either on the telephone exchange, with Tilly Finestein, or later in 1943 packing and 
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weighing small gold tola bars prior to dispatch to the Middle East.457 All three 
complained about the extra work caused when a company, White Metals, were 
offered temporary office accommodation when their own premises were bombed.458  
 
     One particularly eventful night for Refinery firewatchers was 7-8 September 1940 
when the Luftwaffe launched a massive attack on London. The Peabody buildings on 
the Whitechapel Estate were destroyed, killing nearly 80 people.459 Hunt had been 
part of the rescue party, and his son later recalled how his father had subsequently 
collapsed with exhaustion. He spoke of the kindness extended to his father by 
Anthony, who on visiting the Refinery dispatched Hunt senior to the mansion at 
Tring for some much-needed rest.460 October and November 1940 proved just as 
eventful and the Refinery experienced frequent interruptions to services, in particular 
the water supply, as bombs rained down on the surrounding areas: target areas 
included the docklands, Tower Hill and along the banks of the Thames.461 At the 
Bank of England firewatchers on the roof used a map designed by Arthur Bond, a 
Bank employee and artist, to identify key land marks around the City. Bond set a 
panoramic view around an ordnance survey map of the surrounding area. The 
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Figure 12. Bank of England 'Roof Spotter’s Guide'.462 
  
 
     Fewer raids were recorded by staff at the Refinery for December but the building 
suffered minor damage when a land mine exploded in Tower Hill blowing the 
windows in and small incendiaries caused fires on the roof that had to be 
extinguished by the firewatchers on duty. Kynaston observed that ‘firewatching was 
one of the war’s many egalitarian aspects.’463 Alan Welsford, partner at Slaughter 
and May, remarked how it had ‘given us all a great opportunity to know each other 
much better than is possible in ordinary peacetime circumstances,’ adding that it was 
‘exceedingly good’ for a partner such as himself ‘to get thoroughly put on the spot 
by a junior office boy at the office billiard table.’464 Ackrill and Hannah, in research 
into the business of banking during the war, wrote about how nightly fire-fighting on 
vulnerable buildings took its toll on the energy of staff. They noted that ‘getting 
through the day to day business in civil life required dogged persistence rather than 
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dashing enterprise.’465 Holmes and Green, in the history of Midland Bank observed 
that ‘London staff suffered worst of all. As well as the hazards of working in 
damaged premises, often with no heat or light, they faced the problem of getting to 
and from their places of work, sometimes after having suffered damage to their own 
homes’ but added that in most cases ‘business continued’ as usual.466 
 
     The night and morning of 10 -11 May 1941 marked the peak of the German 
bombing campaign, and was one of the longest nights in London of the war.467 The 
spotter’s log at the Royal Mint Refinery recorded that no raid took place during the 
day. However, in the evening warnings began at 11pm and at 11:18pm the first oil 
bomb exploded in Finsbury. The order to shut the Refinery down was given at 
11:20pm. Reports followed of planes ablaze above the London sky as they were hit 
by gunfire. At 12:10am five bombs landed in Cable Street, adjacent to Royal Mint 
Street. Steel in his report of the evening’s events wrote:  
Incendiaries on our roof and surrounding areas hundreds of them in this 
district at that time. Royal telephone exchange had incendiaries on their roof 
they were allowed to burn out. No watches apparently could get through to 
them by phone for 10 minutes. Large fires in the City and West End.468  
 
At 01:25am ‘power and light had been cut off and fires were burning furiously 
everywhere. Tower Bridge was struck.’469 It was observed that ‘smoke and glare 
from fires blot out a full moon.’470 More incendiaries and land mines were dropped 
over the area at 03:25am and by 04:20am ‘fires in every direction, within 100 yards 
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of RMR, burning furiously.’ At 05:25am there was ‘still plenty of action’. Finally 
the all clear was sounded at 05:45am.471 Steel’s final entry reported that:  
Tonight’s raid can be compared with the worst we have had. At 06:00am 
fires were burning furiously everywhere. This raid must hold the record for 
the number of delayed action bombs that have been dropped. Power and light 
still off but telephone ok. Weather brilliant moonlight. Visibility excellent. 
Power and light cut off at 01:25am, 10 May 1941 – partly restored at 
01:00pm 29 May 1941 and fully restored on 1 June 1941.472 
 
Press reports that followed estimated that across London 1,436 people had been 
killed and 1,792 injured.473 Thankfully none of the staff present at the refinery that 
night suffered any injuries. It is little wonder that 1941 represented the lowest figure 
ever for the treatment of gold at the refinery: merely 37,000 ounces.474 The search 
for alternative premises became more pressing as the realities of war hit home and a 
less vulnerable position for the business was sought. 
 
Victor came to Rothschild’s assistance and agreed to lease a disused factory unit in 
Tring, the Silk Mill, which he had also inherited on the death of his uncle Walter.475 
A lease for the premises was drawn up for a term of 21 years between the Ministry 
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of Aircraft Production, Victor, Lord Rothschild and N M Rothschild & Sons. 
William Huckvale junior, a local Tring architect, who had completed a number of 
building projects for the Rothschild family, was commissioned to make suitable 
modifications to the structure of the Silk Mill; in particular the floors which were 
reinforced to cope with the weight of the heavy plant and machinery relocated from 
the Refinery in London.476 On the highest point of the roof an anti-aircraft gun was 
mounted in a gun-turret and the exterior of the building was painted in camouflage 
colours.477 A new company was formed and the new venture at Tring began trading 
under the name RMR (Engineering). A new manager was appointed for the factory, 
John Flynn, who took up the position in 1941 having relocated from the Midlands. 
Flynn’s extensive background in the engineering industry made him the ideal 
candidate to set up and take control of the new operation, which received a 
government contract to manufacture torpedo detonators478 and precision parts for 
artillery and aircraft.479  Shield Alloys, the company formed and fronted on behalf of 
Rothschild by two employees, Kimpton and Hoyland, shared the factory space and 
produced aluminium alloy and brass sand castings for aircraft components. Whilst 
Anthony visited Tring, it was Kimpton, in his role as General Manager at 
Rothschild, who regularly travelled between New Court, the Refinery in London and 
the factory in Tring. From 1942 Kimpton took a greater role in the business and 
assumed overall responsibility for the co-ordination of supplies and production. 
Staffing of the new factory was left to Flynn. 
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     In the past the heavy manual nature of work had meant that the workforce at the 
Royal Mint Refinery was predominantly male, with the exception of catering staff. A 
number of skilled staff relocated from London to Tring, and the workforce was 
enlarged with women and older men recruited from the local area. Staffing levels 
required constant attention to keep pace with losses to the armed forces. Frequent 
recruitment campaigns were run at the factory. Adverts were placed in regional 
newspapers in areas with a tradition of tool making and these attracted some 
workers, particularly from the Midlands. Suitable housing for the inflated workforce 
was also a problem. There was a shortage of accommodation in the area. In the 
1880s 400 cottages had been built on the Tring Park estate and some of these estate 
houses were placed at the disposal of the incoming workers. Single men were 
accommodated in ‘The Bothy’ in London Road480 and single women in the old 
Rothschild laundry building in St Peter’s Hill.481 As war progressed the majority of 
the workforce engaged in work at both RMR Engineering and Shield Alloy were 
women. 
 
In 1939 women constituted 27 per cent of the total labour force in Britain, but by 
1944 this had risen to 39 per cent.482 In 1943 females aged between 15 and 60 were 
required by law to register with the Ministry of Labour and were engaged in the 
forces, munitions work and essential industries.483 Nearly three million married 
women and widows were employed in these sectors.484 Engineering was one sector 
that opened up to women and engaged them in all forms of light and consumer 
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engineering production in ever-increasing numbers.485 Unpleasant and dirty work 
proved no barrier and women were trained to perform semi-skilled task. One limiting 
factor the Ministry of Labour had to overcome, in order to expand the war industry, 
was the need to redistribute and increase the supply of skilled labour. McIvor defined 
‘skill’ as ‘a combination of manual dexterity and knowledge of materials and tools 
and discretion acquired through a long training period, traditionally of several years, 
commonly through apprenticeship’.486 Skilled operatives were the scarcest and 
therefore less skilled workers were ‘upgraded’ to perform skilled tasks and it become 
common practice to use semi-skilled workers to assist skilled men. These ‘dilutees’ 
might take over machines to free the skilled worker from mundane tasks. This was a 
transformation in the practice and experience of work.487 There is no evidence of this 
happening at the Refinery, but at Tring the practice was adopted. 
 
     Leopold de Rothschild (1927-2012) recalled something of the working methods 
at Tring during the summer he spent working at RMR (Engineering) in 1944, whilst 
staying at the family mansion. He observed that ‘it was a long hot summer’ and the 
work was ‘boring and repetitive as you did the same task over and over again’.488 
Each morning he cycled from the mansion to the factory where he took his place on 
the production line making detonators. He operated a lathe on which he was trained 
by the lady who stood next to him, Margaret, who after the war went to work at New 
Court. Leopold observed that he was the only male on the line. The monotony of the 
work was broken by the music piped throughout the factory. Programmes such as 
Workers’ Playtime and Music while you Work were introduced by the BBC to relieve 
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men and women working at top speed in the factories.489 Neither of the programmes 
lasted more than half an hour at a stretch, as if the music went on all day as a 
background to work, it had the opposite effect to ‘relief’.490 Calder noted that 
‘progressive managements relayed the programmes over loudspeakers twice a 
day.’491 The programmes acted as a stimulant in the ‘dead’ parts of the day, mid-
morning and mid-afternoon, which proved to allay fatigue and boredom and stepped 
up production.492 If anyone complained about feeling tired the favourite wartime 
response given by the women was 'don't you know there’s a war on?’493 Generally 
Leopold observed that workers at Tring appeared happy with the working 
environment, and that there was a good atmosphere, despite most of the women 
being tired, overworked with the effort of war and under-nourished from prolonged 
rationing.494  
 
     The Rothschild workforce, at New Court, the Refinery in London and factory in 
Tring, had access to a staff canteen. Leopold remembered the canteen at Tring being 
good, although perhaps not in the same league as the New Court catering 
arrangements had once been, operated by outside caters Ring & Brymer who also 
catered for the Lord Mayor’s banquets. In 1937, as part of the refurbishment the 
catering facilities at Royal Mint Street the kitchen and canteen facilities had been 
upgraded and during the modifications to the factory at Tring, provision had been 
made for a staff canteen. Food was of course very important to the workforce and 
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difficult to manage during the war, and one of the issues that regularly came up at 
the meeting of the Joint Production Committee. 
Figure 13. ‘RMR Canteen and Serving counter, 1937’495 
  
Joint Production Committee’s (JPCs) were one of the Government initiatives 
introduced in 1942 in factories across Britain to promote better communication 
between operators and workers and ensure the smooth running of works in an 
attempt to maximise production levels.496 Angus Calder considered the introduction 
of JPCs, consisting of management and men, as ‘superficially one of the most 
striking manifestations of the war-time social revolution fostered by the supply 
ministries.’497 Nearly four thousand JPCs had been formed by the end of 1943, of 
which five hundred existed in the engineering and allied industries.498 Calder noted 
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that ‘it was in engineering that the committees were most publicised and, probably, 
most effective.’499 
 
     The JPC at Rothschild was typical in its makeup. It was formed with 
representatives from each department across the three operations; Royal Mint 
Refinery, RMR Engineering and Shield Alloys. Representatives were selected by 
their fellow workers and served for a year before another employee took their place; 
departments represented included the metal handlers, mechanics, foundry, rolling 
department, maintenance staff, billet foundry, and general foundry. The meetings 
were chaired by Sargant, and management were represented by Belcher, Perry, 
Kimpton, Flynn and his assistant Linton. On occasion Anthony would attend but 
generally he received a copy of the monthly minutes. Meetings offered workers a 
platform to express any concerns they had and to put forward ideas and 
recommendations for increased productivity. According to Calder ‘the scope of the 
committee was confined by the agreement to matters relating to production and 
increased efficiency.’500 However, he does acknowledge that ‘about one in five was 
going beyond the agreement to discuss such things as piece rates and output 
bonuses.’501 In certain factories JPCs aroused interest and enthusiasm and as Calder 
observed ‘it was found that excitement generally ran highest when there was a 
prospect of the workers’ representatives attacking the management, and when the 
two sides were co-operating successfully, there were often cries that the former had 
‘sold out’.’502 There is no evidence in minutes of meetings held by the Rothschild 
JPC of this type of behaviour but what is of interest is that prior to the formation 
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there is little evidence to suggests workers at the firm had any input into the 
decision-making process or that their comments and concerns were considered by 
Partners. 
 
     Topics covered by the JPC included the Essential Works Order, whereby 
members were asked to help management check on absenteeism and lateness, 
pilfering and checking of lockers, in addition to issues of product rejection, holiday 
entitlement, and clothing coupons. Additional coupons for industrial clogs and 
overalls essential for work were sought, which resulted in a representation being 
made to the Board of Trade to see if extra coupons were available.503 Calder pointed 
out that through the JPC firms were able to raise problems to external regional 
boards giving a voice to both management and the worker.504 Also on the agenda at 
Rothschild were the general performance of the business, updates of contract 
positions, the treatment of gold, and fuel economy; one discussion had included the 
recommendation put forward by the Ministry of Fuel and Power to reduce the 
number of hot dishes in the canteens to save on fuel.505 
 
     The issue of food and the canteens was always high on the JPC monthly agenda, 
including discussions about the quality and variety of meals on offer and the attitude 
of catering staff. Facilities at Royal Mint Street meant the canteen catered for 130 to 
140 hot meals a day; while at Tring 70 to 80 meals were served daily. Both canteens 
were operated by an external catering firm, Staff Caterers Ltd.506 Rothschild 
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subsidised each canteen with £350 per year, and an additional £2 each week towards 
the night cook’s wages at the Refinery. The cost of a plate of meat and two 
vegetables was 10d-11d, and an additional 2d-3d was charged for a sweet.507 
Vegetables grown at Tring Park frequently made it onto the canteen menu. 
 
     Rothschild addressed the complaints over the canteen facilities by engaging a 
report from an independent advisor, George Polltzer, who happened to be an official 
advisor to the Ministry of Food on industrial canteens. Polltzer’s report highlighted a 
number of concerns. First he reported that the canteen at the Refinery was ‘dirty and 
the whole atmosphere sordid’. Second, he was concerned about the management of 
both locations. He observed the long queues and the lack of ‘imagination or sense of 
psychology in the way food was prepared and served’.508 Polltzer suggested that the 
catering firm engaged by Rothschild was ‘not a good firm’ and many of his other 
clients had already changed firms.509 Kimpton reported back to the JPC addressing 
Polltzer’s initial findings and wrote that: 
Cleanliness: Impossible to maintain a state of cleanliness. Smoke is 
continually pouring into the Canteen and the men themselves go up in their 
working clothes, often without washing. The canteen is not closed for the 
necessary time to enable the staff to keep the mess room reasonably clean. 
The kitchen is small and it is inevitable that during the day the floor gets 
dirty, but I was assured that it was washed over every day.  
Food: Complaints mainly over quantities. The amount of meat allowed per 
head per day is so small that it is inevitable that the portions served to the 
men are small. The employees are apt to overlook the fact that canteen meals 
are extra to their ordinary rations and no caterer can serve out what he cannot 
get. Fish is provided when obtainable and permissible and it is obvious that 
on the “make up” days meals may be less appetising. There are plenty of 
vegetables. I am quite satisfied as to the quality of the edibles. 
Staff: It is admitted that the type of labour allowed to canteens is mainly 
drawn from women unsuitable for factory work and even if we change our 
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caterers the incoming firm have to take over the existing labour with all its 
defects. 
General: Our own employees must be held to blame for the trouble. Their 
attitude towards the canteen is indefensible.510 
 
There was some controversy at the May meeting in response to the findings, in 
particular the comment made by Kimpton that ‘many of our men are unreasonable 
and greedy’.511 The minutes recorded that it was felt that the ‘psychological situation 
now existing is not one which can be solved either by improvements, or by any of 
the remedial measures suggested in the report but only by complete change.’512 
Change was difficult to orchestrate as the contract had a three month notice period 
and once the wheels were in motion it might lead to the firm being without catering 
facilities. Also if the contract was cancelled at just one of the Rothschild canteens, 
for instance London, it was doubtful if the caterers would continue to provide the 
canteen at Tring, where conditions were aggravated by the isolated situation of the 
works. Therefore it was agreed that rather than give notice and have to seek 
alternative arrangements it would be better to make an effort to improve the present 
service. This was the right choice. It was reported by the June committee that an 
improvement to the service was recorded and that the problem appeared to have 
passed. At the Refinery canteen the introduction of a book that recorded ‘Complaints 
and Appreciations’, which had been completed by a member of the Men’s Canteen 
Committee for the previous three months, concluded that there were now more ‘ok’s 
than complaints .’ Sample menus were also presented to the Committee in order to 
show the variety of food now on offer (see below). Rothschild, despite war-time 
shortages, managed to ensure that the workforce in London and Tring received at 
least one hot and nutritious meal a day. Although the idea of a works committee had 
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been a Government initiative the fact that the monthly meetings continued into the 
post-war period showed they had made a positive contribution at Rothschild.  
Figure 14. ‘RMR Canteen Menu, 1944’513 
 
 
Whilst the operation at Tring prospered and production levels increased, reaching 
half a million parts a week, work at the refinery in Royal Mint Street proved more 
volatile. By 1941 the treatment of gold had dipped to an all-time low of 36,159 
ounces of gold. Disturbance to the London gold market was echoed in Samuel 
Montagu’s Annual Bullion Review as it noted that there was ‘little interest to place 
on record’.514 In October 1940, after the fall of France the previous June, it was 
estimated that the cost of the second year of war would be in the region of £800 
million.515 At the end of September Britain’s gold and dollar reserves had reduced to 
around £222 million and in addition £175 million securities were held, which were 
                                                
513 Source: RAL XI/111/908, Menu Refinery Canteen, 15 Apr and 22 Apr 1944. 
514 Samuel Montagu & Co, Ltd., Annual Bullion Review, 1941. 
515 BEA, M5/533, p. 1243.  
Chapter 6: The impact of World War 2 
179 
 
difficult to sell.516 Britain required at least £150 million as an essential reserve.517 In 
October South Africa and India had been approached for help, but assistance from 
the United States could not be sought until after the Presidential election in 
November. India gave up its gold almost immediately; assistance from South Africa 
was not as forthcoming. In 1940 Britain found it harder to ensure receipt of a steady 
supply of gold from the Cape, which was of paramount importance in financing the 
conflict. Unlike the First World War Britain was unable to commandeer South 
Africa’s entire gold production (discussed in chapter 3). Early encouragement to 
stimulate production in the dominions and colonies was given by the authorities in a 
bid to maintain a continual steady supply of gold,518 but South Africa was not part of 
these early discussions, which clearly undermined Britain’s relationship to gold from 
the Cape. One reason for the oversight was offered in a memorandum to the Bank of 
England Bullion Office in July 1941, when it was observed that it had been ‘taken 
for granted that the South African government policy was neither to allow output to 
fall below about 14.5 million fine ounces a year not to increase it by concentrating 
upon high-paying ores or other ultimately wasteful means.’519 Another view taken by 
the Colonial Office had been that the importance of gold as a dollar earner should 
not be exaggerated and that other minerals such as manganese, tin, bauxite and oil, 
might be just as valuable. 
 
     In 1941 British diplomatic relations with South Africa were high on the agenda as 
the new High Commissioner Lord Harlech took up his post. Part of the brief 
prepared for him by the Treasury and Bank of England outlined some of the 
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difficulties Britain faced and put forward four ways that South Africa could 
contribute to Britain’s war effort. The first was to sell the whole of the current gold 
production for sterling. The second was to impose severe restrictions on imports 
from non-sterling countries. The third was to tighten up the administration of 
exchange controls, as it was felt that the existing way increased the risk of a flight of 
capital from ‘the pound sterling into the South African pound and thence in the 
United States dollar’. The final way was deemed as being ‘of very special 
importance’ and involved the revaluation of the gold holding of the South African 
Reserve Bank, then still at 84s an ounce. By law the Reserve Bank was obliged to 
hold in gold or specie a reserve of at least 30 per cent of its sight liabilities. If gold 
was to be revalued at the London price of 168s an ounce, it meant  that a large 
proportion of the gold held in reserve could be released and sold for sterling, which 
would be ‘of the utmost help to us’.520 Behind the desperate tone of the brief lay the 
fact that Britain’s gold and dollar reserves were almost exhausted, and those stocks 
needed to be replenished in order to maintain an adequate working balance. The 
Union Government had rejected a similar proposal made in October 1940 as being 
‘politically impossible’. Talks between Lord Harlech, Jan Hofmeyr, South African 
Minister of Finance (1939-1948), and Johannus Postmus, Governor of the South 
African Reserve Bank (1932-1945), who were both said to be ‘intensely conservative 
and orthodox, as well as nationalistic’ proceeded and it was observed that the 
Government seemed ‘far from enthusiastic’ about alleviating Britain’s plight.521  
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     South Africa ‘consciously and deliberately’ remained on the gold standard, whilst 
nominally being a member of the Sterling Area.522 Britain, as bankers of the Sterling 
Area, was liable to be called upon to provide gold to meet the international 
commitments of its members, and as such it felt that it should be ‘entitled’ to the 
custody of the Empire’s centralised reserves in gold. However, following the First 
World War there was a marked reluctance by South Africa to bank with the Bank of 
England and to sell more gold than needed to meet international liabilities. Any 
surplus was retained by South Africa, as a national store of value for international 
purposes. Canada was put forward by Britain as the example for South Africa to 
follow. It was suggested that gold should be treated more as a commodity for export 
and that it should sell as much of it to Britain as possible for sterling, and that the 
store of gold kept for international liabilities should be as small as possible for the 
duration of the war. It was observed that: 
South Africa is certainly doing less than she could to help us to meeting the 
financial strain of our common war effort, but the matter is very delicate 
because the opposition in South Africa are constantly representing the Union 
as being in financial chains to this country and are doing their utmost to 
argue that the Union should be detached from any form of financial 
dependence on us, and, in particular, that the South African pound should no 
longer be linked with the pound sterling.’523 
 
Through the intervention of General Smuts’, who was sympathetic to Britain’s 
plight, some temporary assistance was provided. However, out of the 14 million 
ounces of gold produced in South African during the first year of war only 10 
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million ounces had been sold to Britain.524 In addition Britain thought that South 
Africa had also spent too much on imports from the United States and was believed 
to have an inadequate Exchange Control. 
 
The international situation meant that there was a drastic curtailment of gold and 
silver at the Royal Mint Refinery and almost 20 non-skilled men lost their jobs. On 
the outbreak of war Rothschild and Johnson Matthey had been forced to announce an 
increase of 20 per cent on their usual treatment charges.525 A further 20 per cent 
increase came in February 1940 and another in December 1941 when a war 
surcharge of 45 per cent was announced by both refiners (see table below).526 





16.1.1905 11.2.1915 1.10.1919 1.5.1923 22.11.1939 1.2.1940 1.12.1941 
800/1000 3d 4d 3d 2d  2d + 20% 2d + 45% 
700/800 3d 4d 3d 2 ¼ d  2 ¼ d + 20% 
2 ¼ d + 
45% 
Under 700 3d 4d 3d 2 ½ d  2 ½ d + 20% 
2 ½ d + 
45% 
Melting 
Over 500 ¼ d    ½ d+ 20%   
Combined gold & silver under 500 + Melting charges     
Small amounts under 250 + 50%  + 50% + 50% 
 
Source: Compiled from information Bank of England, C52/22, ‘Charges for Gold Refining from 1905 
to 1941’. 
 
     Rising costs of fuel, materials, wages, and transport were blamed for the 
necessary review in charges. A small improvement at the Rothschild refinery was 
recorded in 1942 as gold treated amounted to 470,000 ounces, and levels continued 
to increase over the next three years to around 1,000,000 ounces of gold. The 
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reprieve was the result of a scheme initiated by Rothschild, on behalf of the Bank of 
England and Treasury for the production and sale of small gold bars, mainly 5 and 
10 tola bars, destined for the Middle and Far East markets. Following the outbreak of 
war the British export ban on gold meant that the manufacture and sale of these 
popular smaller bars had been suspended. The reintroduction and sale of smaller bars 
was conceived as an anti-inflationary measure. 
 
     The rise in inflation in the Middle East, a result of the large number of allied 
troops posted to the area, had pushed up local prices. In an attempt to keep inflation 
levels low British and Empire troops stationed in Egypt were paid in Egyptian 
pounds. A ban by the Egyptian government on imports, the shortage of staple goods 
and scarcity of cereal crops had driven up costs in the local economy and provided a 
much needed boost to local industry.527 By mid 1942 in Egypt the danger from war 
had passed and Cairo, the capital, had become a vital pivot in the Allied war 
machine. The last two months of 1942 saw the arrival of American troops in Cairo. 
At the start of 1943 there were just over 1,000 American service personnel compared 
to 126,000 British and Dominion. Artemis Cooper explained that the impact the 
American troops had on the economy was ‘out of all proportion to their numbers.’528 
Accommodation and staple foods were prized commodities, and the ‘cash rich’ 
American troops drove prices up further and placed additional pressure on the local 
economy. Cooper noted that prices had increased by two-thirds since 1939 and 
showed no sign of descending.529 
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     Rothschild became involved when Governor Norman approached them to see if 
Kimpton, who for a number of years had chaired the London Gold Fix until the 
suspension of the market in 1939, could be spared to establish a base in Cairo from 
where the Bank of England could sell gold bars produced by Rothschild and Johnson 
Matthey. Rothschild was happy to oblige. Kimpton accepted the assignment and his 
duties were passed on to his deputy Bill Williams. Kimpton set sail on a fast cruiser 
arriving in Cairo in August 1943. Prior to his departure preliminary arrangements for 
the manufacture, weighing and packaging of a first consignment of small ingots had 
been made with Rothschild and Johnson Matthey. Although it had been Rothschild’s 
suggestion to manufacture and reintroduce the sale of small gold bars Governor 
Norman had been keen that the production was divided equally between the two 
firms. Each was to produce 3,000 bars a day that ranged between five ounce and ten 
tola bars. Strict guidelines were set down by the Bank for the appearance of the bars, 
which were to be delivered without the refiner’s mark and had to be presented in a 
plain wrapper that did not bear the weight or any other marking. Boxes were to be of 
a size sufficient to contain approximately 1,000 ounces each, gross weight, including 
box and banding to be about 75lbs. Each box contained the same size bars and the 
weight inside would be denoted by A, B or C; A. equalled 200 five ounce bars, B. 
equalled 250 ten tola bars and C. equalled 500 five tola bars. The address for each 
consignment was to be stencilled onto each box and a copper crate banding applied 
both ways. To avoid re-examination of the bars after delivery at the Bank of 
England, a representative of the Bank was to observe the weighing and packing of 
the bars prior to being dispatched by the Refinery. The Bank supplied the wood for 
the boxes and also the copper banding.530  
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     Kimpton, on setting sail for Cairo, had been unaware of the finer details of his 
mission. He knew that he was to work out of the Office of the Minister of State but 
he was unsure what lay ahead of him or exactly how much work was involved. 
Captain France, already in Cairo working for the Minister of State, was to assist him 
and in addition a suitable assistant would be appointed in London and sent out at the 
earliest opportunity. The duties of the assistant would be to arrange for the custody 
and movement of bullion, co-ordinating with the naval, military and air authorities 
for facilities required. The assistant would also supervise records of sales, prices, 
stocks, shipments, etc. The Treasury were willing to pay the suitable candidate up to 
£750 per year and in addition offered a tax free allowance of £300 for ‘a suitable 
man with the right qualifications’.531 Regular letters from London sent by Anthony 
and Norman Raven, head of the bullion department at New Court, kept Kimpton 
informed of operations in London and Tring. In return correspondence Kimpton kept 
Rothschild abreast of developments in the Middle East. He frequently wrote of his 
difficulty in acclimatising to the heat of Cairo, and the sleep deprivation he suffered 
from. He also constantly complained about the lack of official communication he 
received from London about the project, and the length of time he was expected to 
remain in Egypt. He was adamant that he should be back in London by Christmas.  
 
     During his time in Egypt Kimpton was free to move around the Middle East and 
attended conferences in Palestine and Syria. He was able to explain the Bank of 
England’s policy to its representatives in the territories, whom he reported as being 
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an ‘intelligent and co-operative lot of men’.532 By the end of September, in a letter 
informing Anthony of the success of his mission, Kimpton observed that: 
I have been here over 2 months, and it has become quite clear that in the first 
place the men here, as well as those in the territories, are not such a lot of 
amateurs as the Governor feared and that there is no justification for my 
continued presence in Egypt. Such questions as are likely to arise when I 
return home and can be settled in London now that I have the local colour. 
Mr Casey in agreeing to the idea of putting a period to my stay is kind 
enough to say that it is not so much that I am able to do anything special here 
but that the moral support I have been able to afford everybody in connection 
with the sales of gold has justified my coming out. I am banking on being 
able to start sales in Egypt in the near future and this of course depends on 
the receipt of supplies of small bars especially made for Egypt.533 
 
There was to be a three-month trial but early expectations for orders of the small 
gold bars were quickly exceeded. Anthony informed Kimpton that orders from the 
Bank of England had been received and that they would keep the Refinery going 
until the end of October, although if Kimpton’s initial indications proved right then 
the refinery would be fully occupied until the end of the year.534 Antony felt 
Kimpton would be amused to hear that ‘Johnson Matthey – who at first complained 
of the job and of having to take their men away from other work – when we 
suggested that we would be ready to help them and do a bigger share of the whole, 
were not at all interested and said they had now made arrangements which were 
convenient to themselves.’535 Anthony also thought that Kimpton would be amused 
to hear that Rothschild had received news from a contact in Tel Aviv ‘telling us there 
had recently been some small bars marked with our name in their market’ and 
wanting to know when, where and how many had been produced.536 Anthony 
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confirmed that a cautious reply had been sent.537 News of the forthcoming sales had 
become widespread.  
 
     Late in September 1943 Kimpton’s own frustrations spilled over in one of his 
letters to Norman. Kimpton wrote that whilst he had no difficulty in establishing the 
system for sales of the bars he was now ‘perturbed at the lack of co-operation on the 
part of the Treasury as regards the second part of my mission viz: sales of gold in 
Egypt’, these could not begin until ample supplies of small bars had been 
received.538 Despite repeat cables to the Treasury for information about any possible 
objections to the sale on part of the Egyptian Government he had received no 
response. Kimpton asked Norman to intervene and remind the Treasury that ‘by their 
own actions they are postponing and possible jeopardising the success of the whole 
project.’539 Kimpton finally received coherent instructions from the Treasury, via 
Bolton at the Bank of England. Initial indications were that there would be a bigger 
demand for small gold bars. By the end of October the Treasury had placed a second 
order with Rothschild and a third smaller order. Kimpton booked his return passage 
to London departing in mid-November and looked forward to getting back to his 
wife, who was in poor health. 
  
     At the point of Kimpton’s departure it was unknown whether the manufacture of 
small bars would continue. An air of secrecy surrounded their sale and no official 
announcement was made. This was partly as the Treasury were unsure of the 
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reactions from the dominions, and in particular from the South African Reserve 
Bank. The United States Treasury participated in the project and although it had been 
hesitant at first, seemed pleased with the arrangement.540 The Bank pressed for 
further consultation with South Africa so clarification for a policy to follow could be 
agreed. Eventually the matter was raised with the South African government during 
a visit by General Smuts to London.541 Subsequent correspondence reveals the 
concern and dissatisfaction of the South African government and mining industry, 
who challenged and objected to the scheme. After the initial three-month trial the 
sale of small gold bars was discontinued, but the wrangle over the sale of South 
African gold continued. Kimpton’s efforts in Cairo did not go unrewarded and at the 
end of the war the Order of the British Empire was bestowed on him. Kimpton, in 
one of his final letters sent to Anthony from Cairo, observed that ‘one of my first 
jobs on my return will be to endeavour to get settled a long-term policy instead of 
this hand to mouth existence which we are now having.’542  
 
In January 1944 Kimpton returned to work and there were a number of matters at 
Tring and Royal Mint Street waiting for him. Just as things began to get back to 
normal at the Refinery, staff had to contend with a new bombing campaign. Flying 
bombs, Germany’s new arsenal of V1 and V2 bombs, started to drop on London in 
June 1944.543 Sir Cuthbert Headlam, in his diary entries, captured the mood in 
London. On 19 June he described an aerial assault he witnessed on London‘2 of 
these beastly [V1] robots in the air this morning. They go at a terrific pace.’544 He 
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went onto describe the effects they had on life in London ‘the raids go on day and 
night and I fancy that the damage done already is pretty considerable. The morale of 
the people, too, is a bit shaken – crowds of people are said to be leaving London.’545 
A couple of months later, after the introduction of the German V2 546 Headlam wrote 
‘I don’t like V2 a bit- it is rather uncanny to feel that at any moment it may drop 
unannounced from the sky and extinguish you... One hears of V2 plumping down 
two or three times a day and I gather that it makes a beastly mess where it falls – but 
so far it has not done anything like the damage done by V1.’547 A V1 bomb fell in 
Cartwright Street close to the Refinery sometime in 1944. Godfrey Hunt was visiting 
his father at the time and described the day’s events: 
Afterwards we went to examine any damage, there was some. Ken Belcher 
was phoned and he later came up from home. Later also was the telegram 
from the Partners about the damage. Such a long telegram it amazed me, 
being accustomed the usual few words on a GPO telegram.548 
 
Matters at the Refinery began to improve from March 1944. Kimpton had brokered a 
deal to purchase the James Royce Electric Furnaces Ltd and Electric Furnace 
Company Ltd (Royce) on behalf of Rothschild. Royce had business premises at 
Chiswick that had been destroyed during an enemy raid in mid-February. Rothschild 
stepped in to assist the firm, which had been an essential supplier of furnaces and 
ancillary equipment to Rothschild.  
 
     The purchase made good economic sense for at the time of the takeover Royce 
had a full order book, including a number of unexecuted orders for the Admiralty, 
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which were valued in the region of £10,000. The purchase also included additional 
land at Chertsey. Part of the deal included the employment of the former owner, Mr 
Royce, as Technical Manager for the Furnaces Branch of the Refinery at a salary of 
£1,000 per annum and a commission of ten per cent on the net profits of the 
Branch.549 His duties included soliciting for new business and providing advice to 
prospective customers. However, Royce was not authorised to conclude contracts 
without the authority of the manager of the Refinery.550 The contract stipulated that 
if the contract was terminated future activities at Royce would be curtailed in 
relation to contacting customers and commercial associates. The agreement 
continued for several years. Electric furnaces were produced in tandem between 
London and Tring and were sold under the name of James Royce Branch. In 
November 1946 Mr Royce was in the position to buy back the business from 
Rothschild. The sale was agreed and terms included all the stock in trade and 
company assets, and the company car Mr Royce used. The deal was finalised in 
January 1947. The amount raised by the sale is unknown. However, Rothschild no 
doubt had made a profit from the deal and both companies found it mutually 
beneficial, for the additional work generated by the take-over in 1944 had guaranteed 
orders for the Rothschild ventures at a time when work had significantly declined 
and government orders had started to be cancelled. 
 
     Rothschild considered the problem of declining government orders ‘urgent’ 
enough in 1944 to raise their concerns with the Ministry of Supply, headed by Oliver 
Lyttelton. Rothschild proposed a plan to Lyttelton that would ensure machinery at 
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the Refinery was not left idle, and the remaining men employed by them would be 
engaged in the treatment of nonferrous metals, swarfs, turnings, scrap etc. Rothschild 
asked Lyttelton to release the metals for treatment, which could then be melted into 
ingots and stored until required for post-war purposes or export.551 An internal report 
produced at the Refinery recorded that: 
Whilst the Board of Trade has circularised certain firms offering to consider 
the question of permitting labour and material to be used for the manufacture 
of prototypes for post-war use at home or for export, this does not go far 
enough now, and in any case the Board of Trade is not equipped or in 
possession of the necessary information as to labour and materials to enable 
to deal adequately with the position.552 
 
The Royal Mint Refinery and RMR (Engineering) at Tring were heading towards a 
turbulent period and it became increasingly apparent at Rothschild that it would be 
necessary to prepare a post-war trading plan and also consider how and indeed if the 
Refinery and factory would continue to operate once the conflict ended. 
Investigations into new processes, techniques and viability at both locations began. 
Special attention was paid to the factory at Tring and whether it could be converted 
to a profitable concern once peace returned. 
 
In conclusion Rothschild rose to the challenge set down by the British government 
and successfully converted the operation at the Royal Mint Refinery to the 
production of munitions. Taking advantage of government incentives, Rothschild 
established, equipped and staffed a new factory away from London. In London the 
workforce underwent periods of severe difficulty as they manned the Refinery and 
protected it during German bombing raids on the City. Work continued; staff lived, 
worked and carried out additional duties in the most appalling conditions and freely 
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put their own lives at risk as they ensured the operation continued. Gold continued to 
be treated at the Refinery, although in vastly reduced quantities, and the operation 
served the needs of industry and the Bank of England.  
 
     In 1943 the expertise of staff was utilised by the Bank for the Egyptian small bars 
scheme, and as new markets formed the pace of work increased again, which came 
just at the right time for Rothschild as it considered the future of the Refinery. 
Unfortunately, although a success the Bank decided to discontinue the scheme rather 
than run the risk of upsetting the South African government. Gold treatment had 
been in decline before the outbreak of war. In opting to convert the operation and 
moved into the production of munitions Rothschild showed it was prepared to invest 
in the future of the Refinery. It embraced change as new plant and machinery were 
purchased, renovations made and greater investments in scientific experiment 
projects. 
 
     In addition Rothschild successfully established a new factory at Tring, despite 
wartime restrictions and difficulties in engaging and retaining staff. The venture 
exceeded the targets laid down in government contracts and the machinery remained 
busy. Following the death of Lionel de Rothschild in 1942 Anthony became the sole 
partner and single-handidly steered the bank through the remainder of the conflict. It 
placed a heavy burden on him. As working patterns and methods changed he adopted 
a new style of management at Rothschild. He became more dependent on Kimpton, 
Williams, Hunt, Belcher and Flynn, who took on greater roles and responsibility in 
their areas of expertise. Through the Joint Production Committee the workforce had 
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a greater involvement in the decision-making process at the Refinery and factory. It 
is hard to quantify the success of the JPC or the impact this had on production levels 
at either location, but what is evident is that employees did have a voice and 
frequently experienced the benefits of staff representation. In the post-war period the 
committee continued to meet monthly.  
 
     In the later stages of war the purchase of the Royce operation was no doubt a 
calculated move. Rothschild was able to take advantage of uncompleted orders to fill 
the void left following a general downturn and cancellation of government contracts. 
The work Royce held averted the need for the disbursement of the machinery at 
Tring by Government officials to companies still holding contracts. The war-time 
experience at Rothschild was not unique. In comparison to some of the large shadow 
factories established across the country that had thousands of workers Rothschild 
was small. But as in other ventures the plant at Rothschild worked 24 hours a day 
producing munitions for Government orders. The passage of years proved only how 
great the staying power of the British workforce was. Tring had been a great success 
during the war, but once readjustment plans began to form it is surprising that there 
was no hesitation in including it in these. How the operation fitted into the overall 
business venture of Rothschild is the subject of the chapter 7.  
 




‘Work, Food & Houses’, 1944-1949 
 
 
This chapter explores the transition of the Royal Mint Refinery from trading in war 
to peace. Hit by the scaling back of Government munitions contracts and bound by 
the continued war-time restrictions imposed on industry, the management at 
Rothschild had the task of seeking out markets that required new products which 
could be manufactured at the Refinery in London and factory in Tring. The period of 
transition proved a turbulent time for both operations; strict financial controls were 
put in place and the services of a commercial sales agent engaged. Either of the sites 
could have failed. However, by 1948 both had been transformed into viable 
commercial concerns with a secure outlook. The chapter provides an insight into the 
approaches adopted by Rothschild to these challenges. First a review of the business 
in 1944 will be undertaken. Second the immediate problems faced by the two 
operations will be identified and the options available to them explored. Finally, with 
the end of the war longer term problems existed such as restrictions in the movement 
and sale of gold, both of which were beyond Rothschild’s control. How the firm 
adjusted to its new trading position in the post-war period will be considered. 
 
Winston Churchill summed up the British post-war programme for reconstruction in 
three words: ‘work, food and houses’.553 Plans for the transition from war to peace 
began at least eighteen months prior to the end of hostilities. Government contracts 
for the production of munitions were scaled down and labour redeployed. There was 
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no large blueprint for the reconversion of British industry, and a laissez faire attitude 
took hold. It was recognised that the key prerequisites for Britain’s post-war 
prosperity would be the revival and expansion of its export trades.554 In March 1943 
the Bank of England formed a Committee tasked with considering the best approach 
to meet the country’s post-war financial needs. The Committee deliberated over 
measures necessary for an effective control of the economy; these included the 
demand for and allocation of capital together with the co-ordination of materials, 
especially for new industries, the encouragement of full employment and the 
continued advance of industrial research.555 The Committee also assumed that during 
the difficult period of readjustment the maintenance of low interest rates would be 
required, as would the stability of commodity prices.556 In preparation John Maynard 
Keynes led the British delegation to the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference held in the United States in July 1944 and put forward his plan for an 
international clearing union. The outcome was the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, 
which provided a formal framework intended to solve the three critical problems of a 
system of international payments, liquidity, confidence and adjustment.557 The 
Agreement provided a fixed exchange rate and a gold exchange standard under 
which currencies were exchanged into gold at stable rates. Initially it was thought 
that newly mined gold would be the main source of new international liquidity. 
However, it quickly became apparent this would be impracticable, when it became 
necessary to economise on the use of gold. In practice, this meant the US dollar 
became the new basis for international liquidity because the US Treasury were 
prepared to buy or sell gold to central banks at $35 an ounce, making dollars and 
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gold interchangeable.558 John Guiseppi observed that ‘the Bank of England was 
never sympathetic to the Bretton Woods proposals: At that time it was far more 
concerned with immediate post war problems than with the far-reaching schemes’.559 
 
     The success and failure of government planning was recorded by Peter Hennessy 
Never Again, which examined the immediate post-war period. One key failure 
highlighted by Hennessy was the introduction of the Economic Planning Board, 
which he holds up as ‘an example of British machinery-of-government ad hocery at 
its worst. Nobody – not Government, industry, trade unions or Whitehall – ever 
really knew what it was for.’560 Information about Government intentions for 
industry was difficult to obtain and was slow to filter down to those in business. In 
planning the realignment of business at the Royal Mint Refinery information was 
essential to Rothschild’s decision-making. The sources of information and its 
availability were all factors that affected thinking at the time and influenced the route 
taken to recovery. By 1944, Anthony de Rothschild, who for most of the war was the 
sole Partner of N M Rothschild & Sons, would have been bombarded with decisions 
and no doubt suffered from decision fatigue. It was Anthony who headed the 
internal-committee for recovery of at Rothschild and its many investments and 
enterprises. He was joined by his nephew Edmund, son of Lionel, in 1947 by which 
time the transition was already underway. Anthony was assisted by an able 
management team led by Arthur Kimpton, general manager at Rothschild, who had 
delayed his retirement until 1946 so he could assist with the realignment, after which 
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point he continued to play an active role in company affairs as an advisor to his 
former colleagues. Bill Williams managed the Refinery and John Flynn managed the 
factory at Tring. A good internal communication network between New Court, 
Royal Mint Street and Tring had developed during the conflict, partly due to 
increased levels of government bureaucracy, and this continued ensuring that all 
parties were kept regularly informed and updated. 
 
In 1944 one of the immediate concerns that faced Rothschild was the future viability 
of the Royal Mint Refinery. The operation had changed considerably since its pre-
war existence. The main activity was now the melting and rolling of metals for 
industry. Whilst the refining and treatment of gold and silver had returned latterly in 
the form of small bars of gold for the Bank of England, these activities were in the 
minority. The outlook for bullion treatment in London was bleak; no plans to re-
open the London gold market existed and it remained closed until 1954. In addition 
gold continued to be subject to government export and import restrictions. The 
outlook for the factory at Tring seemed no better. The operation had been formed to 
meet the needs of government and designed for the sole purpose of the production of 
munitions. As the end of war approached the main decision was whether the 
operation could be converted to produce products that might compete in the highly 
competitive light engineering sector. 
 
     Work at the Refinery began to reduce from September 1943 as government 
contracts were scaled back. The main concern for Rothschild was to keep the 
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workforce employed, so other firms were contacted and offered the spare capacity.561 
Over the next year the situation deteriorated further. A number of the munitions 
contracts awarded to Rothschild had not been renewed. Rothschild was frustrated by 
the lack of official information received following the cancellations and its inability 
therefore to form a plan to hold onto key skilled employees.562 Kimpton was 
dispatched to a trade conference in Harrogate as part of a fact-finding mission to 
learn more about government planning. He reported back to New Court that he had 
been ‘fortunate that the first official approached proved able and willing to furnish 
me with most of the information we require and probably all that could be given at 
the present time.’563 The informant confirmed what had already been gleaned by 
Rothschild, through unofficial channels, that the Government were concerned with 
problems of post-war production and the future of ‘shadow’ factories and the future 
of factories in general was regarded as most important. Planning was at an 
exploratory stage and no final decisions had been reached. Kimpton was asked to 
regard the information as confidential as ‘it would be disastrous if any details were 
published which would embarrass the Government in view of the intention they have 
of making a statement as soon as possible on the whole position.’564 
 
     The informant told Kimpton that the post-war plan would fall into three stages. 
The first concerned the termination of war in Europe, the winding up of contracts for 
stores not required for the next stage and the arrangements necessary for closing 
down unneeded production capacity. It was said that ‘so much importance is 
attached to this process, that a special Assistant Director is being detached, who will 
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devote his whole time to it.’565 Rothschild was more concerned to learn if they would 
have the opportunity to secure the surplus of raw materials held by the firm once 
contracts were terminated. On this point it was suggested the plan was that 
‘contractors would either be directed to transfer such surplus to other contractors 
who needed them, or the contractor would be asked if he would like to buy them at 
an agreed price for use in his own civil business.’566 In addition it was observed that 
‘where contractors were working to a long-term schedule they were advised not to 
produce too far ahead of it, though it was recognised that it was often not possible to 
produce each month’s part of the scheduled quantity within a particular month.’567 
The second stage concerned production for the Japanese war. The main problems 
that arose from this stage would be the quantities needed and which firms would 
manufacture them. The third stage concerned peace-time production. The 
government official led Kimpton to believe that post-war requirements would be 
greater than pre-war, although at the time no estimate was available and was totally 
dependent upon government policy. Firms of contractors were to be categorised. The 
first classification was those firms whose peace-time manufacturing capacity had 
been diverted to war production and who would wish to revert as soon as possible to 
their normal work. The second consisted of firms who had been pre-war government 
suppliers and would wish to continue as such. The third were those firms brought 
into being either by private enterprise or with Government assistance which had no 
pre-war background. The Rothschild operations fell into the second category at the 
Refinery, and third at the factory. Kimpton learnt that price, quality and delivery 
would have a bearing on the future allocation of contracts in stages two and three. In 
addition, labour supply and location of the factory would be taken into account. The 
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official also expressed the opinion that in the case of factories, similar to Tring, 
which had received government finance, whether wholly or partly, it might be more 
economical to keep them going than to shut them down. 
 
     It was on the basis of this new information that the decision to continue both 
operations was made. The war-time transition had increased the range of products 
made at the Royal Mint Refinery, which now included plated wires of all kind, 
previously only produced in the United States. For example, copper, manganese-
nickel and tungsten were plated with gold, silver, platinum or nickel in thicknesses to 
suit the requirements of industry. The base metal foundry produced thousands of 
tons of brass billets, cupro-nickel and gilding metal rolling slabs.568 Kimpton was of 
the opinion that ‘in view of the importance of our gold and silver work it must be 
decided whether it would be best to abandon any other form of melting metal.’569 
However, at that point the most viable option was to continue, especially whilst 
uncertainty hung over the treatment of precious metals with no guarantee such work 
would return in sufficient quantities to render it economically viable. It was only 
much later that it became apparent that the heyday of gold refining at the Refinery 
had passed. 
 
On 17 April 1945 the first formal post-war planning meeting took place at Royal 
Mint Street between Anthony and senior staff from both operations assembled to 
discuss the issues affecting business; Kimpton, Williams, Flynn, Sargant, Belcher, 
Perry, Steel and Barsham. On the agenda were a range of concerns; these included 
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labour, work in hand, future prospects of attracting new contracts, and the possible 
relocation and adaption of machinery. The importance of attracting new business, 
especially products for export, was emphasised and action points agreed. These 
included the need to produce a list of firms, industrials, and government agents who 
might be approached with a view to obtain business. Once the list was available it 
could then be divided into various categories such as 1. where New Court could 
approach at a high level; 2. where the Royal Mint Refinery had contacts; 3. those 
who could only be approached by letter. It was agreed that Anthony would take the 
lead in the acquisition of new orders, working closely with Kimpton. It was decided 
that it would be advantageous to hold a monthly conference so progress could be fed 
back to the post-war planning committee; this was in addition to the Joint Production 
Committee (JPC) discussed in chapter 6 that continued to meet monthly after the war 
ended.570 Each department was asked to provide a report stating the present position 
of work and future outlook. 
 
     The report produced by the Brass Strip Annealing department revealed that it 
anticipated a future complication in the pricing structure of products. When the 
annealing plant had been installed at the Refinery at the beginning of the war rather 
than connect to town gas, requested by the Ministry of Supply as a protective 
measure, Rothschild opted to connect to the more expensive ICI Burner Plant, as it 
was thought it provided better results for melting at high temperatures, and at the 
time it was more appropriate. Unfortunately the decision was flawed. The ICI plant 
had not provided satisfactory results. During the war when a set price was paid for 
goods, it had not been of great significance. However, in a competitive market the 
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additional production cost could render the product uncompetitive. Further 
investigation revealed that even if Rothschild transferred to a cheaper process the 
method would be slower and could affect output. Rothschild faced stiff competition 
and had already been made aware that a contract to provide three tons per week was 
about to be made available. The problem took precedence as it was predicted that 
there would be ‘considerable liveliness’ in the brass strip market. 571 The solution put 
forward was the adaptation of an idle machine, which could be altered to speed up 
the process. Enfield Rolling Mills, with whom Rothschild had a very good working 
relationship, held up all enquiries for brass strip for three months until Rothschild 
was in a position to take on production.572  
 
     Another area of potential development for the operation was the treatment of 
residue, which Rothschild had advanced during the war. A proposal to extend the 
treatment of scrap metal and skimmings was put forward to Anthony by staff at the 
Refinery. The proposal showed understanding of post-war economic conditions and 
the need to build a favourable balance of trade for Britain by reducing imports and 
increasing the value of exports. It observed that in 1945 a shortage of treatment 
plants existed, and an accumulation of material requiring treatment had built up. 
Britain had continually imported virgin metals and exported the bulk of the scrap and 
residue. Prior to 1939 labour costs on the continent had discouraged British refiners 
from treating scrap metal. Germany had been only too happy to acquire metal at 
cheap prices and to use surplus labour to convert it. During the war the position 
changed, and as various plants in Britain were unable to cope with the amount of 
residues and contaminated scrap Rothschild saw a gap in the market. Industrial 
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intelligence suggested that the main refiner of swarf, Bolton & McKechnie, were 
reluctant to treat any material containing less than 40 per cent of copper and that 
there were a number of large dumps of scrap material around the country.573 The 
same source had suggested to Rothschild that the Government would restrict the free 
export of scrap after the war and insist that the metal only be exported in a fabricated 
form, so that the full value would be obtained. The report considered that even in the 
event of a change of government the policy would still be supported as it would 
experience the same export problems.574 However, Anthony rejected the plan, 
probably due to the amount of capital investment the scheme required. In addition 
the premises at Royal Mint Street were not considered to be large enough. However, 
the site at Tring would have been more than adequate as previously when a similar 
scheme had been considered the ideal site had been identified as ‘in the country with 
good railway and canal facilities, and a space for dumping slag.’575 Access to a good 
supply of labour was no barrier or necessarily the prime concern at the Refinery. 
During the war the operation had undergone some changes and had become highly 
mechanised, incorporating an array of labour-saving devices.576 
 
When staff at the Royal Mint Refinery who had been on war service returned to 
London, they found very little going on. However, one change that had been made 
during the war, and which endured, was the maintenance of detailed records. These 
new systems had developed out of the daily communication sent to Anthony of 
events at the factory and the Refinery. In addition Rothschild had to supply detailed 
reports to the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) to justify their requirements for 
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each operation and for the regular auditing of its work. Practices adopted in war-time 
continued with peace. Arthur McIvor suggested that this was quite common as 
capitalist enterprises became larger so methods of labour management and control 
became more sophisticated.577 Certainly in the past Rothschild had struggled to 
explain the separation of tasks and provide a breakdown in the cost of each task 
performed. In post-war planning it proved a real asset that these costs were now 
available and it was possible to calculate cost projections through the close 
monitoring of income and expenditure, in tandem with labour requirement. 
 
     In November 1945 a report was produced for Rothschild by a firm of chartered 
accountants, A J Barsham & Co, projecting income and expenditure for the first full 
post-war year of trading at the Royal Mint Refinery. The object of the exercise was 
to estimate the anticipated revenue from known sources against known expenditure. 
Staff at the refinery assisted with the preparation of the document. Unfortunately the 
original breakdown is not available but figures appear throughout the report. Divided 
into six sections, the first part of the report explained the reason for the document 
and was followed by a section on estimated income, which was then subdivided into 
three possible areas; precious metals, rolling mill, and other. Under Precious Metals 
it was anticipated that gold from Rhodesian and West African Mines would soon be 
sent to London for treatment. The predicted figure was based on 1938 treatment 
figures charged at the refinery of 2.2d per ounce, plus the 45 per cent war-time 
surcharge that had remained in force.578 In addition the commission charged to both 
buyers and sellers of Rhodesian and West African Gold were included. It was 
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calculated that the rolling mill might generate an income of around £2,500 per 
month. Other sources, such as silver refining, durville casting, gold and platinum 
molybdenum wire, powdered metals, nickel silver, nickel recovery and skimmings, 
were estimated as generating an income of around £1,000 per week. The annual 
anticipated revenue from these activities was close to £60,000. However, after 
deducting direct costs, wages and materials (oil consumption and crucibles) the 
amounted fell to around £17,000. In addition to known expenses a number of 
indirect office and fixed expenses estimated at nearly £45,000 were calculated, 
which once deducted from the estimated gross profit left a deficit. The deficit 
deepened if the total cost of personnel engaged by the Refinery, but not involved 
directly in the programme of refining and rolling, were included which then pushed 
the deficit to nearly £15,000.579 
 
     As a result of this exercise the viability of each department came under the 
spotlight and managers were told to keep costs to a minimum. Throughout 1946 
monthly operating costs and expenses were assigned to each department. Whilst this 
is of interest the notes generated as a consequence of these reports offer an insight 
into the obvious dissatisfaction by section heads in the way calculations were arrived 
at and objections raised at the equal division of overheads across all departments; it 
was felt unfair that as precious metals played the biggest part in the whole economy 
of the Refinery the department should bear the heaviest proportion of costs. 
Similarly complaints were made over semi-productive wages, where a task was 
undertaken by several departments and was not apportioned correctly. An additional 
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report planned for the dismissal of 16 non-essential employees by the end of 1945.580 
Over half of those to be dismissed were women, who it was noted were not happy to 
undertake other work, or who had requested to leave. The rest were elderly men. A 
further surplus of 17 staff, mainly composed of foundry men, would be let go after 
February 1946 if no further work was forthcoming.581 Some of the measures put 
forward must have worked, although which is not apparent, as in 1947 the operating 
net profit at the Refinery was reported as £25,000.582 
 
     Salaries and wages paid during 1945 constituted nearly half of the running costs 
of the firm and staff remuneration rose over the course of the next few years.583 
Monitoring the rates of pay for foundry workers had been an ongoing task at 
Rothschild since the outbreak of war in 1939. In 1943 Kimpton had produced a study 
to ascertain if the rates paid to workmen employed at the Refinery were competitive. 
He found that unlike workers at iron foundries, which had union representations and 
scheduled rates of pay, there were no equivalent rates for non-ferrous metal 
foundries and that rates greatly varied depending on the type of alloy being 
manufactured.584 Kimpton observed that ‘some of [the alloys] are difficult and 
depend for their success on the skill of the men involved whereas ordinary brass 
melting probably represents the least skill of any of the alloys made.’585 He felt 
obliged to fall back on general practice in engineering factories to arrive at a 
satisfactory comparison for wages at the Refinery. In practice Rothschild had been 
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resistant to join trade associations.586 However, in 1943 it was through the firm’s 
membership of the Watford Manufacturers Association,587 that Kimpton was able to 
separate employees into the three categories of work undertaken at the Refinery; 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled. Each came with their own definition, as advanced 
by the Association. Skilled work required a degree of skill or competence acquired 
by a workman of normal intelligence and ability after a period of 18 months training 
or experience including a period of experience in a training centre.588 Semi-skilled 
work was understood to mean ‘work that can be satisfactorily executed by a 
workman of normal intelligence and ability after 9 months practice or training, 
including the period of experience in a Training Centre, if any.’589 Finally unskilled 
work was defined as ‘work that can be satisfactorily executed by a workman of 
normal intelligence and ability after 7 days practice or training.’590 The rate of pay 
reflected the level of skill required for a task. 
 
     The majority of the workforce at Royal Mint Refinery, particularly those who had 
worked on brass melting, were classed as semi-skilled. Wages paid by Rothschild 
were higher than the district rates of pay. In 1943 an unskilled labourer in London, 
working a 47-hour week, could expect to earn £3 8s 9d, while an employee at 
Rothschild earned £4 1s 10d. A semi-skilled man in London working a 47-hour 
week received £3 16s 3d, compared to £4 7s 3d paid to Rothschild staff. A three shift 
system had been introduced at the refinery in 1937 but this had been replaced, and 
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melters and refiners now worked two shifts of 24 hours, 7am-5pm and 7pm–6am 
with two hours sleeping time. 591 Overtime was worked when justifiable. The hours 
worked at the refinery were not felt to be excessive; the day shift worked 54 hours 
and 48 hours in alternate weeks and the night shift 48 hours, and no deductions were 
made in respect of meal times and other intervals for refreshment. In 1943 Kimpton 
felt that workers at the Refinery received more competitive rates than their 
contemporaries and as such there had been no case for a general increase in the 
wages paid.592 
 
     In December 1945 the workforce at the Refinery stood at 132 and the monthly 
wage bill totalled nearly £3,200.593 Monitoring wage rates formed a large part of the 
ongoing review taking place into the operational costs and expenditure at the 
Refinery. In preparation for adopting a 44-hour week at the Refinery in January 
1947, the management overhauled wage rates, and re-graded certain sections of work 
and individual employees. Any merit rises considered due were taken into account in 
the new rates. Part of the change involved the consolidation of wages and bonuses. 
By 1946 the war bonus of 15/s was thought to be an anachronism and had in part 
already been consolidated for purposes of overtime and, in individual cases, for 
pensions.594 Kimpton began a full review of labour in February 1946, just before his 
retirement. In general observations concerning industry Kimpton noted that ‘firms 
have a small proportion of trusted specialists who would be very difficult to replace 
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who are paid high wages and who in consequence are likely to remain with the same 
firm during their working life.’595 Whilst the vast bulk of labour were recorded as: 
constantly changing their employment. They are taken on by firms for a 
particular job, dismissed when the job is finished and move to other firms 
and other jobs. They get no remuneration beyond their standard wages except 
for overtime and possibly a production bonus. They are dismissed without 
compunction when they are no longer needed, they are “stood off” when 
conditions make their work impossible, and there are no personal relations 
between them and their employers, no help in time of sickness or trouble, no 
pension, because they are a floating population with no permanent employers 
(Class 1).596 
 
Certainly before 1939 honesty, character and reliability were of paramount 
importance in the recruitment of staff at the Royal Mint Refinery, as workers had 
been mainly engaged on the refining of precious metals. If workers possessed these 
qualities, and if they proved competent, they could expect to remain permanently 
employed at the refinery with a pension at the end of it.  
 
     As precious metal work declined and was replaced by base metal work a tendency 
to recruit labour on less permanent factory lines had begun. However, a number of 
these men proved extremely valuable and graduated into the grade of trusted 
specialists, as was highlighted later in the year when some employees were selected 
for higher grades and were likely to qualify for a pension.597 In March 1946 clerical 
staff (Class 2) and trusted specialists (Class 1), held additional benefits over and 
above their basic wage, war bonus and production bonus. These included a pension 
when they reached the age of 55/65 (class 2 only), a Christmas present varying 
between £3 to £10, a fortnight’s holiday with pay (instead of one week) plus all bank 
and national holidays, pay when sick on an increased scale above the normal and for 
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longer periods graduated in accordance with their years of service, and help for 
themselves and members of their families in times of trouble and sickness, such as 
hospital treatment.598  
 
     In 1946, 50 of the 104 employees who represented all the labour at the Refinery 
(excluding boys, girls and laboratory assistants) had asterisks placed against their 
names, identifying them as key men or of long service, who would be the last to go 
unless the Refinery was closed down.599 No account was taken of the family 
circumstances of the men when bonuses were paid and as wage rates and bonuses 
were also not determined by ability or length of service, it was felt that a two-tier 
system should be introduced to take both into account. In addition the war bonus, 
15/s, and production bonus, which varied between £1 and 12/s 6d, was discontinued 
and substituted by a ‘cost of living bonus’ that could be maintained for some years 
until post-war conditions had settled down.600 One of the main problems in 
consolidating the bonuses was that rates had increased ad hoc over the years and did 
not reflect post-war conditions. The war bonus, which had been introduced after the 
1940/1 emergency production efforts had started to slacken off, had been an attempt 
to resolve some disputes and discontents in the work place. It had not decreased 
output and was thought to have improved ‘the quality and the general spirit of the 
works.’601 However, by 1946 the production bonuses had virtually become fixed 
additions to wages and applying the varied bonus had only been possible while the 
bulk of men had been engaged on long runs of a standard product in the foundry or 
rolling mill. The transfer of men, permanent and temporary, to other departments 
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meant that the bonus was difficult to maintain and justify, and had become a source 
of friction.602 It was felt that it was no longer possible to continue with the bonus 
system as the varied and irregular work at the Refinery meant that it was no longer 
possible to fix an equitable rate which did not place sections of the works against 
each other. Having consulted with staff it was found that workers were more 
interested in receiving a good steady wage and being encouraged to take an active 
interest in their work, by being given more responsibility, receiving good treatment 
and special privileges, than in competing for extra money. It was felt that this was 
part of the reason that men at the Refinery had not joined a trade union, unlike many 
of the staff next door at the Royal Mint, which was said to have an ‘atmosphere of 
hostility.’603 
 
     Streamlining wage rates brought departments at the Refinery into line with each 
other. Maintenance men and floating gangs were treated as one department, and for 
the first time provision were made for them to receive a bonus. Overall sick pay, 
holiday pay and pensions were increased. The review, in monetary terms, cost 
Rothschild an addition £24 10s 0d per week on the wage bill. Management selected a 
number of men for ‘special treatment’. Most held positions of responsibility and 
some had special qualifications, some worked a great deal of overtime on the 
premises, and a number took paper work home with them, yet their total earnings 
were only comparable with salaries for others in similar positions. Those selected 
were said to be ‘the kind of men who respond willingly to any calls which are made 
on them and can be trusted to give the firm a full contribution in return for what they 
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receive in salaries and privileges.’604 In the first instance six men and one woman 
were selected for special treatment. The recipients: Green, Hutton, Relph, McEvoy, 
Fielder, Edwards, and Mrs Coltman, were taken from across the various departments 
of the refinery. Most were either foremen or in charge of the department. With the 
exception of Mrs Coltman, all had worked for the firm for over ten years and their 
combined service to the refinery totalled 117 years. Green, the Bullion Room 
Foreman, was the only one out of the seven who had undergone his apprenticeship at 
the Refinery and had served the firm for 30 years. Each gained the same status as 
clerical employees, and for pension purposes their maximum basic wage was to be 
considered £8, the highest consolidated basic wage that could be earned under the 
new scheme. Management response to the findings of the review and changes to the 
basic wage, bonuses and overtime payments was that: 
One does not want to encourage leisurely working during the normal working 
day so that the standard wage can be increased by over-time. The aim should 
be to pay a good man good wages for a good day’s work (within 40 hour 
week or whatever it is) and if he qualifies for a pension pay him a pension 
based on the good wages which he has earned.605  
 
The new rates and departments came into effect on 4th January 1947. Employees 
were divided into nine departments; Foundry, Rolling Mill, Residues Press & 
Floating Gang, Bullion Room Weighers & Iron Foundry, Porters & Cleaners, 
Moebius Plant & Milling Saw, Fitters, Labourers Bricklayers Painters Carpenters, 
and finally Electricians. The chart below indicates the division of wages by 
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Table 9. ‘RMR Wages by Department 1945-6’ 
 
Source: RAL, XI/111/908, ‘Notes on Re-Draft’, 2 Dec 1946. 
     The revised scales took into account new entrants, who could progress after three 
to nine months of service. Longer service employees were divided into skilled, semi-
skilled, and those with seniority in position. Wage increments ranged between 2/2½d 
to 2/9½d.606 A grid was produced and every employee entered showing their present 
wage, war bonus and production bonus and the wage rate that applied underneath 
their name, age and length of service were noted. Despite receiving ‘special 
treatment’ Mrs Coltman remained the lowest paid employee at the Refinery.607 The 
new pay scale was circulated to all workers with an accompanying guide. It informed 
employees that: 
The new consolidated wages will mean increased rates for overtime, so that, 
although these wages will in a large number of cases be a little less than the 
total of the previous payments no man will have his average earnings reduced 
by the change so long as the number of hours overtime worked is not 
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substantially below the present level. It will further be appreciated that the 
new wages will rank for pensions, sick pay and holiday pay.608 
 
Workers were invited to consult with their department manager if they did not 
understand the new scheme. The review in rates of pay was long overdue and was 
carried out of necessity. 
 
In 1946 in an attempt to develop new business Anthony engaged the services of an 
experienced commercial sales agent S Goodfellow, to see how best the existing 
range of products could best be adapted to the post-war needs of industry and 
consumers. The appointment was not welcomed by all at Rothschild. John Flynn had 
turned down an approach by Goodfellow in 1945, put off by the £500 a year fee 
charged. Flynn felt the charge unjust, and also it had not been right time to expand 
the business. However, a year had passed and in order to achieve the full potential 
from both operations Goodfellow was asked to conduct a study and provide some 
general notes on how he could assist Rothschild to develop new products and 
markets. The advantage of engaging an independent individual was that he had an 
unbiased view of the operation. Goodfellow suggested that before the outbreak of 
war the sole existence of the Refinery was to treat bullion and that the premises had 
seen better days. He noted that whilst the refining of precious metals still 
experienced bright periods, there were not enough. He accurately described the 
operation as he remarked that: 
If something could be done to fill these dull periods all well and good but 
above all it was refining that mattered; and if by any stroke of good fortune, 
bullion mails arrived again on their old scale then whatever had been 
developed meantime would have to take second place.609  
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He recalled that during the pre-war operation the ‘lack of space seems to have stifled 
at birth many ideas for development which should have been considered more 
seriously.’610 He also explained that the relationship with the firm’s main competitor, 
Johnson Matthey, and the long standing agreements and activities with them had 
impeded the development of the Rothschild venture. One of the main faults in the 
past had been the aversion to marketing products, as an industrialist would have 
done. Perhaps the most striking observation Goodfellow made was that at the 
refinery ‘altogether a sort of mild depression pervaded the place relieved now and 
again by a liveliness which coincided with the arrival of bullion mail’ for ‘the 
refinery knew it was going somewhere but it didn’t know quite where!’611 
 
     Goodfellow advanced the idea of the ‘Group’. He had been struck by the 
preoccupation of each section with its own problems as though it were independent 
of others and felt that there was inadequate appreciation of the possibilities of the 
group as a unit. His reasoning behind this proposal was based on the following 
observations:- 
1) The Refinery (I am told) cannot exist on bullion refining alone but the 
equipment devoted to this must have first place. 
2) The old rolling mill is inefficient in the sense that it could hardly justify its 
existence on ordinary Copper-Zinc alloys in ordinary times and on ordinarily 
margins. 
3) The new Rolling Mill – even at maximum production cannot carry the rest of 
the overheads 
4) The foundry, bearing average overheads exceeding those reasonable for its 
trade, could not make a profit on commercial margins on ingots of base metal 
alloy 
5) To counterbalance high overheads highly skilled highly paid work must be 
developed 
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6) Most suggestions for new work need more space than is to be had at the 
Refinery 
7) Converting a “lump of metal” into something of much greater value needs 
the Foundry and Engineering skills available at Tring. 
8) Since everyone is already accustomed to the idea of “half” the works being in 
the country it may not be quite so difficult after all to face the decision to 
allow development of the Refinery to spread there too.612 
If Goodfellow’s proposal was accepted it would mean that the prices quoted at the 
refinery would need to be more economical. The Refinery would have to enter more 
competitive markets, such as ingot metals, duty bronzes and aluminium bronzes, and 
high duty coppers for the plating trade, which offered better prospect than bullion 
refining. It was also suggested that a market could be developed simultaneously at 
Tring for foundry and finished products. The report indicated other areas of 
development for the company including copper and silver solder alloys for use in the 
expanding market of circuit boards and highlighted past failures in a lack of 
investment in the future of the Refinery. Goodfellow expressed his hesitation at 
presenting his ideas to Rothschild for he was concerned that the venture would 
‘simply to be kept ticking over more or less in a state of perpetual readiness for 
bullion mails and such exceptional “once in a generation jobs” like the conversion of 
the silver coinage’613 or that the ideas put forward might be ‘too farfetched, [and] too 
ambitious.’614 However, in Goodfellow’s opinion: 
the opportunities [were] there to build a first class organisation for technical 
products in demand throughout industry and it is unenterprising not to take 
them especially when one foresees the time when the Refinery may languish 
again to the restless and humiliating inactivity of waiting for something 
around the corner.615 
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Anthony’s thoughts on Goodfellow’s proposals go unrecorded. However, the 
London refinery did extend its activities and some of these changes were ideas put 
forward by Goodfellow.  
Figure 15. ‘RMR British Industries Fair, 1952’616 
 
 
     One of Goodfellow’s recommendations which was followed was that Rothschild 
take a stand at the British Industries Fair. This was a government-backed initiative 
for British firms to expand their exports by providing an invaluable ‘gigantic shop 
window’ to international customers.617 Promotional brochures produced for the 
firm’s stand at the 1948 British Industries Fair provide an insight into the full range 
of activities of the Royal Mint Refinery. Staff received over 180 enquiries, of which 
150 were reported as new contacts.618 It was acknowledged that it could take twelve 
months before enquiries developed into actual orders, but it was also noted that the 
event had provided existing customers with a chance to see the range of products and 
new developments. The main area of growth in the operation of the Refinery focused 
upon the manufacture and production of non-ferrous metals in cast and strip form, 
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including copper foil and plated wires. The modern rolling mill and annealing plant, 
which had been added in 1943 to cater for Government orders, in peacetime was set 
to work producing a wide variety of products to meet the needs of industry. Staff of 
the refinery who attended the event recorded that ‘many people were surprised that 
we were producers of such things as copper strip, silver solders and plated wires, and 
it has definitely given [Royal Mint Refinery] a better chance to sell these products 
without extensive adverting in trade journals.’619 The cost of attending the event in 
1950 was just under £1000, which had slowly climbed to £1350 by 1952. Staff from 
the refinery continued to attend and promote the firm’s products well into the late 
1950s. 
 
As soon as conditions permitted treatment of gold and silver resumed at the 
Refinery, and as predicted by Goodfellow this took precedence over all other work in 
London. In1946 the official rate at which the Treasury purchased gold through the 
Bank of England (the Bank) was 172s 3d; the equivalent of the US price of $35 per 
troy ounce, less 1s 3d for expenses.620 With the London Gold Market still in 
suspension, Rothschild along with the other bullion brokers approached the Bank of 
England for some relief on the import and export of gold. The Bank agreed to small 
allocations of ‘manufactured’ gold being exported.621 Green wrote of the ‘profitable 
loophole’ that this opened up, a lively trade in 22 carat (916 fine) gold sheets, pen 
nibs, ashtrays and statuettes which were dispatched aboard where they were then 
melted into small bars and sent to markets in the Middle and Far East.622 The Royal 
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Mint Refinery manufactured gold serviette rings. Johnson Matthey were more 
inventive as they produced Viking statuettes to export, which were probably the 
inspiration behind the export of gold Eiffel Towers to France in the 1951 film The 
Lavender Hill Mob623 as the characters played by Alec Guinness and Stanley 
Holloway needed to find a way to smuggle stolen bullion out of Britain.624 This 
healthy trade that began when the Bank of England introduced the ‘export float 
scheme’, as it was officially known, anxious to revive an industrial and jewellery 
export trade, the Bank set up a revolving credit of 100,000 ounces of gold for export 
to approved quarters in manufactured or semi-manufactured form.625 Green 
explained the scheme: 
Authorised dealers and users each received an initial allocation, which they 
could replace; provided the Bank was satisfied [that] the gold was being 
manufactured. Moreover, if the manufactured articles were exported, then the 
dealer got a 50 per cent bonus the next time. Thus anyone receiving an 
allocation of 1,000 ounces could have it made up, sell it abroad, and go back 
for 1,500 ounces. Since the shortage of gold in overseas markets was creating 
premium prices well above the £8.12.3d at which the Bank of England sold, 
it was a profitable exercised.626 
 
For a while the Bank of England turned a blind eye to the activities of Rothschild 
and others. Green observed that ‘the official on [the Bank’s] “gold post”, as the 
market christened it, would listen sympathetically to requests for an export licence, 
and then would ask, “Will it earn hard currency?” Assured that it would, he generally 
approved.’627 In 1947 the bullion brokers Mocatta & Goldsmid earned £187,000 
from the scheme, reputed to have been the most profitable single aspect of their 
business in the history of the partnership.628 Eventually the escalation in exports 
became so great that a cut-back had to be made; the scheme was modified and the 
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offer of a 50 per cent bonus on gold exports was removed, as well as replacement by 
the Bank.629  
 
     Amendments to the scheme coincided with the infant International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) effort to tighten up on such ‘leakage’ in an effort to curtail the 
premium market in gold. In June 1947 a statement to Fund members was released 
expressing concerns over the transactions in gold at premium prices. It was 
considered by the Fund that ‘unless discouraged this practice is likely to become 
extensive, which would fundamentally disturb the exchange relationships among 
members.’630 Moreover, it was envisaged that if the business continued it would lead 
to a ‘loss to monetary reserves, since much of the gold goes into private hoards 
rather than into central holdings.’631 The Fund urged its members to ‘take effective 
action to prevent such transactions.’632 It also encouraged the recruitment of non-
members to ‘join with them in eliminating this source of exchange instability.’633 A 
subsequent IMF communication on the eradication of the premium price observed 
that ‘the only dependable way to get rid of premium gold markets and private 
hoarding of gold is to create the economic conditions under which the private 
demand for gold will become negligible.’634 It informed members that: 
In every country the best way to reduce the demand for gold for private 
hoards is to follow budget and credit policies that will give people confidence 
in their currency. Nobody can have a good reason for hoarding gold or 
paying a premium for gold in a country in which the currency will remain 
stable in internal and external value.635 
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The main objective of the IMF was to limit the flow of gold from the supply side. 
Britain backed the request from the IMF. As a consequence the Exchange Control 
Act 1947 came into force.636 Under section 22 of the legislation the importation of 
gold remained free of restrictions but the exportation of gold was prohibited except 
with the permission of the Bank of England, as agents for the Treasury. Therefore 
with effect from July there was greater difficulty in obtaining export licences.637 
Rothschild, which had continued to export a small amount of manufactured small 
gold bars to the Middle East market, was unable to obtain further licences and 
despite the ongoing demand lost the business.638 
 
     However, not all countries exercised the same strict control as Britain and as a 
result business which prior to the war would automatically have been sent to London 
was now diverted to the less restrictive markets of France and Switzerland. Green 
explained that ‘the London market found itself totally frustrated. It had to stand aside 
and watch as the Swiss banks took over much of the legitimate gold business, while 
black markets in Tangier, Beirut and elsewhere proliferated.’639 In the 1948 Mocatta 
& Goldsmith annual circular Goldsmid wrote that ‘the bulk of the world’s gold 
business is carried on in other centres where the Authorities are less scrupulous and 
neither producers, the old-establishment regular dealers, or the ultimate consumers 
benefit.’640 South African producers, and other producing countries, were put out at 
having to accept the official $35 an ounce price for gold whilst on the black market 
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the price rose to over $40 an ounce.641 Harry Goldsmid laid the blame on the IMF as 
he complained that ‘the Governors of the International Monetary Fund are adamant 
that the only acceptable basis for sales of gold is the official price, and any form of 
subsidy is frowned on.’642 Rothschild expressed concern as the ‘present policy may 
result in this loss of supremacy in the field of refining and when controls are relaxed 
the business may be difficult to recover.’643 Under the new legislation, the authorities 
allowed unrefined gold to enter the country and to be returned to the country of 
origin in the form of 400 ounce bars, but the gold was not allowed if it was diverted 
to Britain for refining whilst in transit from the country of origin to another country. 
The restrictions affected the post-war recovery at the Royal Mint Refinery, however, 
the void was filled with the treatment of silver. 
 
Relief at the Refinery came in the form of silver treatment. Since 1941 no silver had 
been released by the authorities other than for war purposes. The cancellation of war 
contracts lessened demands for silver and non-ferrous metals. The price of silver in 
January 1946 stood at 44d per fine ounce, but by the end of the year it had increased 
to 55½d.644 The rise was partly a result of the increased demand for silver for 
essential industry, but the Coinage Act 1946 was also a contributing factor.645 This 
enabled the Government to substitute silver alloy coinage for cupro-nickel, and came 
about because although most of Britain’s obligations under Lend-Lease to the United 
                                                
641 The South African Producers decided to risk the wrath of the IMF and made direct gold sales to 
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States were cancelled, the agreement on silver was not. During the war the British 
Government had borrowed 88 million ounces of fine silver.646 In 1945, the only 
stock of silver left in Britain was the current coin, estimated at around 200 million 
ounces.647 There were no other countries outside the dollar area from whom the vast 
quantity required could be purchased. The main obstacle to the substitution was the 
lack of knowledge and refining capabilities in Britain, or abroad, that could deal 
efficiently and economically to treat the quaternary alloy. It was Peter Steel, one of 
the chemists at the Royal Mint Refinery, who designed a pre-refining process for 
breaking down the four elements involved, which could then be dealt with in the 
Moebius cell.648 Ongoing research into the question of refining the coin, which had 
only been introduced in 1927, had been a pet project of Steel, who predicted that at 
some point in the future a method to treat the coin would be required. Steel was not 
alone in his pursuit and was joined by chemists at the Sheffield Smelting Company 
who designed an entirely new refining process to cope with the coinage alloy.649 
 
     In April 1947 the Royal Mint invited tenders for refining regular weekly 
quantities of quaternary coinage of approximately 100,000 ounces, to commence at 
the start of June, which would be distributed amongst the refiners whose tenders 
were accepted.650 The tender required a price for refining per ounce and the 
abatement the refiner would make from the price of electrolytic copper in crediting 
the copper recovered; copper was a by-product of the refining of the coins. The 
refiners were also asked to estimate any losses that might be encountered and 
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calculate the balance of silver at the end of the process,651 proof that the Royal Mint 
were not fully aware of the technical process themselves. A short visit by the 
Rothschild refinery staff to discuss details of their own tender, prior to submission, 
revealed that the Royal Mint would engage their own accountants to inspect refining 
operations. Rothschild was hesitant about accepting this measure without 
reassurances that there would be no possibility that they would drop hints as to the 
different methods employed in the various refineries. The Deputy Master at the 
Royal Mint reassured them that those engaged would be warned beforehand not to 
talk about the processes.652 Rothschild also learnt that the refining charge was to be 
fixed for a period of six months, in spite of the fact that the cost investigation must 
take place during that period. If during that time the refiners found that the cost of 
refining was not as high as expected, the Mint would expect the price charged to be 
reflected in any follow-up contract. It was agreed that if the refiners had 
underestimated the cost of refining this would also be corrected for subsequent 
contracts.653 
 
     A great deal of thought was given to the tender put forward by the Royal Mint 
Refinery. As usual Rothschild had tried to maximise a return for their investment. 
Instead of the 100,000 ounces on offer their plan assumed the treatment of 400,000 
ounces per week gross at a charge of 2d, a total cost of £3,333 per week, less net 
costs of £1,083 equalling a net contribution of £2,250 per week, or £9,675 per 
month.654 This amount would drop to £7,275 if a joint agreement with the Sheffield 
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Smelting Company could be arrived at.655 Rothschild submitted a tender for the work 
to the Royal Mint on 6 May 1947. Behind the scenes Rothschild had secured an 
agreement with both Johnson Matthey and the Sheffield Smelting Company that 
only one tender would be entered, and subsequently a separate agreement splitting 
the work between the three would be made should Rothschild be successful.656 The 
co-operation between the three refiners allowed each to get their operations in order. 
Rothschild was awarded the contract and whilst the Royal Mint Refinery and 
Johnson Matthey could start immediately, work at the Sheffield Smelting Company 
was delayed whilst it awaited a building licence to be issued.657 Ironically when the 
licence was finally issued it coincided with the Royal Mint’s decision to suspend 
deliveries of the coin, owing to the inability of the Banks to continue withdrawals 
from circulation in view of heavy demands from the public for additional coin. 
However, deliveries resumed at the end of the year.658 
 
     In the development plans for the Refinery one idea advanced by Goodfellow had 
been to produce silver solder, but as this would have required an elaborate selling 
organisation and advertising, the idea was passed over in favour of treating coin. 
Goodfellow received no feedback for the decision and when asked for constructive 
criticism why coin was preferred no explanation was forthcoming. The truth was 
probably that those managing and working at the Refinery were more comfortable 
operating in their traditional sphere, and could see a profit to be had there. 
 




658 Wilson, Two Hundred Precious Metal Years, p. 257. 
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     The business indeed proved profitable and ongoing. In May 1949 a report into 
silver refining prepared at Rothschild recorded that 800,000 ounces of silver coin a 
week was available for distribution between the three refiners, and it was expected 
that this would increase by at least an additional 325,000 ounces a week over the 
following year. The anticipated increase was due to known supplies of silver coins 
still to be treated originating from New Zealand, East Africa, Palestine and 
Malaya.659 It was calculated that an additional 15,000,000 ounces from other known 
sources could be received during the next few years. Therefore an extension plan to 
build an additional 20 new type cells and ancillary equipment and install new electric 
furnaces had been granted permission. It was estimated that expansion costs would 
be in the region of £14,000, which would be recovered in two to three years.660 
Whilst treatment continued into the 1950s the outbreak of the war in Korea meant 
that nickel was required for the defence programme, and the coinage scheme ceased 
for the time being.661  
 
The Tring factory had been born out of an expansion in the production of parts for 
aircrafts instigated by the Ministry of Aircraft Production (discussed in chapter 5) 
and since 1941 its main occupation had been munitions. As the end of war 
approached the main decision Rothschild had to take was if the operation should 
continue, or if machinery should be dismantled and returned to the Refinery and the 
new equipment amalgamated into the operation. The financial returns generated by 
the factory at Tring were healthy. The main concern of management was that 
although the operation had been competitive in the protected trade period during the 
                                                
659 RAL, 148/41, ‘Silver Refining at RMR’, 23 May 1949. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Wilson, Two Hundred Precious Metal Years, p. 257.  
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conflict, it might not continue to be economically viable once exposed to ‘normal’ 
market conditions as peace returned, which it had no way of predicting. If allowed to 
continue a number of prerequisites were stipulated. The first was that Rothschild 
must maintain their competitive edge and reputation for being reliable. The second 
was that Tring must be able to compete for work in a highly competitive market in 
which a great number of British firms would also want a share. Management at Tring 
had been told, unofficially, that the allocation of contracts would depend upon price, 
performance and reliability.662 The third matter concerned speculation about the 
future demands of the RAF for parts and equipment, which were expected to be 
greater than in the pre-war period. Also some indication had been received that a 
growth in the volume of civil aviation consumption would take place.663 As at the 
Refinery, cost was a major factor. During the war the net profit of the Tring machine 
shop had been higher than would have been achieved under normal trading 
conditions. However, no one could foretell how prices would be affected by peace. It 
was anticipated that the work undertaken by the Refinery in London for the MAP 
contract, rolling foil and smelting of metal, would continue indefinitely. It was 
thought that the position of the Rothschild operation at Tring was ‘as efficient as any 
and consequently consider that we can meet any competition from firms’ elsewhere. 
Price was an all-important factor and if Rothschild could maintain this they would 
receive a reasonable share of available contracts.664 As Addison pointed out, ‘foreign 
competition was a minor problem for British industry in the immediate post-war 
years’ as ‘the economies of Germany, Italy and Japan had been temporarily 
overwhelmed.’665  
                                                
662 RAL, XI/111/908, Special Correspondence RMR, Tring Machine Shop, undated. 
663 Ibid. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Paul Addison, Now the War is over (London: Pimlico, 1995), p. 172. 




     Early in 1946 it became apparent that the activities carried on at Tring would not 
return to London. One reason was that most of the workforce lived locally. However, 
perhaps more important was the nature of the work undertaken. The feasibility study 
for extending operations at the Royal Mint Refinery, undertaken in 1939, had 
emphasised the difficulties in increasing the variety of work done in London due to 
the possible fumes generated, some of which would be noxious or toxic or both, and 
the problems of dealing with waste products. The operation would be better off at a 
more suitable site.666 Jerry White observed that in the post-war period firms no 
longer needed to be located close to the capital:  
Some firms chose not to return after 1945, having increased their workforce 
and markets away from London. In the heavily bombed East End there was 
no possibility of as many jobs locating there as before the war, not only 
because of the amount of destruction but because comprehensive 
redevelopment plans would no longer allow industry to mix in with 
‘residential zones’. And the Industries learned they could survive away from 
London.667 
The Tring site had served the firm’s purpose well during the war and by remaining at 
Tring there would be no need to obtain the necessary building licence to extend the 
London premises. The title of RMR Engineering was chosen for the light 
engineering work undertaken at the Tring factory. It was hoped that the title would 
reflect the type of goods made and the section of industry which it served, whilst it 
also preserved the link with the Royal Mint Refinery.668 Although both firms were to 
operate separately, which was considered no bad thing under post-war conditions,669 
a link between the two operations was maintained as the Tring address was 
incorporated onto the letterhead of the Royal Mint Refinery, although the new title 
                                                
666 RAL, XI/111/908, ‘Tring Report’, 1939. 
667 White, Rothschild Buildings, p. 197. 
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RMR Engineering was not immediately registered. The agreement with MAP 
continued in force until early 1947 when the firm purchased most of the Crown plant 
and paid an agreed price for the adaption’s to buildings at Tring. At the same time N 
M Rothschild & Sons arranged with Lord Rothschild to purchase the freehold and 
buildings. 
 
     Perhaps the greatest hurdle that faced RMR Engineering had been the scarce 
housing situation in the area. The core workforce at Tring consisted of staff that had 
transferred from the Refinery in London. In addition the workforce had been 
enlarged by recruitment from areas with a tradition of tool making. After the war the 
promise of a house was an enormous incentive for employees to remain at Tring and 
an advantage to display in recruitment drives due to the housing shortage across the 
country. In 1946 Rothschild registered the RMR Housing Society, since such 
societies had priority over private building. Rothschild was thus able to take 
advantage of the Housing Act of 1946, introduced under the new Labour 
government. Additional housing at Tring represented everything the government 
hoped the Act would deliver. Addison observed that the Labour government worked 
on the principle ‘that new housing should be distributed according to social need 
rather than market forces.’670 In practice it gave priority for manual workers and 
Rothschild took further advantage of the government scheme when the existing 
subsidy of £8 5s per house per year over forty years was raised to £22 over sixty 
years.671 Planning permission was also granted for 24 houses to be built in Meadow 
Close, Tring. One of the first occupants, Mrs Hazel Connor (daughter of Mr Hoyland 
the manager of Shield Alloys) remembered them ‘as very nice three-bedroom 
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houses’.672 With a secure workforce the factory at Tring continued to manufacture 
parts for the aviation industry into the late 1950s. Initially operations at Tring 
appeared to flounder but things soon picked up and within five years the order books 
were full and a bright future for the business lay ahead as new products were 
introduced; ticket machines and lipstick cases and will be discussed in chapter 8. 
 
In conclusion despite the challenging post-war conditions the re-alignment of the 
business and the smooth transformation from trading in war to peace was completed 
remarkably quickly. Rothschild called upon specialist business consultants before 
setting a course for recovery. Ongoing restrictions to gold meant that initially the 
future of the Refinery looked bleak. However a plan was formed and new future 
forged. At Tring, once it had been decided to continue the operation, there was a 
brighter outlook for the factory. As government contracts came to an end Rothschild 
actively sought out new areas of operation. They identified and worked to the 
strengths of the business under a group banner. Profitability and continued 
monitoring of overheads were paramount in making goods competitive in order to 
capture new markets. The business was much changed from its pre-war existence 
and this was reflected in the necessity to review the wage structure. The review took 
into account the division of labour and skill levels required to perform a variety of 
tasks. Rates across the business were updated and enhanced employee benefits 
introduced.  
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Rothschild, on the advice of Goodfellow, actively promoted their connection to the 
Refinery and factory. In a bid to compete for new business the appearance of 
Rothschild at the British Industries Fair informed both new and existing customers 
of the wide range of products manufactured across both operations. Despite marking 
time until bullion returned to the Refinery for treatment, both operations showed 
early signs of recovery and moved into the next decade with a good basic foundation 
that could be built on.  
 




The End of the Rainbow, 1950-1974 
 
In 1952 the Royal Mint Refinery celebrated 100 years of trading. Within 15 years the 
business no longer existed. Rothschild in 1961 split the venture, selling the rolling 
plant to a specialist firm in Southampton and the copper foil treatment business to a 
competitor. In 1967 an American firm purchased the refining operation and the gold 
and silver treatment plant was transferred to a new purpose built facility. In 1974 a 
purchaser was found for the factory at Tring. This chapter charts the dismantling of 
the venture and examines the reasons for it. The first part of the chapter reviews the 
trading position of the business during the first half of the 1950s; a period in which 
profits steadily increased, the Gold Fix returned to Rothschild and the London gold 
market reopened. The second half looks at the remainder of the decade and changes 
made in 1960s. By 1955 the outlook for the venture had started to change as decline 
set in and during the 1960s increased competition from US and European markets, 
together with the effects of decolonisation and independence of African states had an 
impact on the business. The options open to Rothschild will be examined. Finally, 
the sale of the Refinery and the eventual sale of the factory at Tring will be 
discussed. 
 
Centenary celebrations at the Royal Mint Refinery were marked with a photograph 
of senior staff taken on the roof of Royal Mint Street (Figure 16.). Anthony de 
Rothschild, senior partner of N M Rothschild & Sons, sits in the centre of the front 
row, flanked by his nephew Edmund, to his left and on his right Bill Williams, 
manager of the Refinery. Williams retired later that year and the control of daily 
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operations passed to his assistant Ken Belcher. Anthony, who had been involved in 
much of the decision making at the Refinery since 1919, retired in 1954 due to ill 
health and was replaced by Edmund. It fell to Edmund and Belcher to steer the 
business through the turbulent fifties; many post-war problems were still in force as 
an unending series of crises, Korea 1950-3, Suez and Hungary in 1956, and 
continuing issues in areas such as South East Asia and the Middle East continued to 
bring stress to the markets. 




     Part of the centenary celebrations included an action shot of the refinery 
accompanied by an editorial piece on the history of the firm in The Times ‘Review of 
Industry’.674  The image marked the longevity of the business as members of staff 
that had appeared in the 1933 photographs (discussed in chapter 2) appeared in the 
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image taken in 1952. The accompanying article described how the Rothschild 
operation had grown from a single-purpose gold refinery to treating a variety of 
metals ranging from gold to brass, from silver bars to copper foil, as thin as tissue 
paper, wires plated with all kinds of other metals, solders for industry, gold and 
silver grain for the jewellery trade, and metal screens for high volume printing.675 
Figure 17. ‘The Royal Mint Refinery, 1952’676 
 
The management and workforce constituted a highly organised and well-seasoned 
group of employees, including specialist sales people and technical experts capable 
of giving a competent and wide range of services. After the initial upheaval created 
by the changeover from wartime production to peacetime activities the steady rise in 
demand for electric domestic and industrial appliances had provided a good market 
for Rothschild products. From time to time significant bursts of pressure were 
experienced by some sections at the Refinery. The main difficulty was the ability to 
forecast demand and budget confidently as so many factors and events, together with 
varying degrees of official control, influenced supply and demand and the freedom 
to operate. Progress in reorganisation and streamlining of processes was paramount. 
                                                
675 Ibid., p. 13. 
676 Ibid. 




Gold business at the Refinery had been directly affected by the restrictions set down 
by the International Monetary Fund as it attempted to stamp out a free market for 
gold (discussed in chapter 7). Restrictions were relaxed in September 1951 when the 
Fund announced that it would no longer restrain the sale of non-monetary gold at 
prices over $35 an ounce. It was left to governments of gold-producing countries to 
use their own discretion in determining the sale of domestic output.677 Mocatta & 
Goldsmid’s annual circular for 1951 announced the news adding that ‘there is now 
no logical reason why gold producers all over the world should not participate in the 
free market’ although, strictly speaking the gold was still supposed to go for 
industrial use.678 The relaxation meant that Canadian, Australian, Rhodesian and 
West African gold all started going directly to the free market. It was estimated by 
Mocatta that supplies, which had previously been around 600,000 ounces monthly, 
increased to over a million ounces.679 Increased supplies affected the price, which 
having stood at $40 or more came down first to $39 then over the next year dropped 
until it was scarcely over the official $35.680 However, rather than gold going to 
central bank holdings, the demand in the Far East and for smuggling in India meant 
that in 1952 as much as 17 million ounces out of the new mine supplies of 24 million 
ounces was diverted into private hands.681 
 
     Whilst foreign exchange regulations had been relaxed to permit the commercial 
banks to act again as principals, all arbitrage was still banned. The London market 
had been permitted to make some deals with non-residents but essentially the 
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London brokers could do little in London themselves. Parcels of gold did return for 
treatment at the Royal Mint Refinery and by June 1952 output of treated gold was 
around 3,000 ounces a day.682 The establishment in 1953 of a Multilateral Arbitrage 
Area, comprising Britain and six European nations including France and West 
Germany, permitted spot and forward dealing in foreign exchange.683 As Green 
explained: 
The next logical step to restore the comprehensive services that the City 
traditionally offered was to re-open the gold market. Early in 1954 the Bank 
of England discreetly gathered the members together and proposed that plans 
should be made for a grand re-opening of the market in March. It was 
suggested by one bullion house that as such a time had lapsed, fifteen years, 
the fixing should be moved to neutral ground by jointly renting premises. 
However, the idea was withdrawn when the Bank pointed out to the firm 
concerned that presumably they were not interested in taking part, so the 
market would manage without them.684 
Rothschild continued to host the fixing. The cast remained the same. However, the 
pre-war distinction between the brokers was removed as The Economist re-
introduced the firms to their readers and spoke of the ‘four specialised bullion firms, 
Johnson Matthey & Company, Mocatta & Goldsmid, Pixley & Abell, and Sharps & 
Wilkins... together with N M Rothschild & Sons and Samuel Montagu & Company, 
both authorised banks and, therefore, dealers in gold.’685 All six members had an 
equal footing. 
 
     On Monday morning at 10:30 a.m. on 22 March 1954 the representatives of each 
firm gathered again in the traditional fixing room at New Court. A price of £12 8s 6d 
was agreed, which was a little over $35; the price, compared with £8 1s 10d at the 
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last pre-war fixing, had increased due to sterling’s depreciation.686 Green suggested 
that: 
The prestige of the market as the international clearing centre for gold was 
assured from the start, for the Bank of England had been appointed the sales 
agent of the South African Reserve Bank, who had taken the decision to sell 
all ‘industrial’ gold through London. The Bank of England was the prime 
seller through Rothschild in their capacity as chairman of the fixing. 
Rothschild had the responsibility of picking up the gold from the Bank and 
distributing it to the other members of the market.687 
In addition sales of Russian gold, which were substantial until the mid 1960s, 
enhanced the market’s status. 688 Together with the two major gold producers, 
smaller offerings from Rhodesia, Ghana and the Philippines, whose gold was refined 
in London, meant that London’s pre-war eminence was restored.689 The Mocatta & 
Goldsmid 1954 annual circular noted that ‘London is the centre of gravity of the 
European free market... The re-establishment has brought here much of the business 
hitherto carried on abroad and the official London price has provided a much needed 
register of its fluctuations.’690 The re-opening of the London bullion market removed 
the main obstacles that had hindered the treatment of gold in London, which had 
affected the post-war recovery of the Royal Mint Refinery.  
 
In 1955 there was a general improvement in the trading position for precious metals 
and a steady trade in gold refining was reported at Rothschild, although silver 
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business had decreased.691 The Refinery treated German, Danish, Colombian, 
Canadian, Turkish, Brazilian, Russian and Spanish gold.692 The workforce, when 
required, worked twelve hour days and Sundays.693 In the 1956 performance review, 
however, it was noted that the refining business had been affected by the strikes at 
the Ashanti and West African gold fields. Profits were down and it was reported that 
‘alas it is not as good as we had hoped, more a sign of the times.’694 During the year 
the refinery had seen ‘periods of activity and at other times literally nothing to do, 
but we have come to rather expect that in this particular sphere of our operations.’695 
Some improvement was reported in 1957 but Rothschild appealed to workers to 
‘keep overheads to a minimum.’696 Throughout 1958 a steady improvement was 
recorded. However, by 1959, although contracts were in hand for refining gold and 
silver, the future of the business was said to be ‘almost impossible to predict.’697 
Edmund, in a speech to refining staff, observed that ‘the demand [for gold bars] 
depends on the activities of numerous unknown gentlemen in the Middle East and 
the Far East who at the moment seem to be suffering from a total eclipse.’698 By 
1965 an embargo by a number of Arab countries was placed on gold bars produced 
at the Royal Mint Refinery. It became ‘impossible to dispose stamped bars’ showing 
                                                
691 In 1955 the firm suffered a setback when the Royal Mint rejected the quotation put forward to 
refine quaternary silver. It was observed that ‘with RMR’s method of refining it is impossible to 
compete with Sheffield Smelting’. The Sheffield firm were able to undercut both Johnson Matthey 
and Royal Mint Refinery following the introduction of new treatment techniques developed by the 
firm. Increased competition from the Continent and India, from a refinery in Alipore, accounted for 
the reduction of silver requiring treatment at the Rothschild refinery. (See, RAL, 148/38, Silver 
refining and thin copper foil Sundry, 1955). 
692 Notes compiled from the desk diary of Arthur Hunt, with the permission of A G Hunt.  
693 Ibid. 
694 RAL, 148/41, ‘Edmund de Rothschild address to Refinery staff’, Dec 1956. 
695 Ibid. 
696 Ibid., 148/41, ‘Edmund de Rothschild address to Refinery staff’, 19 Sep 1957. 
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the Rothschild logo.699 Subsequently the bars were sent to Samuel Montagu who 
branded the gold with their firm’s logo. 
 
     The re-opening of the London bullion market in 1954 should have seen the return 
of the Royal Mint Refinery to its primary function of treating gold and silver. 
However, it was not long before the venture was subjected to the effects of 
decolonisation as new African countries gained independence and took control of 
industry and finance. Before independence the best customer of the refinery was the 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and the gold was consigned to Rothschild by the 
Bank of West Africa Ltd, Accra under a three year renewable contract. Upon arrival 
the gold was sold on the Bank of West Africa’s behalf at the fixing, and payment for 
the approximate counter value was made to Glyn Mills & Co., for their account on 
the normal value date. Ashanti had been responsible for paying all charges up to the 
time of arrival at the Refinery, such as the insurance and freight. In assessing the 
final amount to be paid in respect of any consignment Rothschild deducted their own 
commission, refining and assay charges.700 
 
After independence in 1957 high on the agenda of the Ghanaian Government was the 
country’s departure from the sterling area, regarded in London as ‘a simple closure 
to break colonial apron strings.’701 Of greater concern in the City were the protective 
measures invoked by Ghana with the introduction of the Mining Abandonment Act 
                                                
699 RAL, 148/37, ‘Memo noting boycott of RMR tola Bars’, 22 Apr 1965. 
700 RAL,148/41, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Limited, 9 Nov 1961. 
701 BEA, OV69/6, Ghana Report, 15 May 1961; Correspondence relates with how to deal with Ghana 
leaving the sterling area. It highlighted that Ghana received few incentives to continue. What was of 
concern was the impact leaving might have on other newly emerging countries such as Tanganyika. 
The position was highlighted in a report back to London by Arthur Snelling, British High 
Commissionaire in Accra. He was chastised for his views on the matter as ‘it was not his place to 
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1961, introduced to safeguard the mineral reserves of Ghana. The Act made it an 
offence to ‘do any act calculated to prejudice the future operation of an underground 
working’ without the prior written consent of the Chief Inspector of Mines. In 1961 
the Ghanaian Government formed the Ghana State Mining Corporation, which ‘took 
over’ the gold mines that had sent their output to Rothschild for refining and 
marketing, with the exception of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Ltd. Although 
at some stage it was assumed by Rothschild that state of affairs would change, the 
status quo continued until a state refinery was eventually opened in 1966. Rothschild 
had been aware of the possibility of the new refinery since 1963. During a visit to the 
Royal Mint Refinery by a development advisor of the World Bank, Ponna 
Wignaraja, it was learned that the Ghanaian Government were determined to take 
control of the country’s gold trade and intended to establish a native gold refinery. 
 
     In order for the Ghana state mines to sell their gold output on the London or other 
reputable international markets it would be necessary for the gold to be refined to an 
acceptable minimum fineness and to cast bars to the standard laid down by the 
London market. In order to be accepted by the market the bars would have to be 
tested at one of the London refineries.702 Rothschild had two options. The first was 
to do nothing, but by doing nothing they would certainly lose the gold refining, 
including the Ashanti business as it would almost certainly be ‘obliged to have their 
gold output refined in Ghana’. Rothschild would lose the marketing of the gold if 
                                                
702 See, for an account of the ‘privatisation’ of the Ashanti Goldfield, Antoinette Handley ‘Business, 
Government, and the Privatisation of the Ashanti Goldfields Company in Ghana’ Canadian Journal 
of African Studies, 41 (2007), 1-37; As part of the development plan the State acquired major shares 
in a number of previously private enterprises. In order to carry out the purchase of shares the State 
sought financial assistance in the form of a loan for £5 million from the Bank of England, the loan 
was declined. It was suggested that the City would be in better position to assist with the request. 
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that happened.703 Or they could co-operate, possibly in collaboration with Ashanti. If 
they did this Rothschild might retain the marketing side and possibly the melting of 
the fine gold produced into marketable bars.704 
 
     History was about to be repeated. Similar to its experiences in 1922 when 
Rothschild had lost the lead in gold refining once the Rand Refinery opened, the 
establishment of the Ghanaian state refinery would affect the future of the Rothschild 
refinery. Ghana offered Rothschild the opportunity to manage the new state refinery, 
and provide technical aid in setting up the gold refinery; assistance from Russia had 
also been sought.705 Rothschild was consulted over the marketability of the Ghanaian 
gold and the fineness was set at 990/1000, a clear indication that the Government 
intended to continue to sell the gold through Rothschild as the fineness was suitable 
for offering to the London market.706 It also offered some reassurance to Rothschild 
that it would maintain some control over West African gold. 
 
     The Ghana state refinery opened in 1966, and while waiting for this Rothschild 
was keen to keep the costs of refining as low as possible, in order to continue to 
attract the state owned gold to the Royal Mint Refinery for as long as possible. So 
when Johnson Matthey suggested an increase in London refining charges Rothschild 
were in favour of maintaining the existing rate. In reviewing refining costs at the 
Royal Mint Refinery, including direct and indirect overheads, the rate 6d per ounce 
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was maintained providing ‘an adequate supply of refinable gold [was] maintained.’707 
The Sheffield Smelting Company no longer refined any substantial quantity of gold 
and Rothschild and Johnson Matthey received the majority of gold treated in 
London. Calculations for 1964 show the levels of gold treated at by both firms were 
comparable. 
 
























TOTAL 953,000  
  
904,000  
Source, RAL, 148/37, compiled using data from Gold Refining Charges, 11 Mar 1964. 
 
The figures in Table 10, although estimated, show Rothschild was on an equal 
footing with Johnson Matthey. However, it did not include ‘service’ refining for 
Johnson Matthey’s own group, and had these figures been available it would 
certainly have increased the overall treatment levels. Rothschild did consider 
increasing the refining cost, but felt it too risky in view of the approaching renewal 
of the agreement for treating Rhodesian gold, due in the June, and the contract with 
Ashanti Goldfield, which was due to end on 31 December 1964. Sir Edward Spears, 
Chairman of the Ashanti Goldfields, whilst at lunch with Edmund at New Court in 
November 1964, encouraged Rothschild to be actively involved in the management 
of the new refinery in Ghana. Edmund declined the offer. He wrote to Spears over 
his approach noting that ‘I am afraid that you will be disappointed in our somewhat 
negative attitude, but we feel that the management of a gold refinery in Ghana would 
                                                
707 Ibid. 
Chapter 8: The end of the rainbow 
243 
 
be very difficult to control and we would have grave hesitation in assuming the 
responsibility for the operation.’708 The decision not to become involved in the 
management of a state refinery was on much the same basis as that of Edmund’s 
own father Lionel in 1919; and had also included the matter of security and the 
difficulties of overseeing such a venture from London, the necessary personnel and 
the cost of operating the refinery (discussed in chapter 3). 
 
     The future of the Royal Mint Refinery hung in the balance as news of the opening 
of the new refinery in Ghana was awaited. In the meantime a report was produced 
into working practices, and whether it would be viable to modernise the existing 
plant at the Royal Mint Refinery. The findings of the report were that the best course 
of action would be to reduce labour requirements and incorporate new plant, increase 
the productivity of existing labour, improve the quality of metal cast rolling, which 
would become a more important factor as gold refining fell away and retrain refinery 
staff to be more versatile. It was hoped that implementing these measures would 
lower future operating costs. 
 
Edmund had instigated some changes at the Royal Mint Refinery in 1955 when he 
introduced a programme of reorganisation. It was already apparent that in the future 
the emphasis of production would be on non-ferrous base metal production rather 
than the treatment of precious metals. At that point in time the difficulty was the ad 
hoc development of operations, which meant that it suffered from being overstaffed 
and lacked co-ordination of tasks and efficiency, making operational overheads high. 
As a result it was said that the Refinery experienced: 
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A serious lack of drive and initiative and the tempo of the works as a whole 
is slow. The workers are good and loyal, but they lack leadership, and while 
it is essential to avoid physical strain in a heavy industry, there seems little 
doubt that by more efficient planning and drive much extra output could be 
obtained without any ill effects on the health or well-being of the men. The 
present administrative staffs seem unwilling to bring about changes for the 
better in this direction. They have no experience of what happens elsewhere, 
and the inevitable result is that in trading conditions production costs at the 
Refinery are much too high.709 
The reorganisation of the Rolling Mill, Copper Foil, Plated Wire and Durmamet 
Screens departments required the reallocation of the activities and responsibilities of 
staff, so as to avoid such anomalies as packing and despatch being separated. Staff 
were drawn from each department to form a new packing department to deal with all 
the products of the Refinery, with the exception of gold and silver. A new 
administrative department was also created, through the amalgamation of existing 
clerical staff, to cope with all the paper work generated at the Refinery. An internal 
candidate, Robinson, was appointed to head up the new clerical department. It was 
thought that ‘he [was by] far the most efficient and able person amongst the clerical 
staff at the Refinery, and this new position would give greater scope to his 
abilities.’710 The new method of working meant that each production unit became 
responsible only for the output of its product. 
 
     A firm of management consultants, Associated Industrial Consultants Limited 
(AIC), were asked to investigate the annealing capacity and profitability of the 
Rolling Mill department. It was suggested by them, in order to increase production 
levels, Rothschild appoint a skilled engineer, which would improve the overall 
profitability of the department.711 In the past one of the key strengths at the refining 
operation had been the traditional approach to training. Young men entered the 
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refinery, generally on recommendation or through family ties, and skills were 
handed down by their fellow workers until they were able to treat the variety of gold 
and silver received at the Refinery. If their work was satisfactory, they could expect 
to remain with the firm until they retired. This method of training had been 
satisfactory when gold and silver had been the only activities undertaken at the 
Refinery, particularly as experience in refining was a specialised craft, which in 
London could only be gained in one or two other firms. However, in the post-war 
period Rothschild had failed to take on qualified and experienced staff from the light 
engineering industry as it expanded its activities, and the new techniques stretched 
the capabilities of the existing workforce. No one member of staff at the Refinery 
had an engineering qualification or had experience of working for another 
engineering works. The men were left to grapple with problems of engineering 
design and planning, and although almost invariably good results were produced, in 
time, had a skilled engineer been available it was probable that the same or better 
conclusions would have been reached in much less time and at much less cost.712 
Rothschild eventually took steps to readdress the problem and engage the services of 
at least one qualified engineer who could bring his technical ability and experience 
to the developing operations. It was suggested that the ideal candidate would hold 
‘an engineering degree and five to ten years experience in engineering works... it 
would probably be necessary to offer £1,500 per annum as a salary.’713 It is unclear 
from records if a suitably qualified engineer was employed at that point. 
 
     An important factor behind the urgency to facilitate change at the Refinery in 
1955 was the monopoly in the production of thin copper foil. It was generally 
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accepted by management that it was almost inevitable that ‘the happy state of affairs 
cannot possibly last for long and when competition comes, or even before, we must 
be in a position to produce this material cheaply and efficiently.’714 By re-organising 
working practices it was hoped that the department would be ‘put on a sound 
commercial basis and that at worst the scheme would bring about economies and 
would undoubtedly also bring about greater efficiency.’715 Rothschild management 
were keen that the workforce was made to realise the importance of economy and 
that ‘the good old days of ‘laissez faire’ have gone forever.’716 
Figure 18. ‘RMR Gold plated wires, 1950s’717 
 
 
     The void left by the end of the treatment of silver was filled by the increased 
demand for electrolytically deposited copper foil. The decision was taken to 
dismantle some of the silver treatment plant to make way for the treatment of non-
ferrous metals. In 1956 another foil plant was ordered, which took the operation to 
four. The Royal Mint Refinery, in addition to copper foil, produced copper-based 
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alloys of all kinds in the form of extrusion billets, ingots, rolling slabs and cast rods 
and bars, while its cold rolling plant handled substantial quantities of copper, brass 
and similar strip. Much of the copper strip was absorbed by the aircraft and motor 
industries and by manufacturers of coaxial cable. 
 
The limiting factor in any future development and expansion at Royal Mint Street 
was the size of the site it stood on. During the redevelopment of the Refinery in the 
1930s every available space had been incorporated into the new building. There was 
no potential for expansion. In addition the nature and character of the business meant 
the creation of fumes, some of which was noxious or toxic, or both. As discussed in 
the previous chapter the location of the current operation was only tolerated due to 
the longevity of the operation and any future development would have to comply 
with the increased environmental restrictions initiated the Clean Air Act 1956 
recently been introduced to deal with the London fog.718 
 
     Edmund, in his role as senior partner of N M Rothschild & Sons, took a direct 
approach to the workforce in his attempt to connect with them. He regularly visited 
both the Refinery and factory at Tring and addressed staff. He kept them updated 
with the performance of the business, prevailing economic conditions and orders in 
hand. In his address in December 1956 he observed the ongoing credit squeeze 
affecting British industry, which affected profits. Despite the disappointing orders 
for copper Edmund was pleased to report that the work carried out on cable for 
Telcon, the firm engaged in the trans-Atlantic cable laying project, had been ‘first 
class’, and additional orders had been placed for the planned Trans-Pacific cable.719 
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The general format Edmund’s speech took was that he listed the firm’s achievements 
and disappointments, remarking on the performance of individual departments. The 
tone of the address aimed to inspire confidence in the venture and attempted to send 
a positive message to the workforce regarding the trading position. He frequently 
tried to make individuals feel part of the ‘team’. In his speech of December 1958 he 
observed that: 
there is always a certain amount of glamour attached to a production 
department and sometimes we overlook the efforts of maintenance engineers, 
office workers, gate-keepers, painters, cleaners, cooks, chemists and all the 
others who by a united effort with the production workers ensure that the 
goods are supplied in sufficient quantity and on time to suit the requirements 
of our customers.720 
Generally it was announced in the December speech if the workforce could expect a 
Christmas box. One help in the direct management approach favoured by Edmund 
was that unlike Anthony, he was able to spread the workload amongst a network of 
support, as the number of partners who joined N M Rothschild & Sons increased 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Edmund was joined by his brother Leopold and latterly 
his cousins, Evelyn and Jacob, and three non-family partners, David Colville, 
Michael Bucks, and Philip Shelborne. 
 
By 1950 the trading position of the factory at Tring had changed. Whilst it traded as 
a separate entity from the London operation, both ventures remained linked. During 
the transition from the production of munitions, and the search for new product 
markets the firm continued to produce aircraft parts. Demand for aircraft parts 
remained high until the end of the Korean War in 1953. As Britain entered its 
‘Golden Age’ both Rothschild ventures benefitted from the increased affluence and 
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consumerism of the period. Demand for the new range of products available at the 
Refinery, copper sheeting in particular for circuit boards, increased as ownership of 
homes and consumer durables took off; these included the ownership of a whole 
range of domestic appliances, cars and televisions.721  
 
John Flynn, the manager at Tring, filled any spare capacity with the development of 
ticket machines for bus companies and the production of cosmetic containers. In the 
post-war era raw materials remained scarce for a number of years. Flynn was the 
driving force behind the development and production at the factory. However in the 
late 1950s work on ticket machines had fallen off and by mid-1958 the factory was 
predominantly engaged in the production of lipstick cases. Tring became a customer 
of the London refinery, which supplied gilding strip for the cosmetic containers 
produced at the factory. The growth of the cosmetic industry reflected the rising 
affluence and consumerism located in British society and was particularly 
representative of the rise in popular culture and advertising, which challenges 
familiar views of Britain’s post-war decline.722 Capturing the rising cosmetic 
industry was one of the ideas put forward by Goodfellow (discussed in chapter 7) 
when looking at the areas of post-war activities that would suit the firm. The 
production of lipstick cases was not dissimilar to the production of billets that had 
formed one of the ranges of munitions work undertaken at Tring. The move had 
proved mutually beneficial for both operations. Rothschild caught the early take-off 
experienced by the cosmetic industry. Cosmetic firms looked to accelerate 
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production to recover lost markets of pre-war days, coupled with the changes in the 
fashion industry, sparked by the fashion house of Christian Dior in Paris in 1947, 
and provided a target growth market for the operation at Tring.723 Although 
production of lipstick cases began quite soon after the war it was during the mid-
1950s that production was of the greatest significance. In 1954 most of the 
production was carried out for Coty, the firm’s best customer, but work for Max 
Factor, Ponds, Elizabeth Arden and Luft Tangee also kept the factory busy. In 
February 1955 production ran at 188,000 cases a week.724 One employee at Tring, 
Heather Keen, had worked on the production line at the factory after leaving school 
in 1946, placing metal tubes in the rotating machines before the edges were trimmed 
and went off for annealing. Most of the production process was automated but there 
was still a considerable amount to be completed by hand.725 The workforce at Tring, 
predominantly women, performed tasks that required no great skills in the assembly 
shop. The workforce at Tring had grown from 130 in 1950 to 280 by 1956.726 
Rothschild was one British industrialist that reaped the benefits of the seller’s market 
identified by Addison.727 One strategy adopted by the firm was to expand overseas 
exports. Flynn made a trip to America in 1956, following an approach by the 
American company Chesebrough-Pond. The chemist and cosmetic firms had 
recently merged and were looking for production outlets in Europe. He concluded 
that on this occasion the approach from Chesebrough-Pond would have to be passed 
over. His reasoning was that set-up costs for the venture would be in the region of 
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£45,000 for plant and tools, and at that particular time the size of the market in 
Britain did not justify the large capital investment.728 
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Figure 21. ‘RMR Engineering, Lipstick case and face shader container’731 
 
 
     Whilst in the United States Flynn took the opportunity to call on a number of 
cosmetic firms as way of promoting the products on offer at Tring. He toured 
American operators, and spoke with a number of light engineering firms. In his trip 
report Flynn observed that American lipstick case production methods were 
considerably more advanced than those at Rothschild; one American firm, where the 
operation was nearly full automated, produced 120 million lipstick cases annually.732 
He was pleased to report that there was still business to be done between Tring and 
the USA. Flynn learnt while visiting Revlon that the firm was dissatisfied with their 
existing supplier, the greatest competitor for products from Tring, Websters of 
Bournemouth. Revlon were keen to switch supplier. However, Flynn was concerned 
because he discovered that Revlon rather than buy from Tring was considering plans 
to open a factory in South Wales, and had been attracted to the area by the lower 
wage rate.733 Nevertheless, Flynn noted that ‘I am of the opinion that the facilities at 
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present in England for the production of Lipstick cases is not large enough or good 
enough to meet the demand which the American owners anticipate will be required 
in the near future.’734  
 
Figure 22. ‘RMR Christmas Party’735 
 
 
Throughout the 1950s and 60s the operation at Tring had a number of recurring 
problems that proved to be obstacles to the smooth running of the factory: scarcity of 
raw materials, cost effective production, retention of labour, foreign competition, and 
conformity with  new Government legislation. Many of these obstacles regularly 
appeared in the minutes of the monthly meetings of the works committee, formally 
known as the JPC (discussed in chapter 7). David Colville, who in 1960 became the 
first non-family Partner at N M Rothschild & Sons, attended the meetings. They 
provided a platform for management and members of the workforce to raise 
concerns they had about the operation of the factory. Recurrent themes, which by 
some members were considered petty, regularly appeared in the minutes. These 
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included such items as bonus payments, lack of heating during the winter and 
excessive heat during warmer weather, the location and timing of payment of wages, 
the cleanliness of cups in the canteen, the lack and variety of food served in the 
canteen, the temperature of tea served, constant requests to start on time, the volume 
of music piped around all departments, the synchronising of clocks, queue jumping 
to clock out and so on. Management concerns generally stemmed from the economic 
conditions of the day and concerned productivity, including the downtime of 
assembly lines, worker punctuality, attendance, output and standards. Other 
functions performed by the committee included the annual agreement to close the 
factory for the fortnight of paid holiday, normally the last week of July the first week 
of August, and the agreement of the dates of annual events. These included a day trip 
to Southend every June, paid for by the firm, and in December a Christmas party for 
adults and one for children.  
 
     In the post-war years Colville often visited Tring to smooth over any difficulties 
arising between the volatile manager, Flynn, and newcomers to the factory from 
other industries who would have preferred the backing of a union. In line with New 
Court and the Refinery, no elected trade union represented the workforce at Tring, 
although a number of workers belonged to a union they had joined prior to their 
engagement at the factory. In 1956 it was through these existing connections that 
workers at Tring had been canvassed by a Mr Harrowell, the representative of the 
Watford Branch of the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), and urged to join 
the branch. Threats over the cancellation of certain contracts the Tring factory was 
involved in had been made in a letter sent to all workers by the AEU.736 Despite 
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these threats Flynn felt that it was unnecessary to invite union representatives into 
the factory. Colville stepped in to smooth matters over, taking charge of the 
potentially volatile situation by informing the works committee that ‘he wanted to 
make it quite clear that the firm had never raised any objection to any employee 
joining whatever union they wished, but that he had felt bound to refuse Mr 
Harrowell’s request that the management should invite all workers to join the 
AEU’.737 Colville went on to say that ‘he had agreed to existing members inviting 
non-members to join, but had asked that they should do this during the breaks and 
not during working hours’. He pointed out that: 
his reason for refusing to allow the Management to persuade workers to join 
the union was because such persuasion was the same as saying to a worker, 
who might have been with the firm for 20 years, that unless he joined he 
would have to be given the sack, and this he was on no account prepared to 
do.738  
He added that ‘whilst recognising fully the great work which the unions had done for 
workers in the past, it was nevertheless the responsibility of the firm to protect their 
employees to the best of their ability’. He assured the Committee that even if the 
threat to cancel contracts came to fruition ‘there was ample work in the factory to 
keep everybody in their jobs.’739 The workforce accepted this and it was left to Mr 
Colville to contact Mr Harrowell to explain the situation. The effectiveness of the 
work committee lay in the willingness of management to listen to the complaints of 
the workforce and to take appropriate action and therefore there was a general lack 
of support for union representation.  
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     During the 1960s products manufactured at Tring were exposed to greater 
competition from overseas producers. In the volatile economic climate it proved 
harder to maintain profits. The problem was exacerbated with the constant shortage 
of labour at the factory and the failure to attract a workforce to Tring. RMR 
Engineering had always relied upon recruiting workers from the surrounding areas. 
In the 1950s management converted the works lorry to carry passengers from the 
surrounding areas not serviced by a local bus, who were picked up and dropped off 
at the factory. Later they successfully negotiated with local bus companies to 
rearrange routes and timetables to coincide with factory hours. Subsidised travel was 
also provided, and minibuses were laid on. Incentives were offered to employees to 
introduce new people to work at the factory. Immigrant workers became a growing 
group at the factory throughout the 1960s. Workers on the nightshift were generally 
Asian men.740 Two opposing groups emerged at the factory that frequently clashed 
on racial grounds. The lure of housing brought some workers into the area. 
Rothschild had been involved in building a number of subsidised houses in the area 
(discussed in chapter 7). A further scheme for an additional 10 houses was approved 
in January 1950.741 The prospect of being housed appealed to potential employees 
and a number applied of for jobs at RMR Engineering on the back of being housed. 
In addition many of the women from the nearby Polish Resettlement Camp at 
Williston worked at the factory during the 1960s.742 
 
     Friction between the different groups of workers sometimes boiled over and 
appeared in the JPC minutes. Frequent complaints were made about the Asian 
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women and men spitting around the factory. When the question of redundancies 
arose, it was presumed that the ‘Poles’ should go first.743 The ruling on the issue of 
redundancy was discussed and the following agreed by the committee: 
If a Pole had longer service than an Englishman, he would be retained. If the 
Pole had the same length of service but was a more satisfactory operator, he 
would probably be retained. If an English Worker and a Polish Worker had 
been engaged for the same period and their work was of the same standard, 
then the Pole would be discharged.744 
The agreement was not tested. Despite a number of slack periods experienced by 
RMR Engineering workers were not laid off, but generally left of their own accord 
or in the pursuit of higher wages. 
 
     Over three decades the average working week for the workforce at Tring reduced 
from 47 hours to 40. The first reduction, from 47 to 44 hours, took place during the 
immediate post-war slump experienced by the firm. The introduction of the 40-hour 
week came in 1964. Rothschild was not as generous to workers as it had been in the 
past, as the same rate of basic pay applied but was adjusted to a 40-hour week. 
Workers were awarded individual performance bonuses to increase their basic wage. 
In addition Rothschild annually gave each worker a Christmas box, as a sign of 
appreciation, linked to the length of service. The bonus was subject to the 
profitability of the firm and adjusted each year. With the exception of 1962, 1970 
and 1972, when profits were so poor that no Christmas box was given, generally the 
bonus ranged between £1, for less than 12 months service, up to £15, for those with a 
service over 10 years.745 The lavishness of the Christmas party was also linked to 
company profits. Some years it took place at the local Victoria Rooms, with a 
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catered buffet, and other years it was held in the works canteen. Attendance was poor 
and towards the end of the 1960s the workforce decided that they would forgo the 
annual event, preferring a Christmas box. The same fate befell the annual outing to 
Southend and the children’s Christmas party. It was decided through the JPC that 
due to a lack of interest any future events could be organised via the recently 
reformed social club. Support for the social club was limited, and the running was 
left to a few willing individuals. Rothschild provided a meeting room at the factory 
for social events. The main event supported by workers at the factory was the annual 
cricket match hosted at the Exbury estate of Edmund de Rothschild. Other club 
activities included table tennis and swimming. 
 
     In 1966 the factory manager John Flynn, suffered a heart attack and died in the 
yard at Tring. John Linton, his deputy, and Dennis Champney, the production 
manager, were appointed as joint general managers. Linton’s area of responsibility 
was for the administration of RMR Engineering, and Champney’s for production. 
The two men complemented each other. New product lines were introduced, 
machinery was updated and orders for lipstick cases steadily grew; in March 1968 
each order approached three million cases, and 25 per cent of the cases produced 
went for export to the United States.746 New machinery was installed and the factory 
moved into the manufacture of plastic components for lipsticks and bottle caps. 
Colville informed the Works Committee that ‘although we are very busy we are not 
making any profit which may mean our prices are too low.’747 RMR Engineering felt 
unable to increase the unit price of products, despite the increased wages to their 
workers, part of the national engineering pay awards, and the general rise in the 
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overheads at the factory.748 The full order books were not reflected in the firm’s 
profitability. 
 
Profit margins were just as tight at the Refinery. At the start of the 1960s the rolling 
mill department received a series of large orders. One customer, Ruberoid, had 
placed large orders for foil, to be used in the construction of the Birmingham-
Liverpool motorway. The period also saw a high demand for copper foil for printed 
circuit boards, an expanding market.749 Low returns were reported for the rolling mill 
operation. The volatility of the price of copper (prices rose as the commodity became 
scarce) and the unreliability in supply both hampered the economic viability of the 
operation. In addition the operation was further hindered by the advantage European 
and US firms had over Britain, where the price of copper was generally higher.750 It 
became increasingly difficult for British firms to compete with these competitors. 
Rothschild had already recorded that there was a limited amount of business scope 
for copper foil.751 In 1962 news reached Rothschild that a US supplier had installed 
plant and planned to open a factory outside Paris producing copper foil. It was not 
long before news came that a second US firm, Brush Clevite Company of Cleveland 
Ohio, were looking to install a factory in Europe to manufacture copper foil for 
printed circuits. In August 1965 William Laffer, president of the Clevite 
Corporation, paid a visit to Rothschild. Laffer was keen to establish if there would be 
scope for two foil-producing plants in Britain, or whether Rothschild might be 
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interested in selling their plant to them.752 An examination of the future viability of 
its own plant and the volume of business anticipated for printed circuit foil in Britain 
revealed it could expect in the region of 450,000 to 500,000lbs per annum.753 The 
maximum potential production at the Refinery lay between 600,000 and 700,000lbs. 
A deal was struck and the acquisition by Brush Clevite of the copper foil operation 
was finalised in 1966. All machinery and production plant was to be included. Part 
of the condition of sale was that Brush Clevite would occupy the third floor of the 
Refinery, rent free, until 1 October 1966, thereafter they had the option to rent the 
space for a further six months. However, the US firm opted to erect a purpose-built 
factory in Southampton, and once this was completed, the plant was relocated to the 
new site. Workers in the copper sheet and rolling mill department were informed of 
the sale, and given the option to continue their employment with Brush Clevite, 
relocating to Southampton, or take redundancy. While this was happening, 
Rothschild was also contacted by a friendly competitor, Enfield Rolling Mills, that 
wished to purchase the wire plating operation. A deal was agreed and workers in the 
wire department were offered the option to move to the new firm or take 
redundancy. 
 
     In January 1966 Partners at N M Rothschild & Sons received a report setting out 
various options for the future of the Royal Mint Refinery.754 The new Ghanaian state 
refinery was due to commence operation in September 1966, and although the 
amount of gold it would be able to handle was predicted to be low, eventually it was 
expected to treat the country’s whole production. On that basis it was assumed that 
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no gold from Ghana would be received and plans for the future of the Royal Mint 
Refinery were made.755 One option was that the operation should continue to treat 
gold and silver in the basement and ground floor. The upper floors could be 
redeveloped and let as office space and flats. Concerns over security issues, and the 
projected cost of £165,000 to implement the changes compared to potential earnings 
from the refinery and from rent made this uneconomical.756 Another possibility was 
to relocate the refining operation, which would free up the existing site to be sold 
and help pay for the move. A site near Old Street station was put forward, again the 
estimated cost of relocating, purchase and setting came in too high at £335,000. 
Questions were raised by a number of Partners over the desirability of retaining the 
business and whether it was worthwhile to maintain the industrial enterprise ‘and all 
it entails’; it was thought to be a lot of effort for a small return.757 Nevertheless, one 
important function undertaken by staff at the Refinery had been the movement of 
gold around the City and for reasons of ‘prestige’ Partners voted to continue to 
handle the existing volume of gold, on average 300 bars a day, though a peak had 
been reached of 1,500 bars in a day.758 It was therefore decided that the best option 
would be to abandon refining but to retain the transportation of gold and market 
activities, and to locate the bullion solely at New Court. 
 
     In 1967 a series of events happened that could have potentially reversed this 
decision. First the refinery in Ghana opened. During a visit to the Royal Mint 
Refinery two representatives from the Ghana State Mining Corporation informed 
Rothschild of a number of matters which had still to be resolved. Unlike the chloride 
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method of refining used in London the government had opted for the electrolytic 
process. Although by May the building and plant were ready the local problem of 
accommodation for workers remained outstanding. There were also concerns over 
the small matter that Ghana had no experience whatsoever of any type of chemical 
plant, and the large amount of gold which a chemical plant ties up in its process. 
Although electrolytic gold would command a premium, it varied, and was sometimes 
very small if the general supply available in the market was large. Rothschild was 
also informed that it was unlikely that the Refinery would be operated with Russian 
assistance; it was noted that employing one Russian technician meant also the 
employment of ‘an assistant, two commissars and an interpreter to go with him, and 
this was a somewhat expensive arrangement.’759 If and when the Refinery opened a 
management agreement would be sought with an independent operator. 
 
     Second, the chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the Royal Mint was to 
move from Tower Hill to Llantrisant, near Cardiff. The move was due to the chronic 
shortage of space.760 Any advantage Rothschild had in neighbouring the Royal Mint 
would soon disappear. Third, the Treasury announced that the pound was to be 
devalued, and as had happened in the past, the move stimulated the gold mining 
industry and production levels of newly mined gold increased. The London bullion 
market was awash with gold and the Rothschild refinery was kept busy treating gold 
and moving bullion around the City; the movement of gold bars increased to 921 a 
day and one day it reached 2,430 bars.761 
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     Finally, the American chemical company Engelhard were approached by 
Rothschild as it had been established they were interested in purchasing the Royal 
Mint Refinery. Negotiations began in 1967 and were kept under wraps until details 
of the sale could be worked out. However, the sale was nearly thwarted when on 1 
May 1967, much to the embarrassment of Rothschild, the Refinery bullion van came 
under attack. Thieves stole the consignment of 144 gold bars, at the time estimated to 
be worth £750,000. The British press reported that it was the single biggest haul of 
gold in Britain. The driver and two crew members were gassed, tied-up and left in 
the back of the empty van as thieves made their getaway. The driver was injured as 
he attempted to hit the panic button. Although legislation had been passed in 1961 
for London guards to carry guns, Rothschild employees, by choice, did not do so; 
instead they had a baton for protection.762 Was it just bad luck that the firm was 
targeted by thieves just as the sale of the Refinery was imminent? One of the 
repercussions of the claim was that insurers increased rates for the carriage of gold 
around London and lead to a review of the movement of gold between institutions.763 
The Bank of England noted that ‘it is not at all surprising that the underwriters, who 
have been let down by the gross carelessness of those they insured, should now seek 
to reimburse themselves on this underwriting account.’764 As a result, Rothschild felt 
unable to carry on transporting gold on the Bank’s behalf.  
 
     The Bank of England had one month before the higher premiums came into 
effect. Members of the gold market were consulted to find the best solution, for 
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reasons of security and economy, to reduce the physical movement of gold between 
members of the market to a minimum. The preferred option was that the Bank would 
offer the six members of the market gold set-aside accounts. It was proposed that the 
Bank would make no charge for the maintenance of the set-aside account nor for any 
transit between accounts held at the Bank. A charge of £1 for four bars per box 
would be made for gold to be exported, and a minimal delivery charge for bare bars 
would be made.765 The Bullion Office felt that the scheme would work provided that 
‘we are not embarrassed for space by the amount of gold that the market wish to hold 
here, and that we ourselves could allocate all the bars in fulfilment of market orders 
rather than having to work to an exact fine ounce figure of their selection.’766 Hours 
of collection and delivery were restricted to between 10am and 4pm, with at least 48 
hours notice being provided. Gold was not expected to remain in the Bank for more 
than a month. The Bank was willing to mark the boxes with the members brand but 
was not prepared to differentiate the packaging used. The arrangement was to begin 
on the 24 July and a review of the total gold to be kept on account for each member 
was set at a maximum limit of 15 tons, approximately 1,200 bars, although it was 
agreed that periods of short excess at not too frequent intervals would be tolerated. 
Rothschild, following enhanced security to the refinery van, and Johnson Matthey 
continued to collect and deliver gold to the Bank of England. The Bank of England 
and the other members subscribed to the professional security companies. The 
financial loss of commission for Rothschild was said to be in the region of £12,000 
per annum. However the increased activity of the gold market more than 
compensated for this loss.767 
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In June 1967 negotiations for the sale of the Refinery to Engelhard resumed and 
plans for the sale were finalised in November. The sale was announced to customers 
and was also reported in the British press.768 The remaining workforce transferred to 
the new company, went to work at New Court, retired or opted for redundancy. The 
site in Royal Mint Street had not formed part of the deal and was later sold to the 
Ministry of Public Buildings and Works for re-development. One employee 
described the process of packing up the business and having to decide whether the 
trappings of 115 years were sent to the new works, scrapped or sold off.769 Early in 
November 1968 the Refinery stood empty and the gates to the courtyard were closed 
for the last time. 
 
     The disposal of the factory at Tring took longer. Negotiations for the sale of the 
engineering business and equipment to Associated Tooling Industries Limited, and 
the subsequent sale of the land to Elkvale for primarily residential development were 
completed in 1974. Why the delay? The most compelling argument advanced by 
Champney, the former production manager at Tring, is that Rothschild had wanted to 
sell the venture as a going concern because they did not want to be responsible for 
making half of the population of Tring unemployed.770 Just after the decision was 
taken the sale was hindered by trade union disruption and power strikes that besieged 
British industry in the early 1970s. In January 1974 the workforce, like so many 
others, was forced to operate a three-day week even though the order books were 
full. The firm paid full pay to staff for the first couple of weeks, thereafter pay was 
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only made for the hours actually worked,771 which for the next three months was 
only Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays. In an attempt to operate on the remaining 
two days Rothschild purchased a generator from the United States, which finally 
arrived at the factory two months into the dispute. The venture was placed under 
enormous strain and Linton and Champney were asked to prepare a report to assess 
the value of machinery and the cost of redundancy payments should the factory be 
closed. Champney recalled that the initial formula for estimated redundancy 
payments was considered too high, and it was reduced by 20 per cent several times 
until an affordable package was arrived at.772 Negotiations for the sale of the 
business to Associated Tooling Industries Limited began and Rothschild was led to 
believe jobs would be secure. However, soon after the sale completion it became 
evident that the firm had purchased the factory and machinery as an asset-stripping 
venture. The main machinery was removed from Tring and installed in the firm’s 
own premises. Both the managers of Tring, Linton and Champney, along with a 
number of workers, moved over to the new firm, but most left soon after. The site of 
the Old Silk Mill on which the factory stood was sold to Elkvale primarily for 
residential development. In 2011 the factory and outbuildings still remain on the 
original site which has been developed into a small business park. 
 
In conclusion, Rothschild would probably not have established or chosen to operate 
a light engineering operation at Tring had it not been for earlier financial incentives 
offered by the Ministry of Aircraft Production for the production of munitions. 
During the transition from war to peacetime production new markets opened up. It 
was ambitious to expect that the factory in Tring would be able to compete with 
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established operators with previous market experience and contacts. Whilst the firm 
experienced a number of market downturns, knock on effects from the trend in the 
cosmetic industry, the range of other products produced, ticket machines, aircraft 
parts, screws and later plastic components meant that during these downtimes 
workers could be engaged in other tasks. The main drawback of the operation at 
Tring was the ability to attract and retain a sufficiently large enough workforce to 
service the growing order books. RMR Engineering was not as attractive a 
proposition as a gold refinery and when the decision to sell was made it took longer 
to generate interest.773 Rothschild considered themselves sensitive employers and 
were prepared to wait for a sale that would bring some continuity of employment in 
the area. 
 
The fate of the Royal Mint Refinery was out of the control of N M Rothschild & 
Sons. International restrictions on the sale and movement of gold had shackled a 
return to the primary function of the Refinery in the immediate post-war era. Once 
gold returned the management had to contend with new challenges imposed through 
decolonisation. Hit once again by the establishment of a state refinery, this time in 
Ghana, the supply of gold requiring treatment significantly reduced. Rothschild, 
unlike Johnson Matthey, had failed to increase their share of the international market 
and diversify into treating other precious metals. However, the venture had 
successfully diversified into other new areas of production. By the 1960s the venture 
had outgrown the original location. It was inevitable that in order to keep up with the 
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pace of growth Rothschild would have to relocate and establish larger premises away 
from the City. The post-war diversification into areas of production away from the 
main core of the firm’s business, gold and silver refining, increased the overall size 
of the operation, which in turn increased the management workload and commitment 
to operate a business of this nature. The rolling mill, copper and wire departments 
were snapped up when offered for sale. Rather than entrepreneurial failure I would 
suggest that the sale of the venture was a matter of choice. Had the operation 
relocated it would have been a major long-term shift for Rothschild. After all the 
Royal Mint Refinery was a side line for the merchant bank. It provided a function 
and had a place in the chain of business activities which Rothschild was engaged in. 
The main value to N M Rothschild & Sons of operating the Royal Mint Refinery was 
the access it provided to gold and the prestige it offered. 
 






Rothschild is one of those names that resonates through many chambers of history. 
As the world’s leading bankers in the nineteenth century their history is intertwined 
with that of most European countries and many further afield. Through their many 
and multinational enterprises they continue to attract much attention from historians 
straddling a wealth of disciplines and approaches. Early in the nineteenth century 
Rothschild’s relationship to gold was secured through its ability to supply 
consignments of bullion to governments at short notice and in large quantities. 
Rothschild relationship to gold has deepened over the last 200 years. Through a 
succession of investments and expansion in relations with overseas mining 
enterprises Rothschild maximised its command over precious metals. Among their 
enterprises was that of the Royal Mint Refinery, which treated much of the bullion 
sent to the London market from around the world. 
 
This thesis is the first in-depth examination of the Royal Mint Refinery. In the mid-
nineteenth century Rothschild saw great opportunity in operating a refinery in 
London, as world gold production increased tenfold. In 1848 Alphonse de 
Rothschild (1827-1905), on a trip to New York wrote back to the Paris house that 
‘there is much sensation as to the gold mines in California. It seems one only has to 
go down and pick it up.’774 From the Cape in 1888 he wrote to his cousins in London 
of: 
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the amazing stories of the riches in abundance of mining in the Cape... to 
listen to some of them this country has got treasures within reach as real and 
comparable with those of Aladin’s grotto. The gold arriving in Europe should 
greatly please the Bank of England.775  
Carl Mayer had no hesitation in promoting the Cape to the London house. In his 
opinion ‘these fields have an enormous future before them’ and ‘the country together 
will for the next 10 or 20 years offer greater scope for European capital than South 
America and similar countries.’776 For the first fifty years of the operation, there was 
little competition and it appeared to be a successful prestigious enterprise.  
 
The study showed that as the twentieth century began, Rothschild had invested 
significantly in the Royal Mint Refinery, introducing new refining techniques and 
upgrading equipment and had confidence in its future.777 In 1905 Charles Rothschild 
wrote ‘my refinery is forging along nicely.’778 Later in the year he wrote that ‘I am 
glad to say that I really think I have improved our bullion business both as regards 
process and the volume of the stuff treated.’779 He considered the gold bars produced 
in London as ‘works of art’.780 The position of the London refining industry was 
reinforced through the unrivalled position London held as the world’s most 
important gold market. Rothschild now had some competition in Johnson Matthey’s 
refining operations,781 but the two companies co-operated with each other through a 
series of price fixing agreements, together with the general increased levels in gold 
production, eradicated the remaining competition.  
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     This excellent position slowly evaporated during the first half of the twentieth 
century and the continued viability of the Royal Mint Refinery was frequently 
questioned by Rothschild partners. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the challenges faced by 
the Royal Mint Refinery in the face of the growing autonomy of both the 
Government and gold producers of South Africa during the interwar period. 
Research demonstrated the approach taken by Rothschild following the 
establishment of the new Rand Refinery at Pretoria, which heralded a critical phase 
in the history of the Refinery. Not only was the Rothschild refinery exposed to 
overseas competition it also had to contend with the force of the Bank of England as 
it set up in direct opposition to Rothschild and Johnson Matthey as it attempted to 
forge greater links to South African gold. This attempt failed and raw gold sent to 
London for treatment significantly reduced. However, Rothschild maintained its 
connection to gold sent to London through its appointment as agent for both the gold 
producers of South Africa and the Bank of England and its position as chair of the 
daily Gold Fixing established in 1919 to sell gold in the London market. This thesis 
shows how the Refinery survived the attack and was able to diversify into the 
treatment of silver until it could return to its primary task of treating gold. During 
this period Johnson Matthey was the real winner for although it mothballed its gold 
treatment plant, it took advantage of the quiet market and advanced its own treatment 
capability for precious metals and introduced a range of new services. In addition it 
revamped and streamlined its operation investing in new premises and equipment 
and forged alliances with treatment facilities overseas. The investment catapulted the 
firm into a different league from that of the Royal Mint Refinery. 
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     Whilst progress at the Rothschild refinery did not keep pace with Johnson 
Matthey neither did it stand still. During the 1920s and 1930s regular investments 
and upgrades to facilities were implemented. This demonstrates the confidence 
Rothschild had in the future of the Refinery. This thesis suggests that rather than a 
lack of entrepreneurial spirit, the periods of downturn at the Royal Mint Refinery 
were due to external forces beyond the control of the firm: the decline in Britain’s 
relationship to Empire gold; in particular broken ties with the London market, which 
allowed gold to be sent to markets that offered the highest price. From 1929, 
following the series of international financial crises and the widespread abandonment 
of the gold standard from 1931, gold business returned to London, deemed a safe 
haven. The Royal Mint Refinery benefited from the upswing and profits escalated to 
an all time high. 
 
     Chapter 5 looked at the effects of the ‘gold rush’ of 1932. The return of gold to 
London secured the future of the Rothschild Refinery for the remainder of the 
decade. Much of the profits generated from treating the torrent of scrap gold were 
reinvested, a further sign that Rothschild was confident about the future and wished 
to continue their association with gold. The operation was modernised, structural 
alterations made and new rolling mill equipment introduced. Although the primary 
function of the operation continued to be bullion treatment, which took precedence 
over all other work, the rolling mills increased future prospects. Rothschild was keen 
to celebrate its connection to gold through its operation and openly courted publicity 
through the media.782 
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     Whilst change was ongoing the real catalyst came with the outbreak of war in 
1939 and business at the Refinery was transformed as new lines were added. Gold 
and silver treatment reduced to a trickle as markets closed and movement restrictions 
implemented by governments. Rothschild carved a niche for the Refinery, rolling 
metals under government contract and producing munitions. The firm secured 
financial assistance to establish a ‘shadow’ factory at Tring. Remarkably, despite 
wartime restrictions, in 1941 the factory at Tring was equipped and a workforce 
engaged. As highlighted in chapter 6 the workforce in London experienced a 
different war to that of Tring. Staff in London had to contend with aerial attacks and 
disruption to services. However, both workforces made significant contributions to 
the war effort. Research into the period identified a shift in the Rothschild style of 
management; in particular the appointment of a specialist manager to oversee the 
Tring operation. In addition much of the government wartime administrative 
practices were adopted by Rothschild and new reporting procedures and monitoring 
processes enhanced record management. The growth had a positive effect on future 
accounting practices at the Refinery and Tring. As peace returned in 1945 and 
government contracts faded these new systems enabled the firm to select target 
growth sectors. 
 
     During the period of transition from war to peace the Refinery was prevented 
from returning to its primary function of treating bullion as the industry was affected 
by government restrictions, as well as the continued closure of the London gold 
market. Chapter 7 revealed much about the post-war reconstruction strategy of 
Rothschild that developed in terms of alliances formed with suppliers and buyers. 
Professional assistance was called upon as a firm of business specialists were 
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consulted to identify target markets that offered maximum appeal for the range of 
products that machinery could be converted to manufacture. As demonstrated in 
chapter 8 the period of transition was comparatively smooth as Rothschild continued 
to build its order books and attempted to take control of various market sectors. Once 
the London gold market reopened it assumed its place as chair of the gold fix and 
sought to secure a share in emerging gold production from new operations in Africa. 
In the absence of local refineries, gold was still sent to London for treatment. In 
addition Rothschild turned to the United States in an attempt to capture a greater 
share of the growing cosmetic market for its operation at Tring. Whilst overall the 
size of order books at both locations increased, profitability did not keep pace and 
carried the risk of serious losses, which if continued could have eventually lead to 
their closure. Rothschild was faced with the constant need for rigorous control of 
wages and overheads, which were systematic problems throughout British industry. 
Although action could be taken to moderate domestic competition the operation was 
left exposed to international conditions that could not be overridden and eventually 
this sealed the fate of the Royal Mint Refinery and factory at Tring. 
 
This thesis also examines the role of gold in an economic system of exchange. Until 
the mid 1970s gold was either directly or indirectly a form of money. Under the 
nineteenth century gold standard, the inter-war standard, and later under the Bretton 
Woods agreement, gold was at the centre of the international financial system. 
Throughout much of the period London housed the world’s most important gold 
market and received flows of gold from across the world. United behind the Bank of 
England, members of the London gold market maintained a monopoly over Empire 
gold for over a century. As Lisle-Williams suggests ‘kinship and friendship bound 
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the group, but the interests which prompted co-operation in the first place remained 
the foundation of the group’s power’.783 As major gold markets developed and 
changed the dominance of London the group stood together to ensure that the 
importance of the City as a financial centre was not eclipsed. Whilst Rothschild 
severed its links to the physical handling of gold when it sold the Refinery, it 
continued to maintain control of the metal through its position as chair of the Gold 
Fixing. 
 
     In addition to factual knowledge about the business this thesis contributes to 
existing theories of the business strategies engaged by Rothschild to control markets. 
Research into the Royal Mint Refinery confirms the findings of Lopez-Morell and 
O’Kean, in their own research into Rothschild strategies, that Rothschild aimed to 
create oligopolies; for example mining, buying and selling raw material. They 
suggest that ‘reason told [Rothschild] such commodities could only get scarcer and 
more valuable with use and technological advance.’784 Although the structure of the 
Rothschild business changed the business strategies engaged continued to be 
repeated. Lopez-Morell and O’Kean identified that to successfully employ their 
strategy it was necessary for Rothschild to take control of the administrative 
practices for the target sector. This thesis demonstrates that through its access to 
gold, via its connection to the Royal Mint Refinery, Rothschild gained 
unprecedented opportunities for financial invention and manipulation.785 
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     However, this thesis also casts a shadow on the mythical reputation surrounding 
Rothschild of ‘ruling over the financial world’. Whilst Rothschild did gain 
considerable advantages through its myriad of family and business connections, it 
could only ever achieve control to a certain point. Rothschild was vulnerable for it 
was left to a higher authority to allow and ratify the position. An area where 
Rothschild succeeded in gaining and maintaining its control was as the chair of the 
Gold Fixing, which with support from the Bank of England it held from 1919 to 
2004. However, there are occasions when Rothschild failed to secure the necessary 
control. As shown in this thesis Rothschild were unable secure a monopoly for 
treating Russian gold.786 Others have also highlighted their failure elsewhere. For 
example John Lang observed that Rothschild in 1892 failed to influence Krugers 
Government to take ‘proper measures of financial control.’787 Rothschild’s advice 
was rejected and the bank was ‘promptly told, in reasonably diplomatic terms, to 
mind its own business.’788 
 
     David Landes reminded us that in all business ‘luck played a role’.789 He 
suggested that ‘luck is not random’ but that ‘some people are better prepared than 
others to spot and seize happy chance.’790 He believed that Rothschild did better than 
its competitors because it charged less and worked faster.791 Certainly this approach 
was found at the Refinery. But this had become a mantra of Rothschild passed down 
through generations of the family. In 1813 it was James who suggested ‘a wealthy 
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business house must share out its capital and not put all its eggs in one basket’,792 
while in 1831 Salomon declared ‘let us be satisfied with a little less, dear brothers, if 
we can thereby remain in the saddle.’793 This thesis provides an insight into the 
managerial organisation of N M Rothschild & Sons. The status of a family member 
involved in the bank was determined by seniority, rather than on a particular skill set. 
Each member gained knowledge and competence working at the bank. Some family 
members resisted being incorporated into the family firm, as we saw with Victor, 
although he did return to the bank much later. Rose and Jones made particular 
reference to Britain’s system of proprietary capitalism with its ‘vertical specialised 
and horizontally fragmented’ system which they suggest worked ‘brilliantly’ and 
enabled Britain to secure certain advantages.794 Certainly the unbroken involvement 
of Rothschild family members at the bank played a critical role in maintaining 
stability. Roy Church, in research into family firms, suggests that continuity of 
‘ownership and successive generations stimulated rather than prevented innovation 
and growth.’795 The involvement of members of the Rothschild family over two 
centuries also helped secure a reputation for trust – essential to doing business in 
gold. Anthony’s leadership of the bank, following his retirement after serving the 
bank for nearly four decades, passed to Edmund and the reputation continued. The 
reinvigoration of the merchant bank at the start of the 1960s and the expansion in the 
partnership base, which included for the first time a number of non-family members, 
did not affect their reputation. In 1965 a report in the Sunday Times declared that: 
Rothschild is still probably the most important bullion dealer in the country.  
Though not all-powerful in the gold market as it was in the last century, it 
remains the official gold broker to the Bank of England, it has its own private 
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refinery, the Royal Mint Refinery, and the daily ritual of fixing the price of 
gold takes place in New Court... It is complementary to its gold business that 
Rothschild’s has built up such a strong position in foreign exchange dealing.  
Business at the Refinery and Tring had strayed a long way from the primary business 
of treating gold. As the focus of the merchant bank shifted there was no place for 
industrial ventures and both the Royal Mint Refinery and factory at Tring were 
disposed of.  
 
This thesis also contributes to the wider understanding of the current renaissance for 
gold and the increased price. 796 In the twenty-first century N M Rothschild & Sons 
actively seeks to promote its longstanding association with gold through its 
connection to the Royal Mint Refinery. Rothschild marked the bicentenary of the 
Bank of England by presenting a gold bar produced at the Rothschild Refinery to, 
which continues to be displayed in the Bank’s museum.797 In 2000 a troy ounce of 
gold cost just $280, but in the last decade this has more than quadrupled. Similar 
characteristics to the ‘gold rush’ of 1932 have been displayed and adverts offering 
‘cash for gold’ has lead to a period of dishoarding. Gold demand keeps rising as fear 
factors emerge, and shows little sign of softening. N M Rothschild & Sons continues 
to actively promote its heritage and connection to gold gone are the days of the 
merchant bank; Rothschild today promotes itself as an investment bank or advisor. 
Rupert Howard, head of UK portfolio management with Rothschild Private Banking, 
regards gold’s recent performance in nominal terms ‘as something of a quirk.’798 He 
argues that ‘gold has little industrial use apart from its jewellery making and 
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dentistry, offers no yield and is exceedingly difficult to value.’799 In spite of this N M 
Rothschild & Sons have not broken their link to gold and continue to view 
investment in the metal as an effective hedge against further turmoil in financial 
markets. Gold is a rebounding commodity and demand remains robust.  
 
    The decision to sell the Royal Mint Refinery in the 1960s was not taken lightly. 
Rothschild had witnessed great changes in the gold market and much thought went 
into the disposal of the Refinery. The time was right to sell; it was not merely that 
they had lost interest in gold. Rather all available information at the time pointed to 
closure; the decreasing volume of gold sent to London for treatment, increased 
operating costs, rising competition between international markets, together with the 
relatively stable price of an ounce of gold at $35 for over four decades. Rothschild’s 
initial commitment to operating the Refinery was part of their interest in gold an 
interest it maintained through it chair of the London Gold Fixing. 
 
 








ROTHSCHILD: PARTNERS in the LONDON HOUSE(1836-1963) 
Date   Add/delete   Partners 
1836   +Lionel 
   +Anthony 
   +Nathaniel * 
   -Nathan   Lionel, Anthony, Nathaniel 
 
?1839   +Mayer   Lionel, Anthony, Nathaniel,  
 
1870   -Nathaniel   Lionel, Anthony, Mayer 
 
1874   -Mayer   
   +Natty    Lionel, Anthony, Natty 
   +Alfred 
   +Leo 
1876   -Anthony   Lionel, Natty, Alfred, Leo 
 
1879   -Lionel   Natty, Alfred, Leo 
 
1915   -Natty    Alfred, Leo, Charles, Lionel 
 
?   +Charles 
   +Lionel 
 
1917   -Leo     
   +Anthony   Alfred, Charles, Lionel 
 
1918   -Alfred   Charles, Lionel, Anthony 
 
1923   -Charles   Lionel, Anthony 
 
1942   -Lionel   Anthony 
 
1947   +Edmund   Anthony, Edmund 
 
1956   +Leopold   Anthony, Edmund, Leopold 
 
1959   +Evelyn   Anthony, Edmund, Leopold 
 
1961   -Anthony   Edmund, Leopold, Evelyn 
 
1963   +Jacob    Edmund, Leopold, Evelyn 
 





Extract from RFamFD/3 
 
The lamented death of Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild on the 3rd day of June 
instant having rendered it necessary that the position of his three sons Sir Nathaniel 
Mayer de Rothschild, Alfred Charles de Rothschild and Leopold de Rothschild in 
reference to the Association should be defined pending the preparation of a definite 
contract.  It is agreed between the undersigned as follows namely that as from the 
3rd day of June instant the above named Sir Nathaniel Mayer de Rothschild, Alfred 
Charles de Rothschild and Leopold de Rothschild shall be and are hereby admitted 
into the Association in respect of the share therein which on the day of the death of 
Baron Lionel Nathan de Rothschild was attributable to him and his sons and that the 
above named Sir Nathaniel Mayer de Rothschild, Alfred Charles de Rothschild and 
Leopold de Rothschild shall have the same rights and powers in respect of the 
London House as were enjoyed and exercised by the late Baron Lionel Nathan de 
Rothschild and that a definite contract shall be entered into with all proper dispatch 
but in no case later than the 31st day of December 1879.  Dated this 10th day of June 
1879 
 
[Signed by Alphonse, Gustave, Edmond, James, Anthony, Mayer Carl, Willy Carl, 
Salbert]800 
  
                                                









MANAGERS: ROYAL MINT REFINERY 
(1852 – 1967) 
 
1).  POISAT :  Installation of plant, from 1852-54 
2). BERTRAND:  from 1854 to ? 
3). ARNOULD (brother-in-law of BERTRAND): dates unknown 
4). JAQUES ARNOULD (son of the above): ? to 1901 
5). DUDOIT :  from 1901 to 1912 
6). G BUESS:  from 1912 to 1937 
7). S SMITH:  from 1937 to 1938 
8). W H WILLIAMS:  from 1938 to 1952 





Appendix 3.   
Gold Weights 
 
Bar Specifications  
• Established in 1934 the Good Delivery List contains the names of refiners 
and a description of their bars that are acceptable to the vaults operating in 
the London bullion market. Prior to 1934 little is known about the 
specification that applied to gold good deliver bars. The requirements 
required for a Good Delivery bar were that it should be within one of the 
allowed fineness ranges, which at the time included 899-901, 915-917, and 
995 and above, and it should bear the stamp of one of the 20 listed melters 
and assayers. In 1954 list specifications were updated and each bar required 
an unique serial number to be shown. In addition only fine bars of 995+ and a 
maximum fineness of 999.9 . From 1993 new guidelines relating to the 
quality of each bar were set down. A bar needed to be of ‘good appearance, 
free from surface cavities or other irregularities, layering and excessive 
shrinkage, and must be easy to handle and convenient to stack’.801  
Refined Gold bars 
The form that almost all gold bullion is traded come in a wide range of 
shapes and sizes. The main bars are:  
a troy ounce or 31.1035 grammes 
a gram or 0.03215 troy ounces 
a tael bar or 37.5 grammes 
a standard bar of 400 troy ounces or 12.44 kilo grammes 
a kilo bar of 1,000 grammes or 32.15 troy ounces 
a tola bar of 111 grammes or 3.57 troy ounces 
 
The standard 400 ounce bar is .995 fine, while smaller bars may be up to .999 
fine. Small bars have a higher premium than the larger bars both because the 




The troy system is used to weigh precious metals and gems and is named 
after Troyes, France where it originated. The following table illustrates the 
troy system:803 
 
 1 troy pound = 12 ounces, 240 pennyweight, 5760 grains 
 1 troy weight = 20 pennyweight, 480 grains 
 1 pennyweight = 24 grains, 0.005 ounces 
 1 grain  = 0.042 pennyweight, 0.002285 ounces. 
 
 
                                                
801 Source: Green ‘The London Gold Good Delivery Gold List, 1750-2010’, pp.39-43. 
802 Source: Weston, Gold Award Survey, p.45. 
















































Source: compiled using BEA, C52/11 & Samuel Montagu Annual Bullion Review’s 1953-1968; 









The Bank of England Archive (BEA) 
The Goldsmiths’ Company, Collection & Library 
London School of Economics Library 
Museum of London Docklands 
The National Archives, Kew (TNA) 
The Rothschild Archive (RAL) 
The Royal Mint Museum, Llantrisant 




Bank of International Settlement, Annual Report 
The Economist  
Financial Times 
The Guardian 
Mocotta & Goldsmid, Annual Circular 
Samuel Montagu & Co. Ltd., Annual Bullion Review 
Sharps Pixely, Annual Letter 
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